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Abstract
Identifying human suffering as a socio-political phenomenon challenging the
well-being and development of individuals, this work argues that International Relations
requires a re-evaluation of its political structures in light of the ends articulated within the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its associated International Human Rights
Regime. Noting the problem of being, the particular problem of modern cognitive
epistemologies this work seeks to ground an alternative philosophical conception of the
individual framed within an account of natural law morality. Distinguishing itself from
the epistemology of the received view of Modernity, the morality of natural law frames
an alternative account of agency, agents, and the community.
In its pre-modern form, natural law accounts for both the theoretical and practical
reasoning capacities of the agent noting the ontological equality of every individual
similar to modern cosmopolitan assumptions. It distinguishes itself from these accounts
noting the relativity, and not universal ends of moral deliberations reflected in the
tradition of casuistry. Articulating a moral taxonomy reflecting the ends of ‘the good’
this methodology is at odds with the stability of static political structures. Consequently,
the natural law community is able to sustain an account of political pluralism, developing
the unique qualities and characteristics distinguishing each and every agent. The
plurality of life paths, alongside the equality of being, is reflected in the common good,
the institutional representation of the personal relationships sustaining and furthering the
development of morality mirroring the well-being and development of the moral agent.
Articulating the art of politics, the cumulative appraisal of these ideas reveals an
objective account of being political. Endorsing ‘being human in common’, it further
institutionalizes the relationships of being reflected in the synthesis of philia and agape
relations accounting for a personal account of politics. Noting the influential nature of
coordinated political action, reflected in an ethic of love, this objective interpretation
synthesizes local knowledge and customs alongside the universality of ‘the good’
addressing the particular developmental needs of suffering agents. Culminating in an
account of the politics of potential, a realistic appraisal of the ends of this account of
being political is mindful that political change, both solitary and in common, reflects the
equal capacity of the agent to do both good and evil. Consequently, the hope of the
politics of potential distinguishes itself from modern interpretations of politics equally
aware of both the positive and negative attributes of contemporary human nature
affecting those agents endeavoring to embark on the task of international institutional
design.
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Introduction
Loving Care?
International Relations & the Problem of Human Suffering
Since both sympathy and justice depend to a large degree upon the perception of need,
which makes sympathy flow, and upon the understanding of competing interests, which
must be resolved, it is obvious that human communities have greater difficulty than
individuals in achieving ethical relationships. While rapid means of communication have
increased the breadth of knowledge about world affairs among citizens of various
nations, and the general advance of education has ostensibly promoted the capacity to
think rationally and justly upon the inevitable conflicts of interest between nations, there
is nevertheless little hope of arriving at a perceptible increase of international morality
through the growth of intelligence and the perfection of means of communication.
Reinhold Niebuhr,
Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics
The inspiration for this work is rooted in the Rwandan genocide one hundred days
in which over a million individuals were brutally murdered, five hundred and thirty five
thousand women were subject to a vicious campaign of rape, and over two hundred
million children were left orphaned.1 Coalescing around the notion of obligation state,
institutional and individual alike this work wonders, how in the face of such human
suffering a myriad of international actors and agents stood idly by, aware of the unfolding
events, as silent witnesses to yet another genocide. It is a tragedy that is brought to mind
by Romeo Dallaire, Lieutenant-General of the Canadian Army and Force Commander for
the United Nations in Rwanda, when, in his memoirs, he recalls a conversation between
himself and a group of United Nations officials. “Engraved in my brains is the judgment
1 For a particularly detailed and in-depth account of the atrocities see Philip Gourevitch, We wish to inform
you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: stories from Rwanda (London: Picador, 2000) and,
Scott Peterson, Me against my brother: at war in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda: a journalist reports from
the battle fields of Africa (London: Routledge, 2000).
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of a small group of bureaucrats who came to ‘assess’ the situation in the first weeks of
the genocide,” he writes. “We will recommend to our governments not to intervene as
the risks are too high, and all that is here are humans.”2 Reflecting on events that have
ruined the lives of many, Romeo Dallaire underscores the tragedy of great power politics
and begs the question of how? In the face of gross human suffering how is it that
individual human lives balance precariously in a debate of political obligation and
responsible agency? Moreover, it begs the question, is there an alternative account of
politics capable of challenging the problem of human suffering? This work embarks on
the task of institutional design and seeks to provide an account of political agency that
places human well-being and development at the centre of the discipline. The over-
arching hope of this work is to facilitate a conversation, rooted in human action,
challenging the boundaries of ‘inside and outside’ of ‘us and them’ contributing to a
perverse sense of otherness in international affairs.
The Rwandan Genocide is one example of a central human and socio-political
phenomenon; human suffering. “Suffering,” according to Cynthia Helpern, “is capable
of being understood, and necessarily so, as a political question, that is one that opens up a
public moral space for decision-making and that demands a public response through the
exercise of power.”3 William E. Connolly writes that to suffer, “is to bear, endure or
undergo, to submit to something injurious, to become dis-organized. Suffering subsists
on the underside of agency, mastery, wholeness, joy and comfort. It is,” he concludes,
2 Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Vintage
Canada, 2004).
3 Cynthia Helpern, Suffering, Politics, and Power, a genealogy in modern political theory (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2002), 2.
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“ubiquitous.”4 Anthropologist Paul Farmer notes the inability to define suffering
highlighting biographical images with which to contextualize the experience of suffering.
“The texture of ‘dire’ affliction is perhaps best felt in the gritty details of biography, and I
introduce the stories of Acephie Joseph and Chouchou Louis. The stories of Acephie and
Chouchou are anything but ‘anecdotal’,” he writes. “For the epidemiologist as well as
the political analyst, they suffered and died in exemplary fashion. Millions of people
living in similar circumstances can expect to meet similar fates. What these vices, past
and present, share is the experience of occupying the bottom rung of the social ladder in
inegalitarian societies.”5 Finally, suffering is related to language, or the lack thereof, by
David B. Morris noting that suffering is usually a silent process. “Suffering is voiceless
in the metaphorical sense that silence becomes a sign of something ultimately
unknowable. It implies an experience not just disturbing or repugnant but inaccessible to
understanding,” he writes. “In this sense, suffering encompasses an irreducible nonverbal
dimension that we cannot know-not at least in any normal mode of knowing-because it
happens in a realm beyond language.”6 While all these definitions remain different in
approach and description they demonstrate that suffering is part of the human experience.
Suffering is intrinsically linked to the way in which we understand ourselves as
human beings. With knowledge comes understanding of the self and community. For
this reason one can locate suffering in the relationship of structure and agency informing
the practice of politics. “What we can do is the primal question that arises from the
4 William E. Connolly, “Suffering, justice, and the politics of becoming” Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry
20, no. 3 (September 1996): 251 & 252.
5 Paul Farmer, “On suffering and structural violence: a view from below. (how poverty influences
suffering)” Daedalus 125, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 263 & 264.
6 David B. Morris, “About Suffering: Voice, Genre, and Moral Community” in Social Suffering, ed. Arthur
Kleinman, 27 (Berkley: University of California Press, 1997).
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experience of suffering, either in ourselves or in relation to what we see at a distance.
Politics sits squarely in the middle of that void between the active and passive, patient
and agent, suffer and deliverer,” writes Halpern. “Politics and political theory are
constituted and reconstituted around the problematics of agency as these have changed
over time.”7 Attempts to mitigate the grosser forms of human suffering represent a social
agenda informed by a series of beliefs rooted in the capacity and capability of agents and
the values of society. Contemporary understandings of the agent situated within a
political community are related to a particular understanding of politics professing the
universal ideal of human moral progress. The contemporary response to the problem of
human suffering, within International Relations, is articulated within the cosmopolitan
tradition, investigating the idea of harm and conventions which seek to protect
individuals from it, both domestically and globally.
Cosmopolitanism posits that individuals are not only members of their domestic
state but that they are simultaneously members of a global community. The international
nature of this relationship flies in the face of sovereignty, and in particular, the norm of
non-intervention, articulating that individuals are duty bound to care not only for the near
and dear, but also for the distant individual. As an ideal type, cosmopolitanism flies in
the face of the parochial problem of distance and ultimately, seeks to transcend the
bounded nature of international affairs. Identifying three overarching themes in the
cosmopolitan tradition, Patrick Hayden shows through an examination of three
cosmopolitan ‘moments’ the centrality of the individual, understood as equal beings,
alongside a universal understanding of morality engendering a universal interest in the
7 Cynthia Helpern, op. cit., 10.
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well-being and development of individuals as members of a global community.8
“‘Cosmopolitanism’ holds that foreign policy is constrained by moral considerations that
transcend the interests of particularly communities and even international law,” writes
Terry Nardin. “It argues that the division of humanity into territorial states is in fact
morally arbitrary, and that international politics as traditionally understood must yield to
a transnational politics focused on the interests or rights of individuals.”9 Proponents of
cosmopolitanism furthermore, articulate the modern idea of human progress, evident
within the extension of morality beyond the state as demonstrated by The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Geneva Conventions, and even
humanitarian intervention.10 These international rules, norms and the practices they
sustain represent a broader call to prevent harm at the global level. These ideas are
encapsulated in the works of Thomas Pogge and Andrew Linklater, who emphasize, in
the first instance, the negative duties of harm, yet remain open to the possibilities of
positive duties to actively engage in harm prevention. On the other hand, Terry Nardin
articulates a duty to protect focusing on the positive duty to actively challenge the
problem of human suffering.
Thomas Pogge critiques contemporary attempts at international institutional
designed concerned as he is with the global problem of poverty and its harmful
consequences on the global population. The structuring of international affairs harms
individuals, upholding unjust rules and institutions which benefit the powerful states of
8 Patrick Hayden, Cosmopolitan Global Politics (England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), 11.
9 Terry Nardin, “International political theory and the question of justice” International Affairs 82, no. 3
92006): 450.
10 Andrew Linklater, “The problem of harm in world politics: implications for the sociology of states-
systems” International Studies 31 (2005): 141-154.
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the system. On his interpretation the structure of contemporary international affairs
sustains the problem of human suffering, first, by maintaining the current world
structures, and second, by continually allowing states to participate and benefit from
those unjust structures.11 “My focus is then on the present situation, on the radical
inequality between the bottom half of humankind, suffering severe poverty, and those in
the top seventh, whose per capita share of the global product is 180 times greater than
theirs (at market exchange rates),” he writes. “This radical inequality and the continuous
misery and death toll it engenders are foreseeably reproduced under the present global
institutional order as we have shape it. And most of it could be avoided, I hold, if this
global order had been, or were to be, designed differently.”12 On this account, agents are
duty bound to alter traditional international structures of international affairs in line with
a minimal conception of justice which he reveals, is articulated in the discourses of
international human rights. While Pogge fails to articulate in any great detail his
interpretation of justice he develops a Global Resources Dividend (GRD). “The GRD
proposal envisions that neither states nor their governments shall have full libertarian
property rights over the natural resources in their territory but, instead, can be required to
share a small part of the value of any resources they decide to use or sell.”13 This
proposal, Pogge contends, addresses the unjust nature of international political structures
11 Thomas W. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).
12 Thomas Pogge, “Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties” Ethics & International Affairs 19,
no. 1 (2005): 55.
13 Thomas Pogge, “A Global Resources Devidend” in Ethics of Consumption: The Good Life, Justice, and
Global Stewardship eds. David A. Crocker & Toby Linden, 511 (New York: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc., 1988).
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and the need for individuals to adequately care for others living in situations of radical
inequality.14
In a similar fashion, Andrew Linklater draws on the cosmopolitan tradition
seeking to incorporate a variety of harm conventions into civil society. Articulating a
sociological state-system, drawing on the particular work of English School scholar
Hedley Bull, he demonstrates how morality and notions of harm are intimately related to
the structuring of political engagements. “What is most interesting from this point of
view is how far different international systems have thought harm to individuals a moral
problem for the world as a whole-a problem which all states, individual and collectively,
should labour to solve-and have developed what might be called cosmopolitan harm
conventions,” he writes. “These are moral conventions designed to protect individual
everywhere from unnecessary suffering, irrespective of their citizenship or nationality,
class, gender, race and other distinguishing characteristics.”15 Articulating a vision of
cosmopolitan communities, Linklater challenges the bounded nature of contemporary
international politics demonstrating how cosmopolitan harm conventions can alleviate the
tensions and priorities of human equality and moral favoritism. Agents, drawing on the
negative duty to ‘do no harm’ are simultaneously able to care for the local and the
distant.16 Linklater, on this account, challenges the classical interpretation of
international affairs reliant on international sovereignty and the imperfect duties it
articulates noting that international treaties, laws, and norms represent the progressive
14 Thomas Pogge, “Real World Justice” The Journal of Ethics 9 (2005): 37.
15 Andrew Linklater, “The problem of harm in world politics,” 320-321. This is a point also made in
“Citizenship, humanity and cosmopolitan harm conventions” International Political Science Review 22, no.
3 (2001): 261-267.
16 Andrew Linklater, “Cosmopolitan Political Communities in International Relations” International
Relations 16, no. 1 (2002): 135-150. A more elaborate investigation of Linklater’s political communities is
offered in Chapter Four.
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universal acceptance of harm conventions. It is however a pragmatic appraisal of
contemporary international affairs, for as Linklater concludes, the task remains to
convince international society to accept these harm conventions leaving to a later date the
legal or moral foundations of harm.
Harm on both of these interpretations, is intimately related to the equality,
universality, and progressive assumptions of the cosmopolitan discourses. From this
vantage point, discussions of cosmopolitan harm conventions proffer one of three
options, to remain steadfast in the current political structures contributing to the
increasing inequalities and injustices of international affairs. On this account harm
principles will falter, the international affairs will remain largely as it is. On the other
hand, the system of states, like its historical predecessors may in fact implode, leading to
violence, but ultimately, the opportunity to rebuild, from scratch, the structures guiding
international engagements typical of the collapse of world orders.17 A third option, and
that endorsed by both Linklater and Pogge is to move forward, challenge the injustice of
international affairs, developing the requisite space to engage in politics and in so doing,
generate structures supporting the equality of the cosmopolitan individual and the just
political community. The inherent assumption within this third option openly accepts the
inevitability of moral progress sustaining a clear understanding of justice which is
universal in its scope.18
17 For a detailed account of the break down and reconstruction of world order see Andrew Williams, Failed
Imagination? New World Orders of the Twentieth Century (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1988) where he describes the decay of one order and the emergence of another. It is an interesting
juxtaposition in light of the fact made by Robert Goodin, that it is a rare event when those engaged in
institutional design on a grand scale are offered a clean slate with which to proceed. See Robert E. Goodin,
“Institutions and Their Design” in The Theory of Institutional Design ed. Robert E. Goodin, 1-53.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
18 Andrew Linklater, “The evolving spheres of international justice” International Affairs 75, no. 3 (1999):
474-476. He distinguishes between seven different approaches to understanding justice; 1. Distributive
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As the appeal of cosmopolitanism broadens, questions concerning the universality
of justice feature prominently in the discourses of international affairs. “Justice
considerations have moved to the center of the discipline as questions about transnational
justice (justice between individuals within world society) have become as important as
international justice (justice between societies within the system of states),” writes
Linklater. “Few could have foreseen this dramatic change even fifteen years ago when
there were good reasons to suppose that superpower rivalry and bipolarity would survive
well into the foreseeable future.”19 It is interesting that Pogge’s understanding of justice
remains firmly embedded in the discourse of international justice per se, focused as he is
on the structure and institutions of international affairs. Bearing this in mind, Pogge’s
emphasis, in the first instance, on negative duties is not surprising given his awareness of
the powerful influence a classical approach to international affairs exerts on the practice
of contemporary international politics. While Pogge does not discount the existence and
potential for positive duties, he is more concerned with negative and intermediate duties
to avoid current and future harm, aware of the imperfect nature of obligation within
international affairs. On the other hand, Linklater concerns himself not only with
international justice per se, he is also aware of the potential for transnational justice in
and amongst individuals at the global level. Unlike Pogge, his notion of community is
one particular vehicle capable of challenging the bounded nature of international affairs
and in so doing, opening up the possibility of positive duties as well.
Justice; 2. Transnational harm; 3. Global Institutions & Democratic Deficits; 4. Diplomacy & the Global
Environment; 5. Immigration & Resettlement; 6. Inter-Cultural Justice; and, 7. Specieism. This does not
include creative justice, as discussed by Paul Tillich investigated in Chapter Five. This account of justice
proves important for both international and transnational justice incorporating practical reasonableness
alongside and ethic of love and just political structures all related to the ends of morality.
19 Andrew Linklater, “The evolving spheres of international justice” op. cit., 474.
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A classical influence on international affairs, in the opinion of Linklater and
Pogge necessitates a negative duties first approach. Terry Nardin, on the other hand,
offers an alternative account of agency and harm premised on the duty to protect.
Distinguishing humanitarian intervention from justice intervention, Nardin knits the
moral foundations of the just war tradition with the practicalities of distributive justice
examining the relationship of coercion and justice sustaining a particular account of
human dignity motivating agency; namely, a duty to protect.20 “It helps us to see that
intervention might be a duty because failing to intervene not only leaves innocent people
at the mercy of their tormentors but also leaves their tormentors free to act unjustly,” he
writes. “To do nothing in the face of violence is to permit that violence, and in so doing,
to fail to respect its victims as persons. I fail to respect your rights as a person not only
by attacking you but also by remaining indifferent while others attack you.”21 This
respect extends beyond the victim, to the perpetrators of violence. If an agent disregards
their harmful acts, they are disrespectful of the ends of agency and the manner in which
those ends are achieved, related as they are to the morality of the original agent.22
Couched in the framework of intervention, Nardin goes one step further then both
Linklater and Pogge offering an account of human agency, aware of violent and non-
violent harm which individuals, of their very nature, ought to be protected.
Consequently, Nardin shows how the duty to protect is in point of fact, a perfect duty,
20 An in-depth examination of the rhetoric of a duty to protect emerges from the rhetoric of The
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The responsibility to protect (Ottawa:
International Development Research Center, 2001).
21Terry Nardin, “International political theory and the question of justice” op. cit., 460.
22 An interesting point can be made at this particular juncture, which will become increasingly clear in
Chapter Five. In a similar fashion, Jean Bethke Elshtain notes the particular role for otherwise
uninvestigated agents in intervention, a point that will be elaborated on in Chapters Four and Five. See her
“International Justice as Equal Regard and the Use of Force” Ethics & International Affairs 17, no. 2
(2003): 63-75.
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when suitably accompanied by an account of justice.23 Yet, like Pogge and Linklater,
flowing throughout his ideas are the assumptions of human equality, universality, and
above all else, moral progress.
The cosmopolitan investigation of human suffering represents the dominant
discourse addressing the well-being and development of the global community. The
assumptions framing each response to harm, poverty and human suffering can all be
traced back to the Enlightenment and the Modernity Project. It is, as Stephen Toulmin
points out, that Modernity exerts a pre-eminent influence on the discipline of
International Relations and the practice of institutional design therein. Modernity, on this
account, is represented in the dominant assumptions of European supremacy and
hegemony, the centrality of a state-system premised on the idea of political sovereignty,
and the distinctly modern theoretical and technical understanding of political engagement
shaping the political landscape.24 In the same vein, O’Brien and Penna note that
Modernity is reflected in the development, application and circulation of knowledge of
the world reflecting the rationalism of Descartes, Galileo, and Hobbes.25 Modernity
represents, as Nicholas Onuf writes, “the story of how we denied the world any other
purpose than our own and purposely made ourselves over at the same time.”26 This story,
coalesces in what Stephen Toulmin labels the standard account or received view of
23 This idea has gone on to develop alternative ideas of intervention and the duties of states and institutions
within international affairs. Beyond the works of Terry Nardin, Michael Walzer and Richard B. Miller
articulate alternative modes of understanding intervention premised on the duty to protect. More will be
said about these approaches in the concluding chapter of this work.
24 Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1997), 13. This is not the only interpretation of modernity available to scholars, yet it remains the
one endorsed throughout this work. In order to justify this claim, the introduction of Chapter One examines
alternative interpretations, noting their shared assumptions and alternative ideas all the while demonstrating
the value of Toulmin’s interpretation for the ends of this work in particular.
25 Martin O’Brien & Sue Penna, Theorizing Welfare: Enlightenment and Modern Society (London: Sage,
1998), 14.
26 Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, The Republican Legacy in International Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 19.
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Modernity revealing to its agents a cognitive epistemology denying the idea that
individuals are part of a greater project, emphasizing technical knowledge premising
inter-human dialogue to the detriment of metaphysical ideas, assumptions and
conclusions. 27
The standard account of Modernity nurtured the idea of political liberty. Seeking
a measure of stability in lieu of domestic turmoil, Thomas Hobbes, building on the
rationalism of Descartes and Galileo, offered an interpretation of legitimate political
authority resulting from agreed upon contract of men. The original works of Hobbes, as
well as John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau are the subject of Chapter One. Suffice to
note at this point, that the works of these authors, delineating the acceptable and non-
acceptable spheres of human agency, for individuals and government alike, revolved
around a concept of liberty. Liberty, on this account, fostered an isolated existence for
the individual. Combined with the distinction of mind and body, the rhetoric of negative
liberty lead to the conclusion “that human beings, with their sealed off ‘minds’, are self-
sufficient, solitary agents whose interests are separate and often in conflict.”28 It is a
problem that is noted by Jung, who points out that this particular distinction isolates
individuals from on another. “By objectifying the body as well as the mind as substances
(res),” he writes, “the Cartesian plot is oblivious to the body as living subject and thus
renders impossible sociability-both interhuman conviviality and interspeciestistic
connaturality. Society as a multiple web of relationships is untenable without the lived
27 Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1997), 13.
28 Niamh Middleton, “Aquinas, the Enlightenment and Darwin” New Blackfriars 86, no. 1004 (July 2005):
438.
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boy as its root or anchor.”29 The isolated, but liberated, individual subject, set the stage
for a subjective account of politics, subtly influencing interpretations of political
communities, law, morality and justice.
Enlightenment philosophy espoused a particular conception of the individual as a
mover and a doer. This agent reflected the ideals of theoretical first principles and
championed the assumption of human progress. It is this agent which was capable of
overcoming the negative consequences of suffering. “Modern selves in modern societies
tend to understand themselves, as no ancient people could, as living in a man made
world, a world in which human knowledge and ingenuity has decisively altered and
established the conditions of all human and natural life,” write Halpern. “We are
responsible. Human beings are the agents of history, the rational actors accountable for
social and technological change.”30 Prior to the onset of the Enlightenment, suffering
was an accepted side-effect of the human condition; however, it will be demonstrated
how Modernity severed the relationship of nature and grace, altering the concept of
being, and the relationships agents share with political structures. Evident within the
writings of Thomas Aquinas and the Salamanca Theologians, individual agency was
limited to accepting individual hardship. Salvation from suffering was offered through a
twofold relationship in which nature and grace sustained the possibility of human
happiness, understood as an ongoing challenge, oriented around a particular reading of
the teleology of being.31 Modernity paved the way for alternative understandings of
29 Hyn Yol Jung, “Enlightement and the Question of the Other: A Postmodern Audition” Human Studies
25, no. 3 (September 2002): 299.
30 Cynthia Helpern, op. cit., 4.
31 This particular point will be elaborated on in greater detail in Chapters Two and Three. Suffice to note it
refers to the natural motion associated with the ontological assumptions of being within the natural law
tradition.
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agency and political communities reflecting the ability to overcome human suffering
rooted in rational technical knowledge.
Like the laws of physics, modern interpreters of international affairs inherently
believed that international political activity could be understood within the rules and laws
guiding its cognitive epistemology. “Scientific methodology,” writes Niamh Middleton,”
would reveal the laws of man’s nature and existence in the same way that such
procedures had demonstrated the movement of the planets was governed by gravity.”32
The received view of Modernity exerts its influence in the Classical interpretations of
International Relations.33 An examination of the works of Hugo Grotius, Samuel
Pufendorf, Christian von Wolff and Emmerich de Vatell reveal an historical period
ushering in a rational epistemology to the detriment of a simultaneous practical and
theoretical ontology dominating scholarly discourses. Reflecting on the moral and legal
power one state has to inflict harm, these authors, Andrew Linklater writes, provided and
account of ius genitum emphasizing not the metaphysics of pre-modern scholars, but the
cognitive epistemology of Modernity. 34 “Just as legislation is the criterion of law within
each state, so agreement between states is the criterion of international law. The age of
natural law,” he writes, “had come to an end.”35 The onset of positive law, subtly altered
the ideas of associated with the ius gentium articulating instead the rules and laws of
32 Niamh Middleton, op. cit., 447.
33 Andrew Linklater, “The problem of harm in world politics” op. cit., 326. It is at this point that he makes
the link between the English School, a classical interpretation of International Relations and the
relationship between law, morality and international society. For an interpretive look at the English both
historical and contemporary see Tim Dunne, Inventing international society: a history of the English
School (London: Macmillan, 1998). For a good overview of the Classical Account of International
Relations see Robert Jackson, The global covenant: human conduct in a world of states (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000).
34 See, for example, Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: a study of order in world politics (London:
Macmillan Press, 1995), 4-5.
35 Terry Nardin, “The Moral Basis of Humanitarian Intervention” Ethics & International Affairs 16, no. 2
(2002): 63.
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international interaction shaping international politics.36 The emerging idea of civil
society reflected these norms developing conventions, laws and norms in line with a
subjective account of being and politiccs.
The cognitive epistemology emerging out of the works of Immanual Kant further
reflected the changing assumptions of natural law. His publication of Perpetual Peace
further endorsed the cognitive epistemology of Modernity providing a pragmatic account
of morality. His categorical imperative and metaphysics of morals sustained an account
of morality associated with conformity to the law, highlighting rational empiricism over
reasonableness, denying a particular role for human emotion and passion, fostering civil
and not personal, interaction.37 On this account, cosmopolitanism embodies the
universality of rationalism and human equality proffering a particular understanding of
human dignity. Moreover, it shares the self-same assumptions of the current political
structures sustaining the inequality and injustice harming members of the global
population. Bearing this in mind, the challenge of cosmopolitans to extend the equality
of being outwith the bounded community and the vision of justice it sustains will remain
a difficult and fraught journey captured as it is by the universality of moral progress. On
36 The history of this transition and the ideas of these writers is well-documented by Richard Tuck, The
rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999).
37 An interesting paradox emerges out of civil society when the norms of sovereignty and human rights
interact with the phenomenon of human suffering, a point elaborated on in Chapters One and Five. Flying
in the face of bounded obligation and justice, images of individuals suffering instinctively calls for
responsible human action. Suffering, understood as a human experience, flies in the face of modernity’s
boundaries and the manner in which international affairs is conducted. Investigations into the nature of
sovereignty, international law, and civil society demonstrate how the structures of international politics also
contribute to the domestic suffering of the individual. International law, the primary means of
international organization provide a normative function sustaining civil society. On this account,
sovereignty supports the ends of international law developing the constitutive rules of international
engagement rooted in the primacy of the state itself. Distinguishing between empirical and juridical
statehood, Robert Jackson, illustrates how the desire for inclusion within civil society in and of itself
contributes to human suffering. Robert H. Jackson, “Quasi-states, dual regimes and neoclassical theory:
International Jurisprudence and the Third World” International Organization 41, no. 4 (Autumn 1987):
519-549.
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this account, perpetual peace is merely a chimera and the more likely outcome will be the
entrenchment of the status quo, in light of the particular ends of stability and Modernity;
however, a cosmopolitan approach is not the sole means of addressing this particular
phenomenon. Distinguishing itself from the ideas and criticisms of a cosmopolitan harm
conventions and a duty to protect, one can discern a pre-modern approach with which to
investigate the problems of human suffering; namely in the morality of natural law.
Natural law, as it is presented in the ensuing work, is at odds with the universality
of cosmopolitanism and its professed illustration of moral progress. It is in agreement,
however, with its inherent belief in the equality of all persons. Chapter Two will provide
the required definition and description of natural law, morality and justice. Suffice to
note at this particular juncture, a pre-modern account of natural law, based primarily on
the works of Aquinas and his descendents reveals an emphasis on a relative
understanding of situations and human experiences avoiding the problems of positive and
negative duties, themselves the product of Modernity. It offers a particular understanding
of justice that is simultaneously commutative and transnational neatly sidestepping the
problem of enforcement, engendering this distinction focusing instead on the obligations
of love motivating human action. An ethic of love, on this account, reflects the
motivations, deliberations and actions of the agent offering an alternative to the coercive
nature of laws and justice and the morality they represent. The morality of natural law
united individuals focusing on human non-instrumental relationships mediated through
an account of charity in order to develop an alternative interpretation of being political.
The relationships challenge the inequality and injustice of contemporary international
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affairs presenting instead a pre-modern response to human suffering which is agent
centric focusing, in this particular instance, on the individual as an agent of justice.
The ends of the ensuing thought experiment seeks not to draw comparisons
between the contemporary and pre-modern social and political systems. Nor does it seek
to examine and critically engage with the ends of Modernity itself. Aware of the variety
of interpretations offered, it supports the idea of a received view of Modernity,
furthermore endorsing the criticisms of Modernity offered by Stephen Toulmin. It sets
aside the issues of a Modernity Project, and its associated criticisms, facilitating a foray
into the practice of institutional design. In so doing it seeks to create the requisite space
to develop an alternative account of moral and political agency. Natural law agency
sustains an account of justice and morality in order to describe, examine and understand
the capacities of the agent proliferating interpersonal and transnational justice in light of
pre-existing structural inequalities. In other words, this work represents a search for an
alternative vision of being human challenging the cognitive epistemology orienting
contemporary moral philosophy and international relations. The morality of natural law
thus seeks to engage with the problem of being. The appeal of a pre-modern approach
rests on the fundamental equality of all beings, like that of cosmopolitanism, but
distinguishes itself, by its assumptions of relativity and human potential, evident in the
teleology of being itself. These two assumptions sustain alternative structures whereby
other forms of knowledge and moral reasoning can flourish. Emerging from this
theoretical investigation is vision of the political agent and community endorsing an
alternative understanding of morality and justice which is above all else, oriented around
the potential of human action.
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Acting, as it relates to morality and institutional design shapes the understating of
human suffering guiding this work. Defined as the inability to develop one’s innate
potential; it relates this phenomenon to the lack of experience, or experiences, which are
detrimental to the well-being and development of the individual. Suffering like agency,
shares an assumed capacity for individual action. As the ensuing pages will illustrate,
human experience is the primary source of human knowledge and it is human knowledge
that develops an agent’s conception of morality. Couched in the framework developed
first by Aquinas and sustained by the Scholastic tradition of natural law, this
interpretation of human suffering is derived from the morality of natural law sustaining
the relationship of theoretical and practical first principles. It is this relationship of
knowledge sustaining the actions and experiences of the individual contributing to his or
her development. Individuals, on this account, are comprised of seven basis goods; self-
integration, practical reasonableness, justice & friendship, religion & holiness, life,
knowledge of truth, and finally, work & play.38 The development of these basic human
goods provides each individual, with the requisite experiences to develop one’s
conscience and in so doing, to act. Consequently, agents interact with each other moving
towards the ultimate end of human happiness. This account of human suffering,
distinguishes itself from cosmopolitan notions of harm and the duty to protect offering a
moral maximum, instead of a moral minimum, of justice within the human experience.
Human potential is rooted in the capacities and capabilities of being human.
Above all else these capacities represent the ability to will the ends of happiness and to
capably act towards those ends. Individuals suffer when they are incapable of acting on
38 Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus: Christian Moral Principles, Vol. 1 (Chicago, United States:
Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), 124.
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the will’s desire to achieve the ultimate ends of happiness.39 “In summary then, Aquinas
holds that human beings always act for the sake of an ultimate end, which is happiness,”
writes Colleen McCluskey. “Although they are not able to will against happiness, they
are able to fail to will happiness because they are able not to think about happiness.”40
Suffering, on this account, manifests itself when a desire for happiness cannot be willed.
Moreover, an individual is harmed if he or she can will happiness but lacks the freedom,
autonomy, and goods to do so contributing to further injustices to the equality of being
characterizing his or her existence. It is the argument of this work that constituted as
theoretical subjects situated in an isolated political structure, agents cannot desire the
ends of happiness. Similar to the point made by Pogge, the structures of international
affairs are key agents inflicting harm on the human population. Similarly, as Linklater
points out, the bounded nature of political communities, and the related account of
justice, limits the ability of individuals to act autonomously and develop freely.
Suffering, on this account, originates at the site where willing cannot transform itself into
action, or willing, in and of itself is impossible. It further develops as the structures of
society inhibit individuals acting for happiness, reaching its pinnacle when individuals
are denied both the capacity to will happiness and the means to act on it. The universality
of Modernity’s assumptions, and the absolute steadfastedness with which they are
upheld, underscores this account of human suffering, structuring human agency in the
material existence of agents.
39 I am indebted to Steven Lee, Hobart and William Colleges who, when I presented this idea of human
suffering originally, pointed out that suffering conceptualized simply as the inability to reach one’s innate
potential, is an all inclusive category in which any individual could claim to have suffered.
40 Colleen McCluskey, “Happiness and Freedom in Aquinas’s Theory of Action” Medieval Philosophy and
Theology 9 (2000): 79.
Chapter One
International Relations, Modernity & the Idea of Westphalia:
The limitations of Stability Hierarchy & the Methodology of Rules
“As for the image of the state of nature, the consequences we draw from our reception of
the image come from our having suffered in numerous ways the experience of nature it
describes, our knowing or experiencing intuitively, bodily, what it would feel like,
perhaps did once feel like, and what necessities it would provoke in us. This is what it
means that the experience of order and that of chaos necessarily accompany each other,
we know simultaneously always.”
Cynthia Helpern,
Suffering, Politics, Power: A genealogy in modern political theory.
Introduction
International order combines actual events and theoretical ideas in order to
explain and understand the constitutive structures and actors of international affairs.1 To
that end, world order at the normative and empirical level enjoys a distinct history as well
as future trajectory requiring an understanding of the ideas and events shaping its
development. Contemporary scholars proffer a myriad of ideas about the nature of order
that fall into three general categories distinguishing between order and power, order and
liberty, and order and transcendence. On the one hand, order constitutes the development
of an international society.2 Liberal versions of order, on this account, note the problems
of anarchy and a role for states therein but offer recourse to insecurity through the use of
institutions and a doctrine of reciprocal domestic disinterest. For realists, the pre-eminent
1 It is a point noted by Raymond Aron that order, among other things is both empirical and normative, that
it relies not just on actions but also on the ideals and values that shape the community. Raymond Aron,
Paix et guerre entre les nations (Paris: Calman-Levy, 1961); translated as Peace and War: A Theory of
International Relations, translated by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (New York: Doubleday,
1966).
2 Andrew Williams, op. cit., 284.
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problem of international order is anarchy. Consequently, a realist account of world order
reflects the sum total of rules, laws and institutions that structure a system of states.3
Critical theorists, on the other hand, understand order as that which produces and
reinforces shared understandings in and among states at the international level.4
Skeptical of order, critical theory focuses on the relationship of structure and agency,
arguing that agents are capable of overcoming the anarchy problematic and fashioning a
truly universal community of individuals. Regardless of the definition adopted, order, at
the international level distinguishes between governance and government5 focusing on
power politics, institutional design, and the relationship between agents and structure,
highlighting above all else, the modern desire for stability.6 Moreover, each approach, in
its own unique way is linked to the development of the modern social contract tradition,
either endorsing or criticizing it’s sought after ends.7
It is a point well noted by scholars that International Relations is ordered around a
history which sought a scientific account of politics. Heirs to Modernity’s professed
belief in an overarching grand theory promoting stability through hierarchy, international
order sustains a belief in the rational capacities of the individual at the international level
3 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory. Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After
major Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 23.
4 Janice Bailly Mattern, Ordering International Politics, Identity, Crisis and Representational Force (New
York: Routledge, 2005), 30.
5 The distinction between governance and government refers in the first instance to the interaction and
action of political agents void of a legitimate governing authority, and in the second instance, political
agents guided by a legitimate authority. Within International Relations, world order refers to governance
due to its inability to discern a legitimate authority. On the other hand, government is reserved for the
domestic state of affairs and the authority that is created and affirmed by the citizens of the polity.
6 These general theories of order are ideal types and to quickly note them, they are realism, liberalism and
critical theory.
7 See, for example, the work of Fiona Robinson, Globalising care: ethics, feminist theory, and international
relations (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999); John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the world polity;
essays on international institutionalism (London: Routledge, 1998); and finally, Friedrich Kratochwil, “Of
Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System” World Politics
39, no. 1 (October 1986): 27-52. All of these authors, in different ways, note how International Relations
remains embedded within this tradition.
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of analysis.8 To that end, scholars studying world order work within a series of
boundaries divorcing the mind from the metaphysics of man. The dominant image of the
individual, a being in motion, embodies Modernity’s fascination with theoretical
knowledge providing scholars with an original position upon which to foist order. It is
Stephen Toulmin who best articulates the influential nature of modernity’s assumptions
on the epistemology and methodology sustaining this image. He demonstrates through a
synthesis of the social and political problems of the 16th and 17th century how a desire for
stability in society strengthened the ideal of rationalism evident in the works of Newton,
Descartes and Galileo. In the sphere of politics it was the works of Thomas Hobbes, he
shows, which extended the ideal of rationalism into domestic political theory.9 The
institutional designs of Thomas Hobbes, sustained the technical explanation of man and
society denying a particular role for practical knowledge.
Modernity is traditionally associated with a series of beliefs; namely the pursuit of
mathematical exactitude, intellectual certainty, and moral purity. Broadly speaking it
embodies a series of hopes culminating in the desire to find one overarching theory
explaining the natural and the social world and the individual’s status therein. According
to Stephen Toulmin, the works chiefly associated with modernity “committed the modern
world to thinking about nature in a new and ‘scientific’ way, and to use more ‘rational’
8 See for example the arguments of Tronto, Moral Boundaries: a political argument for an ethic of care
(London: Routledge, 1993).
9 Stephen Toulmin, “Cosmopolis” op. cit. This interpretation of modernity will feature prominently in the
following arguments of this work. This is not to discount the interpretations of other authors. In fact, in
what follows a brief appraisal of alternative interpretations of modernity will follow. Stephen Toulmin’s
account of modernity is the dominant one in this work for one specific reason; namely, his notion of an
ecology of institutions whereby the value of agency based on influence as opposed to traditional power,
reflects similar aims and intentions of a natural law account of agency with particular reference to human
suffering.
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methods to deal with the problems of human life and society.”10 In a similar fashion
Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer provide an interpretation of modernity. They
provide one interpretation of the enlightenment, reflecting on the assumptions and ends
associated with the philosophers of that age. “In advance, the Enlightenment recognizes
as being and occurrence only what can be apprehended in unity; its ideal is the system
from which all and everything follows,” they write. “Its rationalist and empiricist
versions do not part company on that point. Even though the individual schools may
interpret the axioms differently, the structure of scientific unity has always been the
same.”11 Similarly, Jurgen Habermas’s examination of ‘modern’ alongside modernity
and enlightenment philosophy is instructive. “With varying content, the term ‘modern’
again and again expresses the consciousness of an epoch that relates itself to the past of
antiquity, in order to view itself as the result of a transition from the old to the new”.12
Building on this idea, he like Adorno, Horkheimer and Toulmin notes the dominance of
rational knowledge defining what it is to be a human being. “Modernity revolts against
the normalizing functions of tradition; modernity lives on the experience of rebelling
against all that is normative. This revolt is one way to neutralize the stands of both
morality and utility,” he writes. “The aesthetic consciousness continuously stages a
dialectical play between secrecy and public scandal; it is addicted to a fascination with
that horror which accompanies the act of profaning, and yet it is always in flight from the
10 Stephen Toulmin, “Cosmpolis” op. cit., 9 & 10.
11 Theodor W. Adorno & Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (London: Blackwell Verso, 1997),
7. Adorno and Horkheimer go on to note that modernity is but another myth created by individuals and
society. Consequently, their interpretation is particularly critical and must be understood as such. In this
way it differs from the ideas of Toulmin, although in a similar fashion, it notes the predominance of
scientific rational thought.
12 Jurgen Habermas, “Modernity – An Incomplete Project” in Postmodern Culture ed. Hal Foster (London:
Pluto Press, 1985), 3.
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trivial results of profanation.”13 Habermas utilizes this idea of modernity in order to
further comment on the appropriate role of practical reasoning in contemporary societies.
On his account, practical reason reflects a Kantian, Aristotelian, or utilitarian approach to
ethics. For Habermas, however, the only means of reconciling the ends of practical
reason in order to achieve a unified sense of purpose is to locate practical reason in the
communication of individuals as potential agents as is evidenced in his interpretation of
communicative action.14
The influence of Modernity and the ensuing responses of enlightenment scholars
are evident in the contemporary discourses of International Relations. Modernity, it has
been demonstrated, culminated with the demise of rhetorical and logical conclusions to
moral dilemmas. It lead to the end of the casuistic tradition of moral reasoning, a disdain
for local knowledge and human experience, making way for the rise of rationality,
embodied in the idea of a social contract, a Leviathan, civil society, and the idea of a
general will.15 At the international level, these ideas culminated in the 1648 Treaty of
Westphalia. Supporting the primacy of the independent and sovereign state, defined in
13 Habermas, “Modernity – An Incomplete Project” op. cit. 5.
14 Jurgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans. Ciaran Cronin
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993). Communicative action has been appropriated by modern scholars who
articulate the idea of discourse ethics. The ideas of this work are similarly situated and can be interpreted
closely mirroring the aims of these ideas, in particular when discussions of ‘the international’ are compared
to the ideas and works of John Dryzek at the end of this chapter, and again when the ideas of community
articulated by Richard Shapcott are illustrated in Chapter Four. Yet they differ in one remarkable way. For
Habermas, and those who employ his framework, discourse ethics is similarly inward looking with regards
to the agent. As Richard Rorty highlights, with the enlightenment individual began to look within
themselves in order to understand assumptions of ethics and morality. A natural law ethic distinguishes
itself articulating instead an outwards orientation locating the possibility and motivation for ethical and
moral action in the recognition of the other ‘the good’. This idea is articulated through the idea of charity
to be elaborated on in detail in chapter four. It builds on the idea of a relational ontology articulated in the
second chapter and in this way seeks to respond to a variety of the traditional criticisms associated with
modern interpretations of natural law. In this way, the value of a pre-modern interpretation of natural law
reveals itself.
15 Stephen Toulmin, “Cosmpolis”, op. cit., & Albert R. Jonsen & Stephen Toulmin, The Abuse of
Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (Berkley, California: University of California Press Ltd., 1988).
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terms of a national language, culture and religion, the modern state represented a
domestic government whose legitimacy lay in the will of a governed people. Westphalia,
on this account, sought to loosely create through custom, norms, laws, and institutions a
degree of authority where it was otherwise absent. As Ian Ward demonstrates the ideas of
social contract thinkers have lead to the demise in the interest of others and have
cultivated instead, an awareness of the self as well as an account of self-interested
responsibility evident in the structures of legal jurisprudence. In his own words, the flaw
of enlightenment philosophy relates to the ideas of Modernity; namely, a lack of romantic
sentiment cultivating the necessary compassion, friendship and love indicative of an
interest in others. Ian Ward provides an interesting rejoineder to the aforementioned
interpretations of modernity. His critical approach rests in an understanding of
jurisprudential theory which notes the lack of natural principles of justice associated with
enlightenment philosophy. He seeks to offer an interpretation of world order which
revitalizes the solidarity associated with the humanism of the renaissance. In so doing, he
highlights the isolated existence of the individual in contemporary political societies.16
It is a point much commented upon by John MacMurray that modernity’s
influence paved the way for an over-zealous fascination with the subject to the detriment
of the agent consequently generating a series of societies failing to appreciate the need for
both practical and theoretical knowledge. He notes how contemporary philosophical
16 Ian Ward, Justice, Humanity and the New World Order (England: Ashgate Press, 2003), 9. Ward
advocates a return to those enlightenment writers in order to rectify this isolation and in so doing recreate
the original ideas and motives of such thinkers as Liebniz, Smith, Colerdige and Shakespeare. He labels
this approach the ‘new humanism’ in which the aims and ends of politics are balanced with both sense and
sensibility, and approach, he claims is evident in the writings of the founding fathers of the United States of
America. His notion of sense and sensibility caters to a particulate sense of charity and compassion within
politics which is similar to the ends of Chapters Four and Five of this work. Yet they are distinctly modern
interpretations and reflect, like Habermas, an inward orientation to politics. The value Ward offers to this
work is the possibility of institutional charity whilst at the same time demonstrating the limited nature of
humanism as an approach. This point will be further elaborated on throughout this work.
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endeavors focus on the “I” failing to comprehend the essential nature of the individual
and community, noting above all else that the “I”’ is only one component part of the “I
and You” relationship. The resulting situation distinguishes a multitude of “I”s
sustaining a dualism whereby individuals interact as isolated others and not as individuals
in relations. The fascination with the empirical self, the “I”, sustains the modern
philosophical image of man producing isolated beings. On this account laws seek to
temper the negative interactions of men, further entrenching a subjective account of
politics. 17 Political engagements, on this account, are a technical process, sustained by a
discourse of negative liberty, and the art of being political, associated with practical
reasoning is situated outside the mainstream boundaries of political engagement.
In a similar fashion, C.B. Macpherson highlights the isolated ends of
contemporary democracy articulating the phenomenon of possessive individualism. For
Macpherson political societies reflect the discourses of scarcity and abundance generating
a series of isolated relationships in society. “The basic assumptions of possessive
individualism-that man is free and human by virtue of his sole proprietorship of his own
person, and that human society is essentially a series of market relations- were deeply
embedded in the seventeenth-century foundations,” writes Macpherson. “It was these
assumptions that gave the original theory its strength, for they did correspond to the
reality of seventeenth-century market society. The assumptions of possessive
individualism,” he goes on to conclude, “have been retained in the modern liberal theory,
to an extent not always realized. Yet they have failed as foundations of liberal-
17 John MacMurray, The form of the personal, Vol. 2. Persons in relation; being the Gifford Lectures
delivered in the University of Glasgow in 1954 (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1961), 26.
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democratic theory.”18 Like Ward, Macpherson notes the lack of mutual foundations
solidifying contemporary political societies and in so doing highlights two central themes
of Modernity and its enlightened philosophy. First, this particular course of history is
rooted in the use of laws in society, a point similarly noted by Toulmin.19 Second, whilst
rights and liberty articulate the structure of that particular society, the heart and soul are
reflected in the values of modern capitalism.
An examination of the ideas of Max Weber provides an insightful understanding
of the relationship of the state and capitalism and the isolated existence of the individual
therein. He notes the dominance of capitalism in the organization of the state and the
ensuing bureaucratization of state institutions. “Everywhere the development of the
modern state is initiated through the action of the prince. He paves the way for the
expropriation of the autonomous and ‘private’ bearers of executive power who stand
beside him, of those who in their own right possess the means of administration, warfare,
and financial organization, as well as political usable goods of all sorts,” he writes. “The
whole process is a complete parallel to the development of the capitalist enterprise
through gradual expropriate of the independent producers. In the end,” he concludes,
“the modern state controls the total means of political organization, which actually come
together under a single hand.”20 Societies become the end product of the fusion of
democracy, associated with rights, and capitalism, associated with a market economy
18 C.B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1962), 270 & 271.
19 Stephen Toulmin, “Cosmopolis” op. cit., 133. It is a point that will be returned to in many of the ensuing
chapters, that this image of the individual is exhibited in our understanding of the rights-bearing subject
identified in the discourse of human rights.
20 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology translated, edited, and
with an introduction by H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), 82.
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geared towards the accumulation of goods.21 It is a relationship which, as Leo J. Elders
highlights, reflects not the idea of becoming, associated with the teleological ends of
natural law. Rather, it is a relationship which mirrors the assumptions of enlightenment
political philosophy focused on materiality to the detriment of being.22 Consequently, a
doctrine of abundance and scarcity has emerged further increasing the isolated and
subjective nature of the political agent contributing to the ongoing problem of human
suffering. The necessary relationships needed to sustain an ethics of unity development
and wellbeing are, on this interpretation, situated outside the mainstream of political
endeavors.
The dominance of the possessive individual in contemporary society reflects one
interpretation of modernity with reference to political structures. This, however, is not
the sole interpretation of the political ends of modernity. As Quintin Skinner highlights,
one can discern a second strand, albeit the less dominant approach, of political
organization associated with liberty and solidarity. It is an interpretation which he labels
the neo-roman theory. This theory broaches the relationship of civil liberty and political
obligation and seeks to provide a symbiotic account of these ideas engendering a
particular account of the political community. “When neo-roman theorists discuss the
meaning of civil liberty, they generally make it clear that they are thinking of the concept
21 This is a point noted by Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri in their work Empjre (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2000). They show the unfolding of enlightenment philosophy and related it back to the
ideas emerging within the discourses of modernity. They ultimately reveal how this account of history is
reflected in the political sphere of the social contract thinkers, but also highlight the diversity within the
term of modernity itself. Not only is it a political concept, it also incorporates sociological,
anthropological, theology and philosophical investigations as well. This multiplicity is evident in the
examination of the authors under work today. Of equal importance they show, like Quentin Skinner, the
presence of a second stream of modernity associated with renaissance humanism and the idea of
communities of solidarity.
22 Leo J. Elders, The Metaphysics of Being of St. Thomas Aquinas, in a historical perspective, translated by
Dr. John Dudley (New York: E.J. Brill, 1993).
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in a strictly political sense. They are innocent of the modern notion of civil society as a
moral space between rulers and ruled, and have little to say about the dimensions of
freedom and oppression inherent in such institutions as the family or the labour market,”
he writes. “They concern themselves almost exclusively with the relationship between
the freedom of subjects and the powers of the state.”23 These ideas reflect the ideas of
humanism found in the political writings of Machiavelli articulating virtue and honor
with reference to the political state and the well-rounded individual therein. It is an
account of politics that focused on relationships of solidarity, a solidarity which as Hauke
Brunkhorst has shown was severed with the ensuing development of capitalism and
modern liberal democracies.24 Bearing all these interpretations in mind the original ideas
of Toulmin remain dominant throughout this work. His ecology of institutions which
highlight coordinated human agency and institutional design provide the necessary
structure needed to challenge the subjective account of being political and the isolated
ends of civil agency.
To act in a civil manner is to develop and adhere to a particular code of conduct.
Such conduct is fashioned through the codification of rules and regulations engendering
the development of the amoral individual and anti-social interactions. It is an assumption
of knowledge which assumes, as John MacMurray points out, “that all human behavior
follows determined patterns, and that the laws which we obey, are like those which
govern all natural objects, discoverable by objective scientific methods of
23 Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (CAmbrdige: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 17.
24 Hauke Brunkhorst, Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community translated by Jeffrey
Flynn (Cambridge: the MIT Press, 2005). More will be said on solidarity in Chapters Four, Five and the
Epilogue. Suffice to note it represents one method of understanding political relationships in the
community and is particularly important when one discusses communicative action and discourse ethics.
Yet it remains primarily, in its modern interpretation linked to the assumptions of the enlightenment,
offering and inward looking account of ethics and morality. Thus its associated accounts of justice do little
to challenge the isolating structures of the political community.
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investigation.”25 Interactions of a civil nature revolve around a shared understanding of
laws and rules which shape a society geared towards a particular outcome- survival.
Laws, on this account function so as to limit conflict and are related to the boundaries
delineating acceptable and unacceptable forms of agency. Human engagement is
impersonal, on this interpretation, further entrenching the political boundaries of states,
which, in light of Modernity’s universal aims reveals the problem of moral favoritism in
light of human equality generating a pervasive sense of ‘otherness’ within international
affairs.
The overarching theme of civility, and its associated conception of political
society, is evident in the discourses of International Relations seeking to explain and
understand, in their own particular way, the events of international affairs. An
investigation into the dominant discourses of International Relations, normative and
empirical alike demonstrates how normative accounts of international order share the
self-same historical ascendancy as their not so distant empirical cousins. Elaborating on
the point made by Fiona Robinson, that “the dominant liberal traditions in Western moral
and political theory resonate strongly in the so-called settled norms of international
relations,”26 this opening chapter seeks, by way of an illustrative account of the history of
the social contract tradition to demonstrate that regardless of the framework adopted, be it
holistic, individual, rational or normative, the discipline of International Relations
structures its over-arching assumptions and aims around a particular epistemology
emerging out of the Modernity. In the same vein as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and
Jean Jacques Rousseau, contemporary scholars share an epistemology that is pervasively
25 John MacMurray, “Persons in Relations” op. cit., 30.
26 Fiona Robinson, op. cit., 4.
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theoretical seeking one over-arching account of order. This particular aim has lead to a
contemporary fascination with the rule of law, embodied in the domestic legal tradition
extending into the international level. In so doing, this particular orientation, to the
detriment of practical knowledge, sustains a series of pragmatic societies. Moral
communities, on this account are non-existent, consequently denying the individual the
capacity to develop as a moral and ethical being. Championing the primacy of the state,
this account of International Relations fails to comprehend the basic anthropology of the
individual as a social and political being.
This chapters offers an acute critique of the manner in which theories of world
order account for agency, otherwise referred to as ‘being political’, representing, in their
own particular way, the universal ends of the Enlightenment Project. Noting the burden
of agency placed on the individual with the advent of the Enlightenment, it criticizes the
dominance of a theoretical epistemology arguing that as the single acceptable
understanding of knowledge, it is ill-equipped to provide any individual with the capacity
to act in a manner befitting a moral and political agent. An examination of the social
contract tradition goes on to detail this series of developments which lead to the
dominance of theoretical knowledge and a subjective account of politics denying a place
for obligation and responsibility within the traditional boundaries of International
Relations. It is this account which espouses the idea of moral progress and human
equality, at odds with the modern boundaries of international politics. Consequently, the
overall aim of this opening chapter seeks to generate a resounding criticism of
international affairs demonstrating how the universality of Modernity’s ends, in light of
the moral equality associated with being human are at odds with one another. In order to
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achieve this end this chapter argues for alternative modes of understanding and
explaining the discipline alongside traditional interpretations of international affairs
acting as a check and balance on the potential tyranny of a rules based methodology. It
paves the way for an alternative account of the individual, the community and the
relationship they share which, when properly understood, illustrates that both, the
individual and community, are key agents of justice capable of altering the structures that
seek to control their actions. To wit, it argues forcefully against the bounded nature of
communities, justice and obligation demonstrating the potential of individuals to alter the
traditional boundaries of international affairs. The chapter elaborates on the idea of ‘the
international’, by way of conclusion, facilitating this claim, and in so doing, generating
the metaphysical space in which moral agency can begin anew.
Part I: Modernity & the Traditional Discourses of International Relations
The discipline of International Relations exists within strictly defined parameters
of knowledge. Knowledge, it will be shown, which has emphasized, for better or worse,
a select few modes of understanding and explaining international affairs. As Martin
Hollis and Steve Smith point out, one can distinguish an holistic or individual
methodology in order to articulate an empirical or normative account of International
Relations.27 Joan C. Tronto is critical of this account noting with despair that this
delineation is the product of a particular reading of history situating morality and ethics
outside the interactions of high power politics. Distinguishing a ‘morality first’ and
‘politics first’ approach to International Relations, she notes how the latter conception
27 Martin Hollis & Steve Smith, op. cit., 5. In this book the authors offer a distinct chart, similar to that in
game theory claiming that works within International Relations rarely bridges the gap between the various
categories and that the easiest way to understand the discipline as a whole is to conceive of it falling within
these distinct categorizations.
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dominates the traditional accounts of International Relations. This distinction, Tronto
goes on to argue, is generally associated with the Hobbesian account of public action and
private morality engendering a rule-based society concerned with order, stability, and
civil interactions.28
Bearing witness to this interpretation is the particular dominance of realist
discourses in International Relations. “Realism is an approach to international relations
that has emerged gradually through the work of a series of analysts who have situated
themselves within, and thus delineated, a distinctive but still diverse style or tradition of
analysis,” writes Jack Donnelly.29 Distinguishing a classical, structural and neo-realist
interpretation, realism focuses on anarchy, power, and the egoism of states. “The essence
of international realism is its belief in the primacy of self-interest over moral principle, of
necessity and therefore as of right, in international politics,” writes Steven Forde. “This
can mean either that self-interest confers a positive right of some kind, as when the
‘national interest’ is seen as a moral principle, or that morality is wholly inapplicable to
international politics.”30 Classical accounts of realism draw on the works of Thucydides,
Machiavelli and Hobbes combing the assumption of a negative human nature alongside
structural factors with which to explain the absence of morality in international political
engagements. On this account, realism focuses on the egoistic actor in an anarchical
environment, lacking a legitimate form of political authority, highlighting self-interested
deliberations and action. Power, on this account, is the dominant factor in any
consideration of political action and justice best articulated in Thucydides’ account of the
28 John C. Tronto, op. cit., 7.
29 Jack Donnelly, Realism and international relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 6.
30 Steven Forde, “Classical Realism” in Traditions of International Ethics, eds. Terry Nardin & David
Mapel 62 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
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Melian Dialogue. Justice, on this portrayal reflects the desires of the powerful and the
capitulations of the weak.31
The relationship of power and self-interest in light of the anarchy of international
affairs is furthered developed in the writings of E.H. Carr, Reinhold Neibhur and Hans J.
Morgenthau. According to Carr, politics is the reflection of utopian and realist thought,
the two of which will never accord with one another. On this account, politics becomes
the balancing of morality and power.32 Bearing this in mind, Andrew Linklater
highlights the fact that Carr failed to articulated how this balance ought to be struck.33 In
a similar vein, Morgenthau also examined the relationship of morality within high power
politics, arguing forcefully that man strives always towards the good, but the potential for
evil runs rampant in politics. Politics reflected in his idea of the national interest
represents the struggle of reason over self-interested notions of power in the face of
anarchy.34 National interest, according to Jack Donnelly, represents for Morgenthau, a
descriptive and prescriptive account of the rules for success in international politics. The
success of national interest, however, is tempered by the structural challenges posed in
light of a negative view of human nature.35 Reinhold Neibhur also comments on the
negative potential of human nature in his related account of political realism. “Such is
the social ignorance of peoples, that, far from doing justice to a foe or neighbor, they are
as yet unable to conserve their own interests wisely,” he writes. “Since their ultimate
31 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian Wars, translated by Benjamin Jowett; revised and abrdiged with an
introduction by P. A. Brunt (New York: Washington Square Press, 1963).
32 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: an introduction to the study of international relations,
2nd Edition (London: 1946), 93 & 209.
33 Andrew Linklater, “The transformation of political community: E. H. Carr, critical theory and
international relations” Review of International Studies 23 (1997): 323.
34 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: the struggle for power and peace (New York: Knopf,
1973).
35 Jack Donnelly, “Twentieth Century Realism” in Traditions of International Ethics ed. Terry Nardin &
David Mapel, 92 & 93 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
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interests are always protected best, by at least a measure of fairness toward their
neighbors, the desire to gain an immediate selfish advantage always imperils their
ultimate interests. If they recognize this fact, they usually recognize it too late.”36
Classical realists, on this account, focus on human nature in the first instance, reflecting
upon the structure of international politics in light of this inevitability.
Highlighting the structural emphasis on international politics, and placing primary
emphasis on power and self-interest therein, Neorealism emerged as the prominent
interpretation of international politics in contemporary affairs. Distinguishing three
approaches to understanding international politics, an individual, a state, or a structural
epistemology, Kenneth Waltz forcefully argued for the dominance of a structural
approach to international affairs articulating an understanding of the state as a black box,
denying in the first instance, the classical realist understanding of national interest
incorporating a moral component of human nature. Highlighting the anarchy of
international politics, the lack of legitimate authority and hierarchical structures
tempering state actions, self-interest and power remained, on Waltz’s account, the best
method to explain the insecurity and violence characterizing the practice of international
politics.37 These ideas influenced both the theory and practice of international politics.
The foreign policies of Henry Kissinger and Nikita Khrushchev focused on the balance of
power during the Cold War seeking, in light of the arms race and the ensuing security
dilemma, the optimal outcome for the state; namely, the acquisition of more power.
36 Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics (Westminster: John
Knox Press, 2001), 86.
37 Kenneth Waltz’s, Theory of international politics (New York; London: McGraw-Hill, 1979); and Man,
the state and war: a theoretical analysis (New York; London: Columbia University Press, 1959) are the
two most widely cited texts of this contemporary argument.
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In light of these changes Charles Beitz sought to blend the otherwise forgotten
morality of classical realism into its neorealist interpretation. “Taking these two points
together, the morality of states might be understood as the international analogue of
nineteenth-century liberalism,” he writes. “It joins a belief in the liberty of individual
agents with an indifference o the distributive outcomes of the economic interaction.”38
Emphasizing the influence of Hobbes’s account of power and authority, he articulates a
particular role for institutions in domestic states to develop a distributional account of
political justice. Upholding the distinctions of domestic and private associated with
international sovereignty, Beitz’s work highlights two important phenomena within the
practice of international politics. In the first instance, he reiterates alternative traditions,
beyond realist assumptions, incorporating institutions and liberal assumptions with which
to understand international affairs. Second, he demonstrates, by way of analogy, the
influence of the social contract, as a political tradition on the structure of contemporary
international affairs highlighting the pre-eminent role of the state, alongside international
sovereignty and the norms of non-intervention and non-aggression. Although Beitz’s
attempt to integrate morality and realpolitic is troubled, it is an interesting rejoinder to an
account of international affairs which remains vibrant even with the eventual end of the
Cold War. As the particular works of John Mearsheimer demonstrate, the pre-eminence
of realism continues to survive in the face of the moral and ethical challenges of
normative accounts of international order.39 Articulating what he labels offensive
realism, Mearsheimer’s work demonstrates how power, anarchy and self-interest remain
firmly embedded in the structures of contemporary international politics.
38 Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1978), 65 & 66.
39 John J. Mearsheimer, The tragedy of Great Power politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).
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Societal interpretations of international affairs offer an alternative to the power
based systemic understanding of world order. Articulating a vision of international civil
society, the English School, and the communitarian approach articulated by Michael
Walzer emphasize norms, customs, and values around which individuals and society
coalesce. From an historical perspective, the English School tradition seeks, among other
things, “not to study diplomatic history in the usual sense, nor to discuss current
problems,” writes Adam Watson, “but to identify the basic assumptions that lie behind
diplomatic activity, the reason why a country conducts a certain foreign policy, the
ethical premise of international conflict, and the extent to which international studies
could be conducted scientifically.”40 The contemporary ideas of the English School have
coalesced broadly around two main features, noted by Barry Buzan, a methodology
which seeks to bridge the gap between realism and liberalism noting a distinction
between an international system, an international society, and a world society.41
Focusing on the idea of an international society, there is, as Tim Dunne notes, “a
consensus that the members are states and that society domain refers to the shared
interests exhibited by them for security, prosperity and liberty: to achieve those goals a
set of norms, rules and institutions have been created over time, have acquired a high
degree of legitimacy.”42 The English School advocates a middle road whereby states
remain the primary actor in international affairs, albeit a primacy tempered by the
40 Adam Watson, “The British Committee for the Theory of International Politics,” Leeds University,
http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/watson98.doc (accessed September 27, 2005).
41 Barry Buzan, “The English School: an underexploited resource in IR” Review of International Studies 27
(2001): 474.
42 Tim Dunne, “Sociological Investigations: Instrumental, Legitimist and Coercive Interpretations of
International Society” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 30, no. 1 (2001): 69.
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individual rights of its citizens. In so doing, however, it fails to explain the source of the
norms and values which shape international society.43
This interpretation of international society bears some similarities to the idea of
Michael Walzer. Employing the rhetoric of rights, albeit community and not individual
rights, he articulates a vision of international society premised on a domestic analogy. If,
he posits, states, like individuals, possess rights, they also have the right to first protect
themselves and when faced with threats, in the same vein as domestic crime, seek
protection, defense and ultimately punishment. “Our primary perceptions and judgments
of aggression,” he concludes, “are the products of analogical reasoning. When the
analogy is made explicity, as it is often is among lawyers, the world of states takes on the
shape of a political society the character of which is entirely accessible through such
notions as crime and punishment, self-defense, law enforcement, and so on.”44 Noting
six characteristics of international society, he provides a legal framework derived from
notions of domestic communities with which to understand international affairs.45 Yet
for Walzer, and unlike the English School, the legitimacy of a states right to exist and
defend itself is rooted in community, the coming together of individuals, coalescing
around shared values and customs which ought to be protected.
43 Nicholas Rengger, International relations, political theory and the problem of order: beyond
international relations theory? (London: Routledge, 2000), 79.
44 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations, Third Edition
(New York: Basic Books, 1977), 58.
45 Michael Walzer, ”Just and Unjust Wars”, op. cit., 61-63. These six characteristics are: one, the existence
of an international society of independent states; two, this international society has laws that establishes the
rights of its members- above all else, its territorial integrity and political sovereignty; three, the use of force
against one state from another constitutes aggression and is a criminal act; four, aggression identifies two
types of violent responses, a war of self defence and a war of law enforcement by the victim and any other
member of international society; five, nothing but aggression can justify war; and finally, once the
aggressor has been militarily repulsed, it can also be punished.
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The English School and Michael Walzer’s interpretation of international society
display striking differences; yet both are highly legalistic. They differ in that the former
employ the rhetoric of rights, namely state rights, derived from the individual as an
isolated subject, and the latter emphasizes the community based idea of common practice.
This distinction is most apparent when one looks at a state’s right to self defence. As
Chris Brown points out, in the face of aggression, an English school scholar advocates
clearly delineated rules and norms outlining when and where the violation of sovereignty
and the norm of non-intervention ought to be broken. Walzer, on the other hand,
highlights a community’s right to protect itself arguing that states are best equipped to
govern their own internal affairs.46 Ultimately, both interpretations of international
society pay the utmost respect and deference to rules, norms and institutions guiding the
interactions of states. With this in mind, Terry Nardin has gone on to interpret
international society as nothing more than a practical association. It is an interpretation
that provides the political space for states to pursue different ends recognizing the ability
of laws to promote mutually accepted practices overcoming a pure governing structure
within an international environment. “Practical associations,” he writes, “unites those
engaged in the pursuit of different and sometimes incompatible ends through their
recognition of the worth of those ways of life constituted by the authoritative practices
that apply to them as moral agents or as members of a political community.”47 In light of
the legalism of international society, international law plays a key role in determining the
structure of a practical association which purporting to uphold civility provides a
46 Chris Brown, Sovereignty, Rights and Justice: international political theory today (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 2002), 92.
47 Terry Nardin, Law, Morality and the Relations of States (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1983), 14.
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subjective account of International Relations. It exudes a decidedly sterile account of
international action similar to domestic laws limiting the consequences of civil
interactions. Practical associations note little beyond common predicaments that
motivate coordinated action but fail to account for the genuine essence and being uniting
individuals throughout the world. The idea of practical association provides a working
example of the influence of modernity’s assumptions. Beginning with the metaphor of a
contract, clearly relegating morality and ethics to the sidelines in the face of civil
engagement, practical associations, as described by Nardin achieve stability through a
hierarchy of laws and institutions neatly sidestepping the messiness of morality and
ethics. Through a clear delineation of acceptable modes of state interaction, practical
associations hope to achieve a level of stability in international affairs assuming that all
states know their place and act accordingly.
In the same vein as realist interpretations of international affairs societal
interpretations are entrenched in a subjective reading of politics. On the face of things,
international society appeals to a morality first’ approach to international relations, but a
deeper investigation into the nature of their assumptions reveals a deep seated problem
with their epistemology. Civility, albeit employing the rhetoric of rights and liberty,
reveals its egocentricity, and ultimate reliance on laws and boundaries limiting political
engagements. Nowhere is the problematic nature of their epistemology better evident
then when viewed in light of the discourse of sovereignty. Sovereignty, on this account,
functions by limiting the political engagement of asocial and amoral states. “The crucial
aspect of this way of being political as far as the problem of order was concerned,”
Nicholas Rengger writes, “was the division of politics into an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’
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the inside of legitimately constituted territory and the outside of an ‘anarchic’ war of all
against all.”48 The product of theoretical knowledge the norms of sovereignty uphold and
reinforce the structure of international order, both systemic and societal. Providing both
the constitutive and substantive rules of international engagement sovereignty supports
the idea of a Westphalian international order, influencing the actions of states.49
Articulating for the first time the norms of non-intervention and non-aggression in the
absence of political authority, sovereignty extended the bounded subjectivity of politics
into world order. Nowhere is this better illustrated then in the contemporary
understanding of international constitutionalism.
Constitutionalism focuses on “agreed-upon legal and political institutions that
operate and allocate rights and limit the exercise of power.”50 Employing a rule-based
methodology, constitutionalism assumes that through routine actions, accepted and
agreed upon customs, described in international law and its institutions, the insecurity and
anarchy of international affairs can be controlled. “When political orders are organized
in ways that constrain the ability of one actor or group to dominate or wield power
arbitrarily or indiscriminately,” Ikenberry writes, “other actors and groups are more likely
to abide by rules and outcomes that the political order generates at the moment.
48 Nicholas Rengger, “International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order” op. cit., 6.
49 A series of treaties that brought about an end to the religious wars that had dominated Europe, the Peace
Treaties of Westphalia placed domestic governance in the hands of the people articulating a universal
doctrine of religious toleration. The state, due to these conclusions, emerged as the supreme actor in
international affairs. States were identified as that body bearing both an international sovereignty over its
domestic population and an external sovereignty over the manner in which it conducted its international
affairs. The treaties explicitly recognize the idea of territorial sovereignty and respects the independence
and jural rights of the state; moreover, the treaties, decidedly legal in their approach, emphasize the
importance of laws, customs and institutions as the primary vehicles deigned to establish international
civility, and therefore, stability. So interpreted, the Westphalian Peace Treaties established a lack of natural
authority within international affairs highlighting the fact that no one body can subsume the interests of the
state to an overarching governing principle. John M. Hobson, The State and International Relations
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) offers a good overview of these points.
50 G. John Ikenberry, op. cit., 29.
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Likewise,” he goes on to say, “when political institutions are deeply entrenched and
difficult to overturn or replace, this also reduces the returns to power and increases the
continuity of the existing order.”51 Constitutionalism notes the knowledge gap that exists
between actions and intentions of state which, when viewed in light of the security
dilemma, pose particular problems to the survival of the state. It thus seeks through
institutional arrangements to disseminate knowledge aimed at cooperative action in and
amongst states.
Distinguishing themselves from both the systemic and societal approaches to
world order Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane articulate a Cosmopolitan
Institutional Proposal to understand the dynamism of contemporary international affairs.
Building on the synthesis of morality and power offered by Charles Beitz, their particular
account of international relations and order illustrates the importance of institutions in
international affairs. Articulating a particular understanding of legitimacy, distinguished
from the ends of justice, these authors appeal to a wide variety of moralities in order to
develop relevant contemporary international institutions.52 Legitimacy, on their
interpretation works within the constrains of contemporary political sovereignty
challenging the moral favoritism contributing to the pervasive sense of otherness in
international affairs including external epistemic actors and a moral minimum of justice,
all of which, they contend will facilitate the smooth functioning of domestic democracies.
This account of institutional design resonates in the ideas of Thomas Pogge, examined in
the Introduction, similarly demonstrating a keen awareness of the relationship of coercion
51 G. John Ikenberry, op. cit., 32-33 & 266. Beyond this problem of change and how world order can not
account for it, I am only concerned about the inability of constitutionalism to generate trust to overcome
security.
52 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions” Ethics &
International Affairs 20, no. 4 (December 2006): 405-437.
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and justice examined by Nardin, also interested in the legitimacy of international action
in light of human suffering. By far the most exciting contribution of Buchanan and
Keohane is the dynamism they attach to institutional design aware of the incomplete
knowledge structures shaping the decisions and actions of agents involved in the design
process. While the minimal account of justice they employ at the outset is at odds with a
pre-modern investigation of suffering, this foray into institutional design, beyond an
alternative to the liberal and realist conceptions of constitutional world order
demonstrates the previously unaccounted teleological development oriented around the
ends of morality.53 Extending this account of institutional design into the practice of war,
specifically preventive war, and intervention, Buchanan and Keohane demonstrate the
influence of a just war morality in the structures of international affairs, in particular
international law, noting however, the inability of such structures to account for a
legitimate political authority to examine the actions of states in light of their humanitarian
ends.54 Bearing this in mind, the appeal of constitutionalism emerges yet again.
Constitutionalism order, and the institutional arrangements it develops generate a
pseudo-authority within international affairs. It views institutions as physical
organizations with guidelines, operating procedures elucidating particular aims and
goals.55 Institutions, as David Luban writes, “establish what is to be held normal, what
53 The emphasis of ongoing development in their works bears a striking resemblance to the teleology of
being to be developed in Chapter Two. It is this teleology associated with the ontology of the agent, in and
of itself, that characterizes a key component of natural law agency and it is not surprising that this element
flows through cosmopolitan approaches to institutional design as cosmopolitanism and natural law are
related to one another, although the former bears the hallmark assumptions of modernity, which, in light of
the aims of this work, is problematic.
54 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane “The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan Institutional
Proposal” Ethics & International Affairs 18, no. 1 (2004): 1-22.
55 Institutions, similar to any other conception within the social sciences, are contested and one can see a
multitude of definitions suiting one’s particular purpose. Robert Keohane’s article “International
Institutions Two Approaches” International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 4 (December 1988): 383 defines
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must be expected, and what can be relied upon, which rights and duties are attached to
which positions, and what makes sense in the community or social domain for which an
institution is valid.”56 Institutions, in a given issue area provide states with the desired set
of rules, regulations and operating procedures, which if followed, create the illusion of
having overcome the knowledge gap typically assumed within an anarchical
environment. Echoing the reflections of both realist and liberal understandings of world
order, Buchanan and Keohane highlight the insecurity arising from the lack of a
legitimate political authority in international affairs reflecting the primordial desire of
international order; namely, international governance. Legitimacy, on their account,
reflects the argument of Ikenberry, that institutions reduce the returns to power,
encouraging states to participate in the institutional order not only for immediate, but also
intermediate and long term benefits. “The practice of making legitimacy judgments is
grounded in a complex belief,” they write “namely, that while it is true that institutions
ought to meet standards more demanding than mere mutual benefit (relative to some
relevant noninstitutional alternative), they can be worthy of our support even if they do
not maximally serve our interests and even if they do not measure up to our highest moral
institutions as “general pattern or categorization of activity or to a particular human-constructed
arrangements, formally or informally organized. More generally, Toni Erskine, in her work “Introduction:
Making Sense of ‘Responsibility’ in International Relations-Key Questions and Concepts Can Institutions
have Responsibilities?” in Collective Moral Agency and International Relations, ed. Toni Erskine, 5
(Houndsville: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003) points out that institutions are associated with regimes and
regime theory as well as having been associated with formal organizations such as the United Nations, the
World Bank, and even Microsoft. While distinctly normative definition in character, a rational definition
of institutions is provided by Barbara Koremonos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, in “The Rational
Design of International Institutions” International Organization 55, no. 4 (Autumn, 2001): 762, where they
define institutions as explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors, the prescribe, proscribe,
and/or authorize behavior.” Obviously, for institutionalism, it is the last definition which holds the most
plausibility; however, institutions for the purposes of this work will be defined in a normative sense within
a much looser framework.
56 David Luban, “The Publicity Principle” in The Theory of Institutional Design, ed. Robert E. Goodin, 199
& 200 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
• Chapter One • 52
standards.”57 The ultimate success of a constitutional world order remains, however,
debatable.
Constitutionalism seeks stability through the dissemination of knowledge. On
this account, it seeks to bridge the gap of intention and action consequently tempering the
insecurity associated with self-interested notions of power. Reflecting the ends of
societal and systemic and communal understandings of international affairs, the
epistemologies of which relate back to the original ideas of Modernity, constitutionalism,
reflects the supremacy of theoretical knowledge and a subjective account of international
politics. On this account, like the domestic laws and rules shaping political society,
international structures seek to isolate and marginalize human interaction championing a
universal mode of governance with which to further the moral progress befitting the
individuals that constitute its practice. Constitutionalism, so the argument goes, exhibits
the technical processes championed by Modernity extending the problematic relationship
of equality dating back to its pre-modern descendents. Upholding the civility of
international engagements, this approach to international order sustains the boundaries of
inside and outside, assuming that human action, experience and development, like the
laws of physics, follows a singular, all encompassing life plan. Yet, human moral
development remains a unique, albeit shared, experience. Moreover, in light of the
definition of human suffering previously investigated, it is increasingly apparent that the
current structure of international order is ill-equipped to deal with the contemporary
problem of human suffering as it flies in the face of the boundaries international order
seeks to uphold.
57 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions” op. cit.,
410.
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Part II: The Development of a Social Contract Tradition
The order emerging from a social contract is the product of the post-material
metaphysics of Thomas Hobbes which denies the existence of incorporeal entities.
Knowledge and human understanding of the self is limited to the material world. So
constituted, individuals lack any vestige of a soul and understand themselves as matter
both acting and acted upon. Furthermore, the natural world in which they inhabit is a
blank slate upon which to impose a particular ordering of society. Hobbes begins his
work in the state of nature – a state of war, where all individuals, comprised of the same
capacities and capabilities seek to achieve their own survival while working towards the
ultimate goal of peace. “Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a
common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war;”
writes Hobbes, “and such a war as is of every man against very man.” Lacking a
legitimate governing authority to mitigate the grosser forms of violence, Hobbes seeks to
outline the compact among men which, upon the surrendering of their natural rights,
creates a Leviathan, that commonwealth constructed and burdened with the responsibility
of creating laws seeking political and social harmony engendering stability. It is a
tradition that outlines the rightness and wrongness of actions and the punishment of those
who would transgress its laws forsaking the elusively sought after social and political
stability.
Modernity developed the theoretical epistemologies associated with the scientific
studies in general and in particular, physics and geometry. The dominance of this
approach is evident in the works of Thomas Hobbes, reflecting a fascination with the
stable and eternal laws of geometry. Both disciplines shaped a particular understanding
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of knowledge offering an alternative means of understanding the capacities and
capabilities of man beyond faith and reason. With its analytical conclusions resting on
testable and quantifiable results geometry ultimately lead Hobbes to pursue a scientific
method of politics. Denying a place for ‘incorporeal entities’ Hobbes puts forward the
idea of man in motion, writing that “life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof
is in some principal part within, why may we not say that all automata (Engines that
move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what
is the heart,” he goes on to ask, “but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the
joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the
Artificer?”58 This is not to be confused with the teleological essence of the individual,59
man in motion supported Hobbes’s idea that individuals come to know their place and
role in the world by the influence of other matter acting on them, and even more
importantly, went on to support his ideas of the Leviathan, or commonwealth. Through
one’s actions, and the actions of others, one could understand the world as it is, and move
beyond the metaphysical or ontological idea of an eternal law governing the actions of
men. So construed, it was the capacities of men, as free agents, that were not only
capable, but responsible for the creation of a society capable of achieving peace.
Arising out of the compact of men was a Leviathan who laid out the laws of civil
governance. These laws were not derived from, nor were they associated with any
metaphysical notion of justice. Construed as they were from experience they could not
58 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, ed. Richard Tuck
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 9.
59 The idea of a teleological essence will be pursued in greater detail in the ensuing chapters. Suffice to
note at this point that the idea that individuals are comprised with an innate teleology is the product of the
fusion of the soul with bodily matter sustaining an objective account of dominion. The potential of all
individuals to be their own masters and achieve their own unique personal fulfillment is premised on this
idea embodying a related account of mutual well-being incorporating a metaphysical motivation of love.
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claim to engender any ethical or moral development of individuals and the communities
in which they inhabited. The sole concern of the laws was to determine the rightness or
wrongness of an action so deemed by the great Leviathan. It was, as Richard Tuck points
out, that Hobbes put forth a convincing account of post-skeptical metaphysics. That is to
say the individual in a material world has enough knowledge (albeit not a complete
knowledge) upon which to choose, act, and fashion a civil society.60 Within the works of
Hobbes, the idea of man in motion is central to his understanding of nature, the world,
and the social environment in which individuals lived out their lives. ‘Man in motion’
places the highest emphasis on the will and self-determination of the individual, and
when combined with the idea of the social contract locates responsibility, be it political or
otherwise, firmly in the hands of the individual as an empowered agent. Contrary to the
religious doctrines which preceded Hobbes in which God was the responsible agent, the
material metaphysics of Hobbes completely transferred the responsibility to the
individual.61
It is a point of utmost importance to be noted at this juncture that due to the nature
of man’s understanding of the world and the artificial justice derived from the Leviathan,
that little concern was devoted to the morality of the agent. It was justice that concerned
itself with correct behavior, a derived sense of right and wrong, but paid little attention to
60 It is an interesting distinction made by Middleton who, contrasting Enlightenment ideologies of progress
with Aquinas’s ideas of becoming, notes that reason, in this framework is associated with emotion and
institinct which, guided by grace, sustains rationality. Rationality, on this account is to be a loving
individual. Niamh Middleton, op. cit., 447.
61 It is a point to be pursued in the ensuing chapters that responsibility is the ontology of obligation located
in the ens of the individual, actualized in the material world; however, Hobbes’ epistemology was
influenced by the goals of modernity and therefore could not substantiate an idea of obligation arising in
the ens and esse of individuals, because such an account of obligation requires both an understanding of
theoretical and practical knowledge.
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the morality and ethics that ought to be involved within action deliberations.62 “Civil law
is to every subject those rules which the Commonwealth hath commanded him,” Hobbes
writes, “by words, writing, or other sufficient sign of the will, to make us of for the
distinction of right and wrong; that is the rule”.63 The rules sought to establish and
uphold a particular version of liberty, negative liberty, establishing clear demarcations of
acceptable human political agency. “By Liberty is understood, according to the proper
signification of the word, the absence of external impediments,” Hobbes writes, “which
impediments may oft take away a part of man’s power to do what he would, but cannot
hinder him from using the power left him according as his reason and judgment shall
dictate to him”.64 It was a responsibility to the self, emphasizing primarily the well-being
of self, overlooking any notion of communal wellbeing and a responsibility to others.
Aware of their natural rights, individuals combined a rhetoric of liberty to define areas of
acceptable agency and a rights discourse to act accordingly, constituting each in
opposition to one another, and in so doing, sustaining a highly isolated environment.
This idea of a contract negotiating the interactions of men was carried on in the
works of John Locke, in particular his Second Treatise on Government65; however,
whereas Hobbes’s individual is motivated to achieve security, a Lockean individual is
motivated to act for happiness. Born into perfect freedom and sustained by a natural right
of punishment, Locke articulated a state of nature sustained by human reason further
distinguishing between a state of nature and a state of war. On this account, war is the
62 This is a point that is noted by A.P. d’Entreves, “The Case for Natural Law Re-Examined” Natural Law
Forum 5 (1956): 5-52. It will be elaborated on in further detail in Chapters Four and Five.
63 Thomas Hobbes, “Leviathan” op. cit., 183.
64 Thomas Hobbes, “Leviathan” op. cit., 91.
65 John Locke, “Two Treatise of Government” ed. Peter Laslett, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political
Thought, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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product of individuals acting contrary to reason. “Man living together according to
reason, without a common Superior on Earth,” writes Locke, “with Authority to judge
between them, is properly the State of Nature. But force, or a declared design of force
upon the Person of another,” he goes on to write “where there is no common Superior on
Earth to appeal for relief, is the State of War.”66 For Hobbes, a state of nature is a state of
war because there does not exist a legitimate authority to punish transgressions; however,
for Locke, in a state of nature individuals inherently possess a right of punishment in
order to deter avaricious acts potentially compromising one’s self-preservation. For
Locke, authority is not the solution to emerge out of a state of nature, or even govern and
avoid a state of war, as Hobbes would have his readers believe. Violent conflict,
insecurity, and war, for Locke occur in the absence and presence of “a common judge”.
The chief aim of civil society, for Locke, is the protection of private property and
the public good. “And thus all private judgment of every particular member being
excluded, the community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent, and
the same to all parties;” Locke writes, “and by men having authority from the
community, for the execution of those rules, decides all the differences that may happen
between any members of that society concerning any matter of right; and punishes those
offences which any member hath committed against the society, with such penalties as
the law has established: whereby it is easy to discern, who are, and who are not, in
political society together.”67 Men in a state of nature take the decision to form a civil
society establishing laws discerning right from wrong and a known and indifferent judge
with the authority to determine who has transgressed the laws of civil society backed up
66 John Locke, op. cit., 280.
67 John Locke, op. cit., 324.
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by legitimate use of force.68 Political power, according to Locke, exists so as to fashion
fair laws and met out equal and deserving punishments “for the Regulating and
Preserving of Property, and of employing the force of the Community, in the Execution
of such Laws, and in the defence of the Common-wealth from Foreign Injury, and all this
only for the Publick Good,” Locke writes.69 Yet, so construed, laws according to Locke,
do not constrain the actions of man, but rather, seek always to perfect that freedom found
in the state of nature. Law, according to Locke, exists for “the direction of a free and
intelligent Agent to his proper interests, and prescribes no farther than is for the General
Good of those under that Law.”70 Rules and laws substantiate justice as fairness as a
means to overcome naked self-interest according to the principles of freedom and
equality within society.
Locke shares with Hobbes a similar concept of human agency. As Locke points
out, it is man’s natural ability to labour sustaining a natural right to property. “The
Labour of his Body, and the Work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.
Whatsoever then he removes of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath
mixed his Labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it
his Property.”71 Society according to Locke, is intimately related to human agency
protecting the natural labour of man. It is human agency structuring society placing the
responsibilities of inequalities also in the actions of the individual as agent. Locke goes
on to write that, “in some part of the world, (where the Increase of People and Stock, with
the Use of Money) had made land scarce, and so of some value, the several communities
68 John Locke, op. cit., 351.
69 John Locke, op. cit., 268.
70 John Locke, op. cit., 305.
71 John Locke, op. cit., 287-288.
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settled the Bounds of their distinct territories, and by Laws within themselves, regulated
the Properties of Private men of their Societies, and so, by Compact and Agreement,
settle the Property which Labour and industry began.”72 Similar to Hobbes, Locke’s
conception of society, and therein law, reflects the isolated conflicting ends of human
action in common.
The image of man as a doer, an appropriator and accumulator, be it in a civil
society, a state of nature, or a state of war is based centrally on the idea of reason. It is
reason that governs the agents in action and, according to Locke, obliges all individuals
to do no harm. Locke understands Reason as the law of nature, that among other things,
“teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no
one ought to harm another in his life, Health, Liberty or Possessions.”73 On this account
reason is subjective. Drawing on the aforementioned assumptions of Hobbes, Locke’s
conceptualizes the individual in technical terms. Responsibility, on this interpretation is
to the self, revolving always around the selfish desires of the individual, related to the
material existence of man. Furthermore, obligation is also self-interested further
entrenching the bounded nature of morality and politics. Tempered with his idea of
freedom and legitimate authority, it falls to the commonwealth to direct the wills of self-
interested agents in the public sphere, while at the same time, providing a large degree of
privacy in those matters outwith the control of the government. Thus, Locke goes on to
solidify the boundaries of public and private, of inside and outside that begin to emerge in
the works of Hobbes and become part and parcel of the social contract package.
72 John Locke, op. cit., 299.
73 John Locke, op. cit., 271.
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The tradition of the social contract emerges out of a relationship between the
individual and the community. It describes how laws, fashioned from a legitimate
authority, outline acceptable behavior and seek to create a civil society in which all
individuals are capable of better preserving themselves. Hobbes and Locke, begin in the
state of nature, note its failings and prescribes laws that can mitigate the worst forms of
insecurity and vice and promote peaceful interactions. Jean Jacques Rousseau, another
social contract thinker, examines the relationships the individual enjoys with the state.
Unlike his predecessors Rousseau locates the problems of human suffering in the very
formation of civil society and the manner in which force is used by authority to uphold
the laws. “Man is born free,” Rousseau opens with, and goes on to write that, “and
everywhere he is in chains.”74 Elaborating on this idea in his essay, On War, Rousseau
notes that good social order is the product of laws guiding the use of force, illustrating the
perverse relationship of modern civil society and law. “It is true that the perfection of the
social order consists in the union of force and law; but for this to be so, law must guide
force; whereas according to the ideas of princes about their absolute independence, force
alone, speaking to citizens in the guise of law and to foreigners in the guise of reason of
state, deprives the latter of the power and the former of the will to resist, so that
everywhere the vain name of justice only serves as a shield for violence.”75 Like the
previously examined Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau distinguishes between war and peace
as poles from which to theorize the nature of political organization in society. Yet, unlike
74 Jean Jacques Rousseau, “On the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right” in Cambridge Texts in
the History of Political Thought, Rousseau, The Social Contract and other later political writings, ed.
Victor Gourevitch, 41 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
75 Jean Jacques Rousseau, “The State of War” in Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought,
Rousseau, The Social Contract and other later political writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch, 163 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997).
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Hobbes, and similar to Locke, Rousseau does not believe that the state of nature is a state
of war, and distinguishing himself further from Locke, he puts forth a peaceable nature of
the individual, claiming that war is the product of civil society and could not occur within
a state of nature. Such is the case because war, or a state of war, requires lasting
structures and relations, whereas the state of nature is in a continuous state of flux.
Individuals pursue freedom in the state of nature, yet unlike Locke and Hobbes,
Rousseau’s free individual is not an equal individual. Moreover, the individual in the
state of nature is guided by instinct and not reason to achieve his own survival. While the
desire for self-preservation remains the same, the inequalities of natural freedom are
those which encourage individuals to form a social union. Having agreed to come
together and form a social compact individuals lose their natural freedom, but in the
formation of the general will, a moral and collective body, they enjoy civil freedom and
property, but more importantly, moral freedom. It is moral freedom which truly makes
man a master of himself. That is to say, it overcomes the passionate desires of man,
teaches him to abide by laws and grasp the morality tempering human action. “In order
not to be mistaken about these compensations, one has to distinguish clearly between
natural freedom which has no other bounds than the individual’s forces,” writes
Rousseau, “and civil freedom which is limited by the general will, and between
possession which is merely the effect of force or the right of the first occupant, and
property which can only be founded on a positive title.”76 Unlike his predecessors,
Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau moves beyond the material world and begins to offer an
alternative conception of justice embodied in the general will, flavored with a distinctly
metaphysical and ontological quality. The problem for Rousseau, however, resides in the
76 Jean Jacques Rousseau, “On the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right” op. cit., 54.
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fact that the role of the general will, to shape legislation and guide the use of force has
come to be misunderstood and because of that, the manner in which civil society is
established, and the social compact that supports it, is ill-conceived sustaining individual
suffering.
The creation of the general will guides the formation of the body politic, a whole
self comprised of the constituent selves of the citizens, namely a city. Therein the
sovereign and state come to be. The former the active component of the city and the
latter, the passive constitutive element of the social pact that legislates at the behest of the
general will. If individuals, in the state of nature were equal and guided by justice, and
not instinct, it is very much the case that a social pact among men would not be
necessary. Yet such is not the case. As Rousseau sees fit to point out, “All justice comes
from God, he alone is its source; but if we were capable of receiving it from on high, we
would need neither government nor laws.”77 Bearing this in mind, it falls to the general
will to legislate so as to combine rights and duties and highlight the primary role of
justice in civil society. For it is very much the case that single men, guided by self-
interest and self-love are very much aware of their own desires but not the well-being of
others, but the general will, unaware of individual self-interest is very much determined
to legislate for the entirety of the general will. “Individuals see the good they reject, the
public wills the good it does not see. All are equally in need of guides:” Rousseau writes.
Furthermore, he points out that “The first must be obligated to conform their wills to their
reason’ the other must be taught to know what it wills. Then public enlightenment results
in the union of understanding and will in the social body, from this union results the
77 Jean Jacques Rousseau, “On the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right” op. cit., 66.
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smooth cooperation of the parts, and finally the greatest force of the whole.”78
Surrendering their natural freedom and creating the social compact individual attains
civic equality and freedom and are according to Rousseau, “be forced to be free’.
The true end of self-preservation is peace. Whereas peace, according to Hobbes
and Locke, is achievable through the legitimate creation and maintenance of laws in the
material world, Rousseau believes otherwise. Peace, in his opinion, “conveys to the soul
a fullness of sentiment that makes us love at once our own and other people’s existence,
it represents the bond among the beings that unites them in the universal system, it has its
full breadth only in the mind of God whom nothing that is can harm and who wants the
preservation of all the beings he has created.”79 Thus, a peaceful society is a just society
and so construed, must allow for the general will to fashion and guide the laws employing
force within the state to uphold them. If the general will is denied the capacity to
function as such, individuals are not only denied their natural freedom, they are also
denied their civic equality and moral freedom and are incapable of tempering their
natural instincts and passions. Rousseau is quick to point out that war is not a natural
state of affairs but is rather, “born of peace, or at least of the precautions men have taken
to secure a lasting peace.”80 This is so because war requires lasting and permanent
relations which do not exist in a state of nature, but come about through the structures of
civil society. Moreover, when justice can not prevail and the passions rule there is a
desire to acquire greater degrees of power and force is wielded with this goal thereby
denying peace, construed as happiness, perpetuating the state of war.
78 Jean Jacques Rousseau, “On the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right” op. cit., 68.
79 Jean Jacques Rousseau, “The State of War” op. cit., 173.
80 Jean Jacques Rousseau, “The State of War” op. cit., 163.
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Rousseau’s works provide an account for the necessity of change in social order,
and in so doing understands what is lacking in Hobbes and Locke. He not only locates
the positive role for passions but takes issue with the manner in which both Locke and
Hobbes understand the negative desires and passions of man. Rousseau understands that
constrained with amoral conceptions of right and wrong, void of any ethicality, laws deny
the role for change and also creative outlets for individuals. For at the end of the day,
war is a learned art, a human art and the product of the social order in which the
individual lives. The body politic is man made. It is inert and because of this can easily
be destroyed. This is contrary to the naturalness of man whose desire for self-
preservation leads him to need no more than basic subsistence and a means to survive.
“For the state to endure, the liveliness of its passion must therefore make up for the lack
of liveliness of its movements, and its will must quicken by as much as its power grows
slack. Such is the law of conservation which nature itself establishes among the species
and which maintains them all in spite of their inequality.”81 At the end of the day
however, Rousseau could not overcome the framework in which he was working.
Believing that man was inherently free, but not equal, Rousseau sought to establish a role
for absolute justice within the confines of a compact among men that could not accept its
origins. He believed that it was justice that could temper the passions and produce a just
compact among men. While Rousseau took issue with the natural man of Hobbes and
Locke stating among other things, that these philosophers “only know what they see, and
they have never seen nature. They know well enough what a Londoner or a Parisian is;
but they will never know what a man is.”82 He could not overcome the idea of self-
81 Jean Jacques Rousseau, “The State of War” op. cit., 170.
82 Jean Jacques Rousseau, “The State of War” op. cit., 165.
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interest due to the manner in which he construed his agent. It was, at the end of the day,
that agency, for Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau alike, was a technique arising out of
theoretical first principles, to the detriment of practical principles.
Part III: International Relations & the side-effects of the Social Contract
The social contract theorists sought to discern a response to the problems of
legitimate authority within society. The social contract seeks a legitimate authority
tempering the self-interested nature of men generating laws and institutions ensuring a
fair and equal society. Sustaining a bounded conception of political community
revolving around the rhetoric of negative liberty, it outlines the realms of responsible
action for the state and the individual. As Isaiah Berlin has so famously pointed out, the
tradition they structured has evolved so that contemporary theorists now endeavor to
determine a response to the question; “What is the area within which the subject – a
person or groups of persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be,
without interference by other persons?”83 The influence of this question and the
subsequent attempts to answer it, have been far reaching. Within the contemporary
discipline of International Relations, scholars have noted the ambiguity of a legitimate
governing authority at the international level. Unable to account for an acceptable
universal form of world government scholars have employed the theoretical construct of
the state of nature generating a plausible account of world order and international
governance.
The social contract tradition, however, is problematic and many of the problems
that are noted by critics of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, are also relevant within the
83 Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty. An Inaugural lecture Delivered Before the University of Oxford
on 31 October 1958 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 169.
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understanding of the international environment as well.84 In the first instance, the social
contract tradition sustains a relationship of opposition between the state and individual as
agent and actor within the political sphere. Concerned as it is with the security and
longevity of civil society, the state is the only actor with a legitimate sense of purpose in
the maintenance and sustenance of its citizens. Moreover, the rule based approach to
governance, which clearly delineates between the public and private life of citizens, and
denies a role for emotions and passions, has determined those individuals who are
acceptable political agents and those who are not. Finally, premised as it is on the
artificial legitimacy of the government, the product of the contract, this particular
tradition can not account for any notion of justice beyond fairness which, retrospectively,
increases its dependence on a rule-based methodology. The tradition can not account for
goodness in and of itself located outside the boundaries of the created society and
therefore addresses each and every situation in a similar fashion denying the possibility
of change, uniqueness, and relativity. Together, the sum of these problems represents a
subjective account of international affairs. Examined in light of human suffering, a
phenomenon transgressing the boundaries of the modern political system, the benefits it
seeks to offer are achieved at a high cost of human lives.
Returning briefly to the aforementioned Peace Treaties of Westphalia is to recall
the particular doctrine of sovereignty which emerged therein. It was the hope that, so
construed, this particular doctrine of sovereignty could provide a series of norms
84 Cynthia Helpern, op. cit., notes there is a long and distinguished literature criticizing the social contract
position. Beyond her critique one would do well to look at Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); Seyla Benhabib, “The Generalized and the Concrete Other The
Kholberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory” in Feminism as Critique, ed. By Seyla Benhabib and
Drucilla Cornell, 77-95 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public
Man, Private Woman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); Kathleen Jones, Compassionate
Authority, Democracy and the Representation of Women (London: Routledge 1993); and finally, Alasdair
MacIntyre, After Virtue: a study in moral theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).
• Chapter One • 67
propagating a sterile sense of civility premised on clearly outlined modes of behavior.
Similar to the negative liberty of the social contract, the ideal of sovereignty sustains a
reciprocal disinterest in the domestic ordering of state affairs. On this account, the
function of sovereignty extends the boundaries of public and private into the international
realm of politics. Interpreted in this light, justice and morality function inside the state
and international affairs are deemed anarchical lacking a legitimate form of authority.
Sovereignty, emerging from Westphalia shapes the ideas of International Relations
engendering a specific understanding of ‘the international’ framing the boundaries of
contemporary international affairs.85 It is this idea of inside and outside, of us and them
that when interwoven with the ideas of a state of nature, placed anarchy on a pedestal
generating a ‘war of all against all’ mentality within international affairs.
Sovereignty, so conceptualized, provides both the regulative and constitutive
rules of international engagement. It is at once, a legal relationship binding and guiding
the actions of states, and a normative conception of values aimed at achieving a level of
peace within the international arena.86 The former embodied in the practices of
international trade, the protection offered by international law, the right of diplomatic
relations, and a level of organization within their borders, namely the capacity to develop
and maintain a civil society.87 The normative agenda of Westphalia has proven elusive.
The desire for peace, for human preservation beyond survival flies in the face of the
conflicts to which states constantly bear witness. “Genocidal politics, major international
85 It is a point well noted by Nicholas Rengger “International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem
of Order” op. cit., 9.
86 Richard Falk, The Declining World Order: America’s Imperial Geopolitics (New York: Routledge,
2004), 8. This work points out that it is a normative project that has by and large failed to take hold and
exert any influence in international affairs.
87 At this point, it does well to note the debates about empirical and juridical sovereignty, as well as
negative and positive sovereignty as they relate to the development and internal ordering of the state as
described by Robert H. Jackson, “Quasi-states, dual regimes, and neoclassical theory” op. cit., 519-812.
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and civil wars,” Falk writes, “are indicators of extreme failure, as assessed by common
Westphalian standards of performance.”88 Situated alongside Westphalian sovereignty
the normative agenda represents an attempt to erode the hallmark problem of the
disinterested, yet responsible, subject; namely, the isolated an un-obliged selves emerging
from the subjective account of political engagement. The value of normative Westphalia,
however, lies in its ability to challenge the values of empirical Westphalia and the
structure of political sovereignty it endorses. At the international level an emergent clash
of legal and normative ideals is challenging the supremacy of sovereignty. Championing
the legal doctrine of autonomy, sovereignty does not allow for the intervention into the
affairs of states. Yet the normative agenda of Westphalia questions the civil aims of
sovereignty and, if interpreted as seeking to achieve peace, requires that agents intervene
to mitigate the grosser forms of human suffering that occur therein. To act contrary to
the legal postulates of sovereign equality and autonomy violates the traditional norms of
international engagement yet it would uphold the normative obligation to offer assistance
to those indeed while at the same time obscuring the traditional boundaries of
international affairs. On this account, normative Westphalia relates closely to the
previously mentioned cosmopolitan harm conventions.
Nowhere is this tension better illustrated then in the discourses of human rights
and humanitarian intervention. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, like the
Peace Treaties of Westphalia, is a product of its time. Supporting the normative
Westphalian agenda, the Declaration exists to protect the very dignity of human life
itself. Concerning itself with the welfare of individuals throughout the world, it is the
88 Richard Falk, op. cit., 8.
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final product of an idea that has floated throughout the course of human history.89
December 10, 1948 saw the culmination of the work of the United Nations committee
and brought into force the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, setting a standard
towards which all nations would strive so as to create and foster an environment in which
all individuals could thrive.90 Constrained by the rationalism of Westphalia, and very
much attuned to the modern discourse of sovereignty, the Declaration functions within
the traditional boundaries of international affairs. It explicitly recognizes the
responsibility of the state to care for its citizens and relies on a vague conception of
‘threats to international security’ when seeking outside intervention; however, it
represents a key attempt to challenge the problematic nature of ‘otherness’ in
international affairs. Recognizing for the first time that individuals throughout the world
are linked by a common bond of humanity, the Declaration, assumes that inherent within
each person are the same constitutive ingredients shaping who they are and their
developmental potential. Common human nature links individuals throughout the world,
it argues and regardless of geographic location, religion, ethnicity or race, all individual
possess, in and of themselves, the right to life itself. However, at the end of the day, the
ideals of the Declaration remain hampered by the constitutional world order championing
the norms of international sovereignty and the underlying subjectivity of international
affairs. The success and failures of the Declaration represent the tensions of moral
favoritism and universal equality of Modernity, sovereignty and the over-arching
assumption of universal moral progress.
89 Micheline R. Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Time to the Globalization Era (Berkley,
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004).
90 The United Nations, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” The United Nations,
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html (accessed July 11, 2005).
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Similar to the subject of the social contract position, the rights bearing individual
suffers at a normative level, as the Declaration fails to address the values and ideals upon
which notions of well-being and development must ultimately yield. At the end of the
day, calls to eradicate human rights abuses throughout the world reside generally on ideas
of common humanity. “The idea of human rights,” Dunne and Wheeler point out, “is that
we all have rights by virtue of our common humanity. Individuals have certain kinds of
rights as members of particular communities, but human rights belong to humanity and
do not depend on their existence on the legal and moral practices of different
communities.”91 Humanity requires an understanding of the sameness of self, an
intangible quality that defies the structures of knowledge within which human rights
abuses operate. Unlike an individual who, if you harm, suffers, the suffering of humanity
calls into question the values that support peace, namely mutuality, trust, care and love;
which can ultimately challenge the traditional power discourses of International
Relations. It is an intangible argument which requires, above all else, an account of
obligation that the legal subject cannot sustain. For within a community, an individual
does not generate relationships fostering the ideals of humanity, but rather, engages as an
autonomous and independent subject sustaining otherness failing to comprehend that
inherently, as a member of this common humanity, her well-being is intrinsically
intertwined with the wellbeing of others.92 Bearing this in mind, this work speaks not of
humanity but of being human. Being, in common, connotes an alternative to legal
91 Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Introduction: human rights and the fifty years’ crisis” in Human
Rights in Global Politics, ed. Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999).
92 This is not to argue against humanity. Indeed, notions of common humanity are intrinsically tied to
notions of well-being. It is, rather, to argue that our understanding of the individual as a capable agent,
understood as a rights bearing subject, is detrimental to the proliferation of this idea; an argument that is
tied to the conception of knowledge and the parameters in which scholar in international relations work.
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civility. It promotes personal relationships sustaining a sameness of self and endorsing
the idea of mutual well-being. Mutual well-being challenges the isolated other,
championing the ideals of love sustained through relationships of obligation supporting a
particular understanding of morality and justice, and above all else, an orientation
towards ‘the good’.
At this juncture, yet another tension emerges. The discourse of international
humanitarian intervention notes that action geared towards increasing human well-being
begins at the international level burdening developed states with the responsibility of
helping those within other states to develop as dignified individuals. Yet, emerging out
of the social contract tradition, the state is a pragmatic society which when so understood,
is incapable of escaping the legalism which constitutes its very existence. Situated within
the assumptions of the social contract tradition, the state is the product of human creation,
and reflects the incomplete knowledge structure in which they operate. The rhetoric of
intervention fails to comprehend that as an entity, the state is not obligated and that its
responsibility is the product of the self-same treaties that recognize its very existence.
Due to the tradition in which it has developed, a state, as an association is decidedly
pragmatic and to that end, offers a pragmatic view of morality. Seeking above all else
civility, as the opening section described, states are built not on the relationships of
agents, but on the isolated interactions of individuals as subject. Consequently, the
knowledge required to sustain in the first instance obligation, and beyond that genuine
action, is wholly absent.93 In the end, states fall prey to theoretical first principles and a
93 This is to build on the arguments of John MacMurray, “Persons in relations”, op. cit., who notes the
following: that states developing out of modernity within the social contract framework sustain a pragmatic
interpretation of morality geared not towards mutual ends but rather conformity and stability. Furthermore,
it is to note another point that he makes that agency is the actions of capable individuals, but at the end of
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technical account of being political concerned with power and security, seeking always
stability in an atmosphere of genuine otherness challenging the very idea of humanitarian
action and the values it represents. The rhetoric of human rights and humanitarian
intervention offer a pointed illustration of the genuine moral desire for human equality, at
the same time demonstrating how this equality is at odds with the universality of
Modernity. As was illustrated in the Introduction the moral progress embodied in
humanitarian practices is constrained by sovereignty and the boundaries it upholds.
Even more interesting is that this rhetoric of humanitarian intervention implies
that individuals inhabit a particular space within the international and that within that
space suffer. Moreover, within this space, the capacity of the agent to relieve this
suffering is real. It is in fact, however, a point to be bluntly stated that individuals suffer
within their own domestic environment. Why then, ought a scholar of international
relations, be interested in the domestic well-being of the individual within her state? It is
because, the manner in which the international has gone on to be constituted, as a static
social order, and the values of sovereignty that it seeks to uphold, and the notion of
civility to which it clings by the barest of threads, both substantiates the state and its
domestic environment and in so doing, generates the problem of suffering. As Chapter
Four will demonstrate in more detail, communities need not be bounded and upheld by
the ideals of sovereignty. Sovereignty, as Nicholas Rengger writes, is influential due to
the manner in which international affairs has unfolded throughout history. In light of the
discussions of empirical and juridical sovereignty revealing the sustained inequalities
the day any theory of action must be sustained by a genuine epistemology which, as the investigations of
the previous two sections have demonstrated is absent from the works of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau
emphasizing theoretical knowledge to the detriment of an holistic epistemology incorporating theoretical
and practical first principles.
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both domestically and internationally, it is time to question the value of its function. A
reconception of the philosophical foundations of being human, sustained by a natural law
interpretation of International Relations, reveals that communities need not be bounded
and that the taxonomical value of ‘inside/outside’ ‘us/them’, and ‘domestic/international’
are no longer required. Eliminating the traditional boundaries of political communities
incorporating the first principles of reasonable knowledge, alongside theoretical
knowledge, facilitates a first step in challenging the grosser forms of human suffering.
On this interpretation, the value of a pre-modern investigation of human suffering lies in
its relativity in the face of the universality of Modern moral traditions.
It is the argument, upon which this thesis seeks to elaborate, that the realm of the
international, beyond any systemic, societal, or communal interpretation, provides the
required space to re-conceptualize traditional understandings of knowledge within
International Relations facilitating anew agency, agents, and community. The outcome
of this thought process, culminating in a particular account of ‘being political’ orients its
focus to the well-being and development of all individuals, aware of the very real
capacities and capabilities of individuals, similarly constituted at the ontological level, as
agents of justice. In order to achieve such goals, it is in the first instance, to
conceptualize anew what exactly ‘the international’ is. As Rousseau saw fit to point out,
nature is not a static concept, but human creations are. He provided the space to
understand a particular role for change within the environment of the individual.
International order, however, in its current conception is a static entity, when in reality it
ought to be understood as in a state of flux, for at the end of the day, the contention of
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this work is that there does not exist a natural ordering of international affairs.94
International order presents one axis of the dichotomies of a subjective politics, domestic
and international communities. An objective account of the natural law community,
offered in Chapter Four illustrates the false hope of stability premised on the idea of
international order and negative liberty. On this account of international order, states are
pragmatic societies which isolate individuals from one another understood as subjects
lacking the requisite practical knowledge sustaining action developing their capacities
and capabilities. Attempting to tame the anarchy of international affairs, scholars and
practitioners have sought through the use of laws, rules and institutions to provide
regulatory practices in order to overcome the lack of information and clear intentions that
contribute to the problems of insecurity. As the opening section forcefully argued the
combined effect of all of these facts remains; international order, within international
relations seeks a static ordering of ends, perpetuating a sense of otherness belying the
innate teleology of individuals and communities. Denying a specific role for morality
and justice, relying as it does on false boundaries and a subjective account of politics,
these accounts of order reflect Rousseau’s conclusions; namely, that war relates to the
peculiar creations of man.
International analyses, to date, represent a piecemeal fragmentation of past
histories which ultimately hinge upon the idea of power politics and security cloaked in
the discourse of liberty and rights. Through the acquisition and maintenance of power, it
is assumed that states can temper the anarchical nature of the international. It is an
emphasis that has ultimately led to the misrepresentation of the international as a fixed
94 Steve Smith, “is the truth out there? Eight questions about international order,” in International Order
and the Future of World Politics, eds. T.V. Paul & John A. Hall, 9-119 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999).
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and static entity capable of being harnessed and governed by the actors that constitute its
structure; however, such is not the case. The contention herein is that regardless of one’s
particular interpretation of the international, be it systemic, societal or communal, it
fundamentally misconstrues the nature of the international and fails to appreciate that
which it ought to examine in the first place, relationships. It is perhaps bizarre to note
that in a discipline that calls itself International Relations, there is a decided lack of
relationships that exist in and amongst the primary actors of international affairs. It
should come as little surprise, given the historical trajectory of political theory that such
is the case. The epistemological assumptions as they relate to world order delineate
between acceptable and non-acceptable forms of knowledge, and in so doing, generate a
series of sterile and civil interactions that negate the possibility of caring and loving
relationships as a means to overcome anarchy and generate trust; however, relationships
provide the key to understanding anew the international and at the same time, provide the
means to overcome the decidedly negative orientation of its actions. Similar to the ideas
of Carl Schmitt ‘the international’ takes the idea of ‘the political’ one step further.95 As
Schmitt sought to highlight what was most real was the distinction between friend and
foe because it was in this particular dichotomy that one began to understand the very
fragility of life and the very real and un-escapable fact of human death; however, one
could not understand this fact of the human condition within the state. As Schmitt was
keen to show liberal states are ill-equipped, and its value orientation so at odds with real
life, that it is impossible to understand the friend/enemy distinction within politics, hence
95 Carl Schmidtt, The Concept of the Political, translation, introduction, and noted by George Schwab; with
Leo Strausss’s notes on Schmitt’s essay; translated by J. Harvey Lomax; forward by Tracy B. Strong
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
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he employs the very metaphysical terminology of ‘the political’.96 In the same vein, ‘the
international’ is used throughout this thesis to distinguish from the traditional conceptions
of world order associated with international affairs articulating an alternative account of
being political within international relations.
As it does not exist in space or time, the idea of ‘the international’ is very much a
metaphysical entity. One cannot grasp it, nor can one witness it in motion. The product
of the relations of its constitutive members, the international is a dynamic entity
sustaining its own teleological ends derived from the essence and being of the individual
as an agent of justice. A fluid entity, the international changes and adapts to the ever
evolving values and ideals as they relate to the constantly changing requirements of the
individual pursuing her own individual well-being. To that end, ‘the international’ fails
to conform to traditional ideas of world order. It is neither a system nor a society, but is
rather a structure that is created, supported and maintained by the wide variety of agents
that constitute its very being. It has an ontological status derived from the same ontology
that supports the essence and being of the individual. But that is not to say that the
international is only the sum of its individual parts. Emanating out of that particular
ontology is an independent teleology that understands the actions and motivations of
individuals and seeks to ensure that as political agents they have the resources to act as
agents of justice. Moreover, as a teleological entity, it is very much a malleable and fluid
entity and contra the popular theories of order that are challenged by the changing nature
of the international, it is only when the international is static that one ought to begin to
show signs of worry. At the end of the day, as the nature of the constitutive agents
96 Charles E. Frye, “Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political” The Journal of Politics. 28, no. 4 (November
1966): 818-830.
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change and adapt to their experiences and their knowledge and understanding further
develops the ideals, values and goals they deem worthy, so to do the structures that guide
what has been referred to mistakenly as international order change as well. To impose a
fixed identity and associated conception of order is not only impossible, but a futile
attempt to quell the problems associated with the discourse of anarchy and to further
complicate attempts at overcoming the grosser forms of human suffering and reaching
out to those that bear its burdens.
What this alternative idea of the international provides is a move beyond the
constraints of sovereignty, and a real opportunity to develop a strong sense of justice and
elaborate on the ideals and values that support the actions geared towards its long term
acceptance and development. As a metaphysical and ontological entity, the international
is that political space linking agents of justice and supporting mutually rewarding
relationships. It is to put forth the idea of relationships based on common interests,
values and ideals from an agreed upon end. Vis a vis the particular problem of human
suffering, the particular end in question is human development, well-being and
fulfillment. However, in light of both the criticism offered of International Relations in
general, and world order in particular, this end is not a static end. As individuals and
their communities acquire knowledge and experiences their ideas regarding individual
and communal development change. Thus, the ends of well-being and fulfillment are in
constant flux changing to meet the needs of individuals. In order to support this
teleological account of being political within the concept of ‘the international’ a strong
understanding of ethics and an associated understanding of justice and morality is
required. To that end, this thesis, while developing an alternative account to agency and
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agents seeks, by way of criticism, to offer an illustrative example of one manner in which
the boundaries of International Relations and international affairs can be re-
conceptualized. The ensuing work emphasizes relationships in order to develop an
account of morality, motivating agents to pursue ‘the good’. Articulating an ethic of
love, this morality reveals a creative mode of justice challenging the traditional
boundaries upheld by sovereignty. Offering an account of moral agency, this work
argues that agents of justice, as beings in common, can exercise a degree of influence
which translates into viable political power. Properly channeled this power can affect
positive political and social change articulation through a combination of theoretical and
practical principles the art of ‘being political’.
Conclusion
Is a more nuanced account of being political, derived from the personal
relationships of individuals’ plausible, or even a credible endeavor? Similar to the ideas
of John Dryzek who envisions a particular role for discourses as a means to generate
transnational democracy, so to can moral relationships challenge the traditional
epistemology that shape the ideal types of International Relations.97 The reality of the
global environment is such that individuals today are interconnected as such a high level
then ever before in history. This is not to bring into the fold, the notion of globalization
and the associated homogeneity criticism which it fosters. Rather, in reiterating the
interconnected lives that a majority of individuals, living within the domestic state share,
is to note the newly developing capacities of individuals acting as agents of justice.
Throughout history the state has been a purposeful actor as it was the sole means in
97 John Dryzek, Deliberative Global Politics, Discourse and Democracy in a Divided World (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2006).
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which the activity of international engagement could be conceptualized. This is no
longer the case. Individuals, conceptualized as agents, are now perfectly situated to
challenge the purpose of the state.98 Articulating a philosophical account of the moral
agent, this work tackles the contemporary problem of ‘being’ in order to demonstrate the
value of the individual as an agent of justice.
Elaborating on the idea of dominion naturale, this account of being political
develops the intricate relationship between action and knowledge required to sustain an
objective account of political agency. Emphasizing the innate social and political nature
of the individual, the natural law framework elaborates on the anthropology of being
tying one’s actions and decisions to one’s very essence engendering a need for a strong
sense of morality tempering human development. In so doing, this account of natural
agency and the natural law agent provides, by way of a living example, how individuals
oriented around like minded goals and ideals, through the vehicle of relationships can
develop the required trust challenging the traditional knowledge gap within international
affairs. In so doing, it seeks above all else to foster genuine fellowship, oriented around
shared intentions permeating ‘the international’ challenging the traditional insecurity and
anarchy within which power politics generally unfolds. In effect, it is to place the
individual at the center of international engagement so as to challenge the pervasive
problem of human suffering offering an alternative framework to theorize about human
welfare within the ordering of the natural world addressing always the question- how
ought the individual to be treated?
98 This statement does not discount a role for the state in international affairs in order to address human
well-being and development. As the Epilogue will demonstrate a particular institutional ordering presents
both the individual and the state as capable agents; however, the emphasis on the individual, at this
particular time is only to redress the power imbalance in the relationship each has with the other. A pre-
modern approach distinguishes in the first instance, the equality of this relationship.
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The overarching aim of this work is to engage in the particular task of institutional
design, “to encourage experimentation with different structures in different places”99 and
in so doing locate that particular space whereby agents are actively political. That space,
the international, is deeply personal. It seeks, above all else to challenge the impartial
rule governed conception of civil society premised on the relationships of real people. It
bridges the actual and the metaphysical, interweaving knowledge of the material, social
and ontological modes of existing developing a conception of the community that grows
and mutates as the relationships of individuals evolve over time. The outcome of this
thought experiment, it is hoped, is not to theorize on the idea of institutional design per
se, but rather, to create the space whereby positive agency promotes such a conception of
justice and brings morality and ethicality into the mainstream of international politics
demonstrating, above all else, that individuals as agents of justice are honing and
developing their capacities and capabilities to affect change. It seeks to put forth an
account of living ethically within a community that understands the appeal of universally
upheld rules but at the same time, noting the limitations of an unquestioned and
universally accepted rule based methodology. This work thus seeks, by way of a critical
appraisal of epistemology, to articulate a more partial, relative, and personal approach to
relations within the international. In so doing, it seeks to provide a tempered critique of
International Relations offering a proactive account of international affairs incorporating
both theoretical and practical knowledge as a means to both understand and explain its
events.
This thesis will, in the next chapter, investigate the tradition of natural law, both
historical and contemporary as a means to shape and structure the overarching arguments
99 Robert E. Goodin, op. cit., 42.
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of this thesis. An examination of the relationship of its ontological, methodological, and
epistemological claims provides an interesting alternative to understanding the individual,
the community and institutions therein. Moreover, its differentiation in and among
universal absolutes and second order normative claims, substantiated by a particular
understanding of morality, ethics and practical reasonableness provides a foundation
upon which to premise the ideas of the natural law agent and agency sustaining a
casuistic interpretation of natural law morality.
Chapter Three focuses explicitly on the works of St. Thomas Aquinas and shows
how his metaphysics provide the foundation upon which to begin to understand the
powers of individuals as agents. An examination of his notion of freedom, human
capacity and capability and action provide the anthropological foundation upon which to
understand the potential of all individuals as political and moral agents. This is followed
by a critique of the human rights discourse ultimately highlighting the predisposition of
the natural law agent to moral development as beings in common.
Chapter Four offers an acute critique of the societies which shape international
affairs noting, to the detriment of the development of the agent, the exclusion of moral
and ethical principles. Building on the natural law account of agency and agent, this
chapter offers an image of natural law communities resting ultimately on the equal
relationships of social and political agents. Employing the ideal of equality postulated by
the Theologians at the School of Salamanca, this chapter builds on the tradition of
morality first examined by Aquinas in order to provide an account of the political
communities premised on action, oriented around the ultimate ends of human happiness.
In so doing it provides an alternative function for laws, as the norms of justice, upholding
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the ends of human happiness, and not the boundaries of the contemporary political
societies.
Chapter Five ends by way of an examination of care ethics and the ethic of love
arguing that it is the ethics of love, extending out of the ethic of care that provides the
means to articulate and actualize the ideas of the natural law tradition demonstrating their
relevance to the contemporary discourses of international relations. It transposes the
ideas of civility with personableness and returns to the age old problems generated by the
sovereignty discourse. It ends by way of an articulation of an alternative to the rule based
methodology of international relations and argues that a commitment to morality
generates repeated actions fostering trust paving the way out of insecurity and fear
replacing traditional ideas of power with development and well-being challenging the
inside/outside barrier of international relations. In so doing, it seeks to overcome the
pervasive problem of ‘otherness’ in international affairs promoting being in common.
Chapter Two
Agency & Structure:
The Traditions of Natural Law and Casuistry
“If there are no ethical absolutes, human persons, rather than being the norm and source
from which other things receive their value, become simply items or commodities with a
relative value-inviolable only up to the point at which it is expedient to violate them in
order to achieve an objective. It would then make no sense at all to speak of the
immeasurable value of the human person. Far from being immeasurable-that is, beyond
calculation-the value of a person would be quite specific and quantifiable, something to
be weighed in the balance against other values.”
Germain Grisez & Russell Shaw,
Beyond the new morality: the responsibilities of freedom.
Introduction
The state is the primary unit in International Relations. Regardless of whether it
is a black box, as systemic theories would posit, or a community or society, as others
would argue, approaches to world order begin with an understanding of the state as the
primary actor in international affairs. Yet, it ought to be clear, emerging out of the
previous chapter, that this situation is the result of a particular reading of sovereignty
shaping one way of being political. Contrary to this reading of international affairs, the
interpretation of ‘the international’ points to an entirely different conceptualization of
‘being political’. Developing further this idea of ‘the international’ this chapter
investigates the tradition of natural law in which to situate a proactive and inclusive
account of moral agency. Coalescing around shared areas of interest, relationships
provide institutional patterns structuring political engagements. Understood as “stable,
valued, recurring patterns of behavior,”1 this informal institutionalization is at odds with
1 Robert E. Goodin, op cit.
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constitutionalism; however, it provides the metaphysical site whereby agency can occur
outside traditional sites of power and authority. Purposefully vague, relationships focus
individual aims within a communal setting providing the means to establish the required
degree of human fellowship and understand anew the agency/structure relationship within
contemporary ideas of world order. Lacking the boundaries of contemporary politics,
this account calls for a strong sense of morality and justice orienting laws and shaping
human action sustaining the development of individual relationships.
The following is an examination of the natural law, as an historical and ethical
tradition. Detailing the development of ethics as a discipline, the opening section of this
chapter illustrates how ethics offers a rational understanding of the individual and
community, similarly influenced by Modernity’s ideal of scientific empiricism.
Critiquing this development, and building on the ideas of Alastair MacIntyre, it notes the
lack of a teleological component of being within contemporary ethical discourses;
however, unlike MacIntyre, the critique offered herein turns not towards the idea of
Virtue Ethics, but rather investigates the idea and tradition of Natural Law in order to
frame the ‘the international’. Describing the works of the ‘new natural lawyers’, the
second section of this chapter looks at the viability of contemporary natural law
interpretations within International Relations developing an account of human agency
alongside ‘the international’. Noting the problems associated with the ‘new natural law’
the final section of this chapter investigates the role of casuistry alongside natural law
sustaining a methodology in line with an agent centered approach to politics. Arguing
that the seemingly innovative natural law of the ‘new natural lawyers’ is in fact a rational
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account of ethics, this chapter refashions the relationship of structure and agency,
developing a framework in which to situate an objective account of international affairs.
Natural law (ius naturale)2 encapsulates the idea of law as an art and a science. It
is concerned with a human and divine knowledge of things (divinarum atque humanarum
rerum notitia), a theory of right and wrong (iusti attque iniusti scientia), and with the
furtherance of what is good and equitable (ars boni et aequi).3 Seeking to ascertain ‘the
good’, natural law examines the relationships between ‘ought’ and ‘is’, between the ideal
and the real, revealing an absolute standard of justice.4 The epistemological and
methodological assumptions supporting the absolute standard of justice require clear
ontological support which is the result of a highly developed knowledge of the essence of
being. As the natural law exits a priori to human experience, it is only through human
interaction in the natural and social world that an individual accumulates the requisite
knowledge of the sensory world, and in the process, acquires an understanding of the
laws of nature.5 Natural law, on this account, is the participation of the agent in the first
theoretical and practical principles of life. Endorsing a particular account of morality and
advocating always the ideal of integral human fulfillment, natural law distinguishes itself
as one ethical tradition among many that utilizes the idea of reasonableness offering an
2 In any instance when a Latin term is given, as a root definition, it will be accompanied in the text by an
English translation, which will then be employed throughout the remainder of this work.
3 A.P. d’Entreves, Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy (London: Hutchinson House, 1951),
19-22 & 95.
4 Yves R. Simon, The Tradition of Natural Law: A Philosopher’s Reflections, edited by Vukan Kuic; with
an introduction by Russell Hittinger (New York: Fordham University Press, 1992), 137.
5 Heinrich A. Rommen, The Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and Philosophy
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 1998), 143-148.
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understanding of the individual and the community that is at once mutually constitutive,
understanding the political and social nature of human development.6
Natural law has enjoyed an ambiguous relationship with the discipline of
International Relations.7 It is however an interesting history as natural law has, time and
again, provided the necessary justification for subverting accepted political structures.
As Sophocles’ Antigone argues to avoid almost certain punishment having prepared her
brother’s body for burial against the edict of the state, political structures are fallible in
the face of more ethereal notions of justice.
That order did not come from God. Justice,
That dwells with the gods below, knows no
such law.
I did not think your edicts strong enough
To overrule the unwritten unalterable laws
Of God and heaven, you only being a man.
They are not of yesterday or today, but
everlasting,
Though where they came from, none of us
can tell.
Guilty of their transgression before God
I cannot be, for any man on earth.8
Antigone’s rebellion offer’s one of many attempts of agency to subvert accepted political
structures.9 In the same rebellious sense, the ends of natural law morality are employed
throughout this work framing a philosophical account of the moral agent and agency
accommodating ‘the international’. The teleology of natural law, and its account of
6 Practical reasonableness, as a methodology has enjoyed a distinct evolution. While Aristotle referred to
this human capacity as eudaimonia, Aquinas referred to it as prudentia. While the methodology has been
interpreted in light of the times, it is important to note that the idea of a universal good, and the teleology of
being associated with it has remained constant and is a key characteristic of the moral tradition.
7 For a particularly in-depth history of the use and abuse of the natural law within international relations see
the work of E.B.F Midgley, The Natural Law Tradition and the Theory of International Relations (London:
Elek, 1975).
8 Sophocles, Antigone, ed., Mark Griffith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
9 Kathleen B. Jones, “Citizenship in a Woman-Friendly Polity” Journal of Women in Culture and Society
15, no. 4 (1990): 781-812.
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justice highlight individual freedom creating a safe place, metaphysically speaking, in
which relationships can thrive and human agency rooted in human reason and action can
challenge restrictive social and political structures.
Natural law revolves around the idea of reasonableness. This capacity to reason,
displayed by all of nature’s creatures refers to the interplay of incorporeal and corporeal
knowledge, the outcome of which is human action. It assumes a quizzical disposition
encouraging individual experience through human interaction sustaining an increased
amount of knowledge. Reasonableness is the outcome of a tripartite relationship of
assumptions, ontological, epistemological and methodology. The ontological essence of
being engenders an epistemonical entity eager to participate and acquire an understanding
of the world in which it is situated. This epistemonical entity is the method through
which an acute understanding of morality and justice emerge as human interaction, and
participation, fosters a distinct understanding of appropriate and inappropriate behavior.
So understood, natural law displays a teleological orientation interested, in the end with
ethical behavior, elucidating an interpretation of morality and justice related to the idea of
the prudent individual.
Part I: Natural Law & Institutional Design
Historical and contemporary natural law assumptions reveal the primacy of the
individual. As an epistemonical entity, seeking to acquire first knowledge, and then an
understanding of the natural and social world, the natural law individual is a free being,
imbued at the outset with a natural teleology. A natural motivation, the product of the
ontological source of being and essence, it is this teleological spirit that motivates
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individuals to constitute themselves as moral beings.10 A distinctly personal task, moral
constitution requires first, an understanding of morality and justice, emerging as one
engages with other individuals, so constituted. Arising from these relationships is the
natural law community; however, to place primary emphasis on the role of the individual
within the natural law tradition is a misnomer as individuals develop morally in common.
Key to the essence and being of the natural law individual is an innate sociability and
thus an intrinsic emphasis on human engagements. Individual relations found the natural
law epistemology constituting the community providing the structures in which
individuals further develop the first principles of knowledge. Added to the ontological,
epistemology and methodological assumptions of the natural law is a symbiosis of
individual and community purpose. Working together, these two entities provide the
means to understand the nature of justice and morality, stemming from the natural
teleology of the individual, imbued with the self-same ontology and teleological
orientation towards ‘the good’.
This particular set of assumptions have enjoyed a distinct history and have
evolved in and out of fashion as societies have altered their ideas on what constitutes a
good political order. First reference is made to the ideas of a higher natural law in the
plays of Sophocles, in particular his works Antigone and Oedipus the King.11 Natural
10 The essence and being of the individual, examined in greater detail in Chapter Three, is referred to as an
individual’s quiddity, “The real nature or essence of a thing: that which makes a thing what it is.” The
ontology of the individual, within the natural law tradition, draws on the work of Aquinas and has been
interpreted in a variety of ways. Suffice to note, in the ensuing section, one particular interpretation, that of
basic human goods is offered as one example. As will be elaborated on in greater detail, the quiddity of the
individual and the community originate in the essence of being, and transition from incorporeal knowledge
to corporeal knowledge through the participatory engagement with the natural law, understood as the first
principles of life found within the intellect and will of the agent. It is this particular development that
demonstrates how ontology is related to epistemology and methodology within the natural law tradition.
11 A constant theme in Greek literature, natural law was a rhetorical device, used by many artisans, seeking
to understand their own place in a larger cosmology from which an account of morality can be derived. In
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law, for the Ancients, as William Orton points out, facilitated an understanding of order,
contrasting the mythical or semi-mythical ideas of their historical predecessors.12 The
idea of a higher natural law was furthered in the works of Aristotle who popularized the
idea of individual telos, and individuals situated within the cosmos, a well-rounded nature
intent on achieving ‘the good’.13 These ideas continued to be debated in the Stoic
tradition yet it was the works of Aquinas which resurrected the tradition. Interweaving
the pagan ideas of Aristotle within a distinctly Catholic framework, Aquinas’s ideas
breathed new life into a faltering ethical tradition. “The attempt to understand morality in
the legalistic terms of a natural law is ancient but is now mostly associated with the
formulation given it by Thomas Aquinas,” writes Knud Haakonssen. “Earlier natural law
is commonly seen as leading up to Aquinas’s paradigmatic version, whereas later natural
law is understood as deriving from it.”14 Aquinas developed the idea of prudentia,
sustaining the tripartite relationship of ontology, epistemology and methodology that
subsequently shaped the ideas of the Scholastic Tradition, and the works of Vitoria, Las
Casas, Molina and De Soto.15 In the same vein as Aquinas, these authors put forth the
Sophocles’ Oedipus the Kings, the chorus sings of laws created by heaven and sustained by the Gods which
moral man has no particular role developing or creating them. In Antigone, the character by the same name
speaks of Justice, existing at the level of the Gods, but finding no place in the world of mortal men
consequently hindering the ability of mortals to decide on the morality of human action alone. See for
example, Sophocles, Oedipus Rex, edited by R.D. Dawe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982)
and Sophocles, Antigone, op. cit.
12 William Orton, “The Sources of Natural Law” International Journal of Ethics 36, no. 2 (January 1926):
150.
13 Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics: A History of Moral Philosophy from the Homeric Age to
the Twentieth Century (Cornwall: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1995), 61.
14 Kund Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy from Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 15.
15 These works will be investigated in more detail in the closing section of this chapter and again
throughout this work. In particular, it is in Chapter Four where the ideas of dominion naturale, natural
dominion, a shared essence and being are delved into demonstrating how this shared ontology provides the
means to understand individuals as like minded entities and how without it, individuals become nothing
more than a subject with rights, the product of one particular moment in time without a history, or sense of
purpose.
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idea of an ordered universe, the Thomist hierarchy of eternal, natural and positive law,
and the tripartite relationships of ontology, methodology and epistemology.16
Working within the tripartite relationship of Thomist assumptions Vitoria and Las
Casas, and others were able to show how a common ontology revealed a natural
dominion, demonstrating a universal capacity to reason and deliberate. With the human
capacity to reason, however primitive, the Salamanca Theologians argued, came a
responsibility to care and treat others in an upright and moral fashion. Capable of
discerning an understanding of morality and justice, such beings required the self-same
ethical treatment. Consequently, the works of the Salamanca Theologians and their
Thomist descendents provided a discourse of obligation and responsibility arguing that
educated individuals are burdened with an ethical mandate to care and educate those less
enlightened, but equally capable beings. This ontological sameness evident in reasonable
deliberations facilitated the acceptance of diverse communities openly accepting
alternative moral customs and norms. Articulating an equality of being, the Salamanca
Theologians were able to safely endorse a policy of pluralism and care couched in the
relativity of pre-modern philosophy and theology. It is this idea of equality reflected in
cosmopolitan discourses which remains challenged by the universality of Modernity’s
assumptions.
The assumptions associated with the reviewed view of Modernity and the ensuing
enlightenment philosophies significantly altered the assumptions of natural law.
Ontology was forsaken for stability and faith and reason, key components of prudentia,
were replaced by a responsibility to the self, and egocentric agency. As Richard Rorty
16 Bernice Hamilton, Political Thought in Sixteenth-Century Spain: A Study of the political ideas of Vitoria,
De Soto, Suarez and Molina (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 5.
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demonstrates, it is the works of Locke, building on the ideas of Rene Descartes,
subsequently interpreted and re-organized in the ideas of Immanuel Kant that a formal
theory of knowledge came to overshadow the metaphysical and ontological assumptions
of the pre-modern era. “Descartes’s invention of the mind-his coalescence of beliefs and
sensations into Lockean ideas-gave philosophers new ground to stand on. It provided a
field of inquiry which seemed ‘prior’ to the subjects on which the ancient philosophers
had had opinions,” he writes. “Further, it provided a field within which certainty, as
opposed to mere opinion, was possible.”17 In the same vein, Jacques Maritain
distinguishes an ontological and non-ontogical method of analyzing the world, the former
associated with the work of pre-modern philosophers, the latter with the ideas of
Descartes and those endorsing the ideas of Modernity.18 “Today the place of metaphysics
is being usurped by logical positivism, whose great discovery is that all assertions which
are worthy of the intellect have no meaning at all,” he writes. “The only way to get rid of
these evils is to recognize the proper field of competence and the autonomy of our
various approaches to reality, at the various stages of the universe of truth, and the unity
of order of human knowledge.”19 These subtle changes are reflected in the works of
Pufendorf, Thomasius, Leibniz and Wolff all of whom were influenced by the works of
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean Jacques Roussau.
Articulating what is now referred to as a classical account of International
Relations, the works of these authors paved the way for a new interpretation of natural
17 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1980), 136 & 137.
18 Jacques Maritain, The Range of Reason (New York: Scribner, 1952), 8.
19 Jacques Maritain, Philosophy and the Unity of the Sciences, Address by Jacques Maritain at the twenty-
seventh annual meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, University of Notre Dame, 7
April 1953. transcribed from a typewritten manuscript. Jacques Maritain Center, University of Notre
Dame, http://www.2nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/jm209.htm
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law. Examined cumulatively the epistemology shaping these works emphasized the state,
and firmly entrenched the individual as a domestic subject represented by a domestic
government. International affairs came to reflect the notion of ius gentium- a law of
nations. On this account international politics were conducted in the strictest of terms.
Diplomatic deference was paid to international treaties which provided the sought after
political stability in the absence of genuine authority and internal affairs remained a
distinctly private practice. The plurality of political communities was forsaken in light of
the universal epistemology shaping the works of these authors. Coupled with the
boundaries of international state sovereignty the value of pluralism evident in moral
customs and norms throughout the world was forsaken for the elusively sought after
certainty and stability. The hierarchy and mutability of laws first established by Aquinas
and sustained in the scholastic interpretation of natural law could not survive in such a
political climate and the ethos of care, responsibility and obligation transcending moral
communities was firmly placed in the responsibility of state leaders. The classical age of
international politics had arrived sweeping metaphysical and ontological assumptions
under the carpet.
The consequence of these shifting assumptions was far reaching. In particular, it
wreaked havoc on the nature of the relationship of agency and structure and the
determination of morality and justice therein. “The unusual feature of medieval Christian
thought,” writes Brian Tierney, “is that both values-the value of individual persons and
the value of Christian community-were asserted with equal passion.”20 Aquinas and the
Salamanca Theologians sought to achieve a harmonious individual/community
20 Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, natural law and church law, 1150-1625 (Grand Rapids,
Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Col, 2001), 212.
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relationship understanding the reciprocal nature of agency and structure providing
dynamic ordering of affairs. What these scholars understood, as John MacMurry points
out, was that the interrelation of individuals, as agents, is the very foundation of morality.
“It provides a reference beyond themselves for all possible intentions in virtue of which
they can be either right or wrong, and this rightness or wrongness is neither technical nor
aesthetic, but moral,” he goes on to writes. “Its corollary is that the freedom of any
agent-that is to say, his capacity to realize his own being as an agent-is condition,
inherently, by the action of all other agents. My freedom depends upon how you
behave.”21 This very idea of mutuality, stemming from a singular quiddity promotes a
moral ontology that is simultaneously inward and outward articulation an obligation of
love respecting the natural equality of being.22 The focus on epistemology, to the
detriment of ontology, within the discipline of philosophy, coupled with the historical
influence of Westphalia, engendered a move away from the mutuality of being, towards a
more pragmatic reading of the state, morality and justice void of any ontological
foundation.23 The values of the medieval era, embodied in the ideas of Aquinas and the
Scholastic tradition in particular, placing an equal value in the community and the
individual, emphasizing a natural teleology, was placed outside the acceptable boundaries
21 John MacMurry, “Persons in relation” op. cit., 9.
22 More will be said on justice in the closing chapter of this work. Suffice to note at this point that a shared
individual ontology provides the means to understand how loving one another, in the agapistic tradition,
provides an alternative reading to justice beyond the economic notion of ‘to each his due’ as is found in the
traditional discourses of International Relations. What is important to note at this particular point is the
way in which a singular ontology that is isolated and egocentric fails to provide the required ontology to
develop a genuine understanding of justice, in the same way that morality has also been affected by the loss
of ontological support.
23 This particular idea will be investigated in more detail in the final chapter of this work. Suffice to note
with the loss of ontology the distributive justice reigns supreme over commutative interpretations. This
proportional reading of justice is concerned with fairness and equality and in its contemporary form has
come to be associated with social or distributive justice. Justice on this account is bounded, relating to the
internal government of states conforming to the norms of international sovereignty limiting the potential for
agents to act on their natural obligation and responsibility limited by the ends of anarchy in international
affairs.
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of political agency. At this point natural law formally attached itself to the institution and
discourses of the Roman Catholic Church and the Papacy. Evident in a variety of Papal
Encyclicals published throughout the 19th and 20th century, in particular Rerum navarum
(1891), Casti Conuubii (1930), Humanae Vitae (1968), and Redempter Hominis (1979),
the individual’s ability to reason and act morally remained grounded in the just and moral
political community; however, religion, in light of the received view of Modernity,
remained outside the mainstream of political engagements alongside reason and emotion,
further contributing to the epistemological grounding of modern political institutional
design.24
The onset of WWI, the ensuing inter-war debates captured in the ideas of the
classical realists, and the onset of WWII facilitating large scale human tragedy, generated
questions regarding the ends of this particular ordering of international affairs. The hope
placed in modernity’s assumptions on rational empiricism, laws, rules, and the idea of a
grand strategy of design was increasingly questioned.25 The malaise, originally
associated wit the political unrest of the received view of Modernity, re-oriented its
critique demanding a practical investigation into the traditional structuring of
international affairs. It was, at this time that the assumptions of the morality of natural
law resurfaced as evidenced in the documented conversations surrounding the
development of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations
Education, Science and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) working group. Scholars such
as Jacques Maritain began to articulate the practicality of reasonable action sustaining a
24 This is well documented in The Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social
Doctrine of the Church (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2004).
25 For a detailed account of the dominance of the social contract beyond modernity and into the
contemporary era, see the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, “A Short History of Ethics” op. cit.
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moral vision of international affairs bridging the plurality of moral communities within a
bounded conception of international politics.26 “It would doubtless not be easy, but it
would be possible, to establish a common formulation of these practical conclusions or,
in other words, of the different rights recognized as pertaining to the human being, in his
personal and social existence,” writes Maritain. “On the other hand, it would be quite
hopeless to look for a common rational justification of those practical conclusions and of
those rights.”27 Rational justification, on his interpretation is limited to an agreement of
philosophical underpinnings which, understood in light of the plurality of moral
communities constituting the newly emerging United Nations community would prove
difficult to achieve. “As long as there is no unity of faith or of philosophy between
human beings, the sphere of rational justification will remain one of division,” he
concludes. “Only in the sphere of practical assertions (at which each man arrives along
speculative lines and by different or contrasting justifications) is an agreement – itself
practical – possible.”28 Jacques Maritain and the UNESCO team sought to avoid the
philosophical problems of ontology and epistemology seeking only to secure the well-
26 Jacques Maritain represents one scholar writing of many representing the natural law in both an historical
and contemporary form. Other scholars, whose work is cited throughout this work include Etienne Gilson,
Yves R. Simon, and Mortimer J. Alder. Their works were, in the first instance, motivated by the political
and religious unrest in France. It was a continuation of the modern debate concerning the preeminence of
epistemology to the detriment of ontology, leading to the contemporary problem of ‘being’. Each of these
authors sought to redress this problem in their own particular way. Maritain is of intrinsic importance here
because he professed the value of a Thomist interpretation, beyond the historical understanding of his work
and sought, throughout his lifetime to develop a contemporary philosophical interpretation of the works of
Aquinas to analyze contemporary problems. See for example, John F. X. Kansas, ed. Jacques Maritain:
the Man and His Metaphysics. [Volume IV of Etudes maritainiennes/Maritain Studies.] Mishawaka, IN:
American Maritain Association, 1988. He was, in his own way, involved in the task of institutional design.
27 Jacques Maritain, Communication with regard to the Draft World Declaration on the Rights of Man,
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Paris, 18 June 1947. The United
Nations, via UNESCO Archives, http://www.un.org
28 Jacques Maritain, “Communication” op. cit.
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being of future generations of the global population.29 In the same vein as the Salamanca
Theologians and Aquinas before them, Maritain attempted to demonstrate the viability of
reason and action sustaining a plurality of norms and customs oriented around an ethos of
care respecting the universal equality of being. What he and his associates could not
foresee, was the unfolding of the Cold War and the detrimental effects power, insecurity
and the ensuing arms build-up would have on the institution and its aims.
The realpolitik ethos surround the Cold War denied any viable institutional
innovation. The traditional explanation of international politics remained focused on the
state, reflecting the self-interest, power, and anarchy highlighted by the discourses of
neo-realism. As hierarchical institutions became further entrenched within international
affairs, the innovative capacity of individuals and communities countering the dominance
of the state became increasingly difficult. Philosophical considerations of human well-
being and development continued, albeit outside the discourses of International Relations
per se. Alistair MacIntyre represents one scholar whose examination of Modernity and
contemporary morality offered interesting conclusions on the philosophical image of the
rights-bearing subject. Arguing that morality in the contemporary era, is comprised of
fragments of past ideas, his critique of Moderniy’s hold on contemporary moral
philosophy concluded that society has completely lost its understanding of the nature of
morality full-stop. “What we possess, if this is true, are fragments of a conceptual
scheme, parts of which now lack contexts from which their significance is derived,” he
writes. “We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the key
29 This task, and the diverse points of view brought to the discussions is well documented by UNESCO.
See, The United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Human Rights, Comments and
Interpretations. A symposium edited by UNESCO with an introduction by Jacques Martian (London &
New York: Allan Wingate).
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expressions. But we have-very largely, it not entirely-lost our comprehension, both
theoretical and political, of morality.”30 Morality, he contends, in its true conception, is
at odds with the epistemology of Modernity. In order to rectify this particular problem he
offers the Aristotelian idea of the Eudaimon, the well rounded individual, seeking ‘the
good’ driven by an individual teleology seeking to become a truly virtuous being.31 The
Eudaimon, unlike the modern subject, is a dynamic agent informed of morality through
historical processes educating him or her in the expected roles and customs of a moral
society.32 In his own particular way, MacIntyre engages both political and philosophical
assumptions in order to investigate, and offer alternatives to, contemporary institutional
design. Like Maritain before him, although within an entirely different framework,
MacIntyre highlights the centrality of telos and the teleology of being within the
discourses of contemporary political philosophy challenging the modern assumptions of
stability and predictability in contemporary political structures.
This particular account of morality, offered by MacIntyre, fosters an epistemology
and methodology similar to the tradition of natural law focusing on practice and
experience shaping communities and noting ‘the good’; however, in many ways it is also
noticeably different. While both traditions share a similar historical ascendancy,
beginning with the works of Aristotle, emphasizing human experience reflecting an
individual teleology, natural law diverges with its Thomistic influences. Teleology, as
30 Alistair MacIntyre, “After Virtue” op. cit., 2.
31 Alastair MacIntyre, “After Virtue”, op. cit. Virtues, according to MacIntyre, reside within the individual
and exist autonomously to human practice. They are, at the end of the day, “those goods by reference to
which, whether we like it or not, we define our relationships to those other people with whom we share the
kind of purposes and standards which inform practice.” 178. Furthermore, he points out that, “The virtues
are to be understood as those dispositions which will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve
goods internal to practices, but which will also sustain us in the relevant kinds of question for the good,”
writes MacIntyre, “by enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers and distractions which we encounter,
and which will furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good.”, 204.
32 Alastair MacIntyre, “After Virtue” op. cit..
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evidenced in Thomist interpretations of natural law facilitates a particular orientation
towards ‘the good’. Moreover, situated alongside the ontology of being, it supports a key
distinction within the tradition itself, between first order moral absolutes and second
order normative claims. This distinction, oriented towards the self-same goal of human
fulfillment provides the necessary pluralism facilitating a variety of intermediary
structures catering to the moral constitution of the individual. Noting the hierarchy of
laws Aquinas developed an ethical tradition placing equal esteem on both the specific
laws that shape particular communities, but also on a reasonableness that would come to
associated with a casuistic moral tradition. His particular understanding of human grace,
when suffused with his ontological and epistemological assumptions provides a means of
understanding human agency premised on an idea of natural dominion. On this account,
the morality of natural law supports the ends of being human, engendering a particular
understanding of moral sustaining the freedom and autonomy of the agent and the
community.33 The relativism echoing throughout his writings is at odds with universal
claims of justice; however, his interpretation of morality, reflecting the reasonableness of
the agent accounts for both international and intranational justice complementing the
natural equality shaping the capacity and capability of being human. It is an
understanding of morality that cannot exist within modern accounts of epistemology.
33 It should also be noted at this point that just as ideas of political order were influenced by modernity
affecting a particular philosophical image of the individual, so to did the discourse of ethics evolve.
Previously, deontological and teleological ethics were considered parts of a greater whole. With the onset
of Modernity, they were aligned in opposition to one another. Deontology emphasized the means of
decisions contrary to teleological methods focused on the ends of action. This also fostered the particular
problem of the naturalistic fallacy, distinguishing between ought and is, and creating two distinct ethical
traditions which, when viewed in light of this particular history, ought to be viewed alongside one another.
This has particular implications for notions of agency, to be examined in the third and fourth chapters of
this work, and how individuals, as agents of justice, require a strong account of morality guiding their
decisions and a defined end orienting that morality. This holistic account of ethics is offered by natural law
whose conception of laws, within the community are related to the ends of morality and a derived sense of
justice.
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Articulating a moral casuistry, investigated in the final section of this chapter, the pre-
modern assumptions of natural law reveal an institutional flexibility permitting pluralism
and human equality articulating simultaneously an account of structural justice in line
with the original teleological orientation as evidenced in the virtue of charity, itself a
reflection of the relationship shared within a pre-modern interpretation of love, equality
and friendship which goes on to influence justice.
Part II: Contemporary Interpretations of the Natural Law Tradition
Building on the inroads made by MacIntyre, and an invigorated interest in the
teleology of being, The ‘new natural lawyers’, John Finnis, Germain Grisez, and Joseph
Boyle, Jr., present a contemporary interpretation of natural law morality. Writing at the
height of the Cold War, these authors provide an alternative conception of morality,
rooted in the basic human goods, arguing the immorality of a nuclear deterrence defence
strategy.34 Highlighting a governmental duty to protect the basic human goods of
individuals and communities these authors demonstrate how such a strategy violates the
intrinsic value of life, one of the basic human goods. Consequently, Finnis et. al,
demonstrate how a nuclear deterrent revolving around Mutually Assured Destruction
(MAD), City Swapping, and Final Relation, violate the requirements of practical
34 The issue of nuclear deterrence, as a defensive strategy, acquired the greatest amount of attention at the
height of the Cold War. It was also at this time that the boundaries of International Relations, as a
discipline in general, were its most rigid. Investigating international affairs within a distinctly bi-polar
setting, realism remained the theory of the day. Consequently, ethical deliberations were relegated to those
scholars who were first and foremost trained as moral philosophers dabbling in International Relations.
There is thus a strong literature that develops during the 1980s and into the 1990s discussing the morality
of nuclear deterrence, which, in hindsight, shapes a majority of the ethical debates that now inform
international affairs. In particular, when speaking of agency in general, and individuals as moral agents, it
is the literature of Onora O’Neill, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Henry Shue, and others whose ideas first used in
this setting now inform debates surrounding human rights, humanitarian intervention, the ethical use of
force. It is for this reason that this section began with the example of the ethicality of nuclear deterrence, to
demonstrate one issue area where it is of particular relevance and how the theory framing the particular
debate is applicable to other discourses within the discipline generating a critique of the boundaries and
knowledge it employs in its arguments.
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reasonableness going above and beyond the just use of force, ensuring the death of
enemy soldiers and civilians alike.35 With this in mind, Finnis, Grisez and Boyle, Jr.
provide a restrictive theory on the immorality of nuclear deterrence arguing that “military
action must be directed toward stopping the enemy’s unjust use of force, not toward
killing those who are bringing that force to bear,” writing further that “by requiring that
the death of an enemy solider be brought about only as a side-effect of a military act
having a different appropriate object, our moral theory would limit warfare as stringently
as possible to the pursuit of the good purposes which can justify it.”36 On this account
nuclear deterrence is an implausible defense strategy in the 21st century.
Supporting the immorality of nuclear deterrence, the authors go on to offer an
interpretation of natural law distinguishable through four characteristics.
1. Individuals are the central focus of the theory as individual agents
and members of a community. Each person is dignified and
exhibits a human nature that is dominated by reason and not
passion. This ability to reason aids in the self-constitution and the
development of personal well-being of the individual.
2. It is based on the primary moral principle which states; “In
voluntarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is opposed
to them, one ought to choose and otherwise will those and only
those possibilities whose willing is compatible with integral human
fulfillment.
3. Based on this primary moral norm, intermediate principles are
derivable that guide the decision of the actor. Firstly, one ought to
conduct his or herself in the same manner in which she or he
would prefer to be treated by his or her fellow individuals.
35 For a detailed examination of the just use of force see the discourses of the just war tradition of which
there is a plethora of sources for example; Jean Bethke Elshtain (ed.) Just War Theory (New York: New
York University Press, 1992); Lynn Miller, “The Contemporary Significance of the Doctrine of Just War”
World Politics 16, no. 2 (1964): 254-286; Jack Levy, “Theories of General War” World Politics 37, no. 3
(1985): 344-374; Inis Claude, “Just Wars: Doctrines and Institutions” Political Science Quarterly 95, no. 1
(1980): 83-96; and finally, Josef Kunz, “The Laws of War” American Journal of International Law 50, no.
2, (1956): 313-337.
36 John Finnis, Germain Grisez and Joseph Boyle, Jr., Nuclear Detterrence, Morality and Realism (Oxford:
Clarendon Press Ltd, 1987), 315.
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Second, one should avoid acts premised on hostile feelings; and
third, one should not do evil to promote good.
4. Certain features of the real world, namely responsibility must be
taken into account when investigating the decisions made by
actors. Specifically, an investigation into the ends or means of a
decision taken as well as both its intended and non-intended side
effects must be examined in order to properly understand the
morality of any particular action within a natural law framework.37
This ethical account of morality vis a vis nuclear deterrence places primary emphasis on
the ontology of personhood reigniting the key relationship, highlighted by Aquinas, of
epistemology, methodology and ontology seeking a strong foundation of justice and
morality. It firmly states that the quiddity of the individual and the community lay in the
basic human goods, which constitute the very nature of the individual and the
community. It is these goods, when properly understood reveal the primary principle of
natural law that; The good is to be done and pursued; the bad is to be avoided,38 fostering
‘the good’; namely, integral human fulfillment.
The basic human goods are the essence of human nature and contain within them
the entire potential of any single individual.39 “These goods are aspects of persons, not
realities apart from persons,” write Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw. “Property and
37 John Finnis, German Grisez and Joseph M. Boyle Jr., “Nuclear Deterrence” op. cit., 139, 279, 283 &
285-287.
38 Germain Grisez, “The Way of the Lord Jesus” op. cit., 178.
39 It needs to be noted in the first instance, that it is fashionable to speak of human quiddity, essence, being
and ontology in terms of human nature. The idea of human nature, a scientific endeavor, is appealing to
those within the discipline seeking a foundationalist account of individuality supporting human well-being
and calls to further support this discourse and practice. While fruitful in the first instance, it loses its appeal
as it begins to be clear that calls to human nature cannot sustain the required degree of action needed to
generate human obligation and responsibility vis a vis human development. Human nature is intrinsically
related to the egotistical self of the social contract and part and parcel of the rights discourse and rhetoric.
Indeed, one of the problems with this account of natural law is its fascination with human nature as it
overrides the teleology of being located within the essence of being. This point will be elaborated on in
further detail in the final section with the influence of the social contract and modern liberal discourses are
investigated vis a vis contemporary natural law and the original ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas. A re-
interpretation of his ideas of nature and grace provide the means to renew the idea of being human instead
of focusing on human nature and rights, per se.
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other things extrinsic to persons can be valuable by being useful to persons. But the basic
human goods by which they enjoy self-fulfillment must be aspects of persons, not merely
things they have.”40 They are irreducible internal goods, located in the basic state of
affairs of an individual and her environment.41 Intrinsically valuable, the basic human
goods can not be ranked, nor are they commensurable. They are self-evident forms of
good accessible to the individual through their own developmental experiences.42 Only
through an acute understanding of the sensory world will the experiences of the
individual develop his or her basic human goods consequently fostering an understanding
of the principles of natural law. The new natural lawyers identify seven basic human
goods where are further subdivided into reflexive and non-reflexive categories.43 The
reflexive goods, so named due to their existential nature, are;
1. Self integration, understood as a harmonious ordering of the individual
engaged in freely chosen activities;
2. practical reasonableness, or authenticity, understood as the harmonious
interplay of moral reflection, freedom of choice, and the execution of
action;
3. justice and friendship, the interpersonal communion of good persons
freely choosing to interact with one another; and,
4. religion or holiness, understood as harmony with God, coalescing in a
harmonious relationship of individual will, freedom, and individual
action supporting one’s essence and being.44
40 Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, Beyond the New Morality: the responsibilities of freedom, the revised
edition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1980), 121.
41 Germain Grisez, “The Way of the Lord Jesus” op. cit., 121.
42 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 86-90 & 92.
43 All of the natural lawyers provide, as their foundation, the basic human goods. Similar to the account
given by Germain Grisez, adopted herein, John Finnis also highlights seven basic goods which are life,
knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability (friendship), practical reasonableness, and religion.
44 In choosing to emphasize the works of Germain Grisez, as opposed to John Finnis, the use of God can be
construed as problematic leading to questions about the nature of God vis a vis universal absolutes and the
problems this poses in a distinctly plural world. Suffice to note, as individuals are constructed within this
tradition, as teleological entities comprised of a particular essence and being springing from the
metaphysics of Aquinas, one begins to see how faith and reason are two complementary aspects of
personhood displaying a varying amount within the lives of individuals. Moreover, as Chapter Four and
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Conversely, the non-reflexive goods, so named due to their ontological relationships, are;
1. life itself, including health, physical integrity, safety, and the
handing on of life to new persons;
2. knowledge of various forms of truth and the appreciation of
various forms of beauty or excellence; and finally,
3. activities of skillful work and play, which in their very
performance enrich those who do them.45
The interplay of reflexive and non-reflexive goods combined with human experience aids
the individual in his or her quest to become a morally constituted being. “The basic
human goods are no more and no less than opportunities of being all that one can be,”
writes John Finnis. “So far from being heteronomous, they are, in fact, the intrinsic point
of one’s autonomy; they outline the worthwhile ‘self’ that one may constitute by one’s
self-determination, i.e. by the free choices towards which all one’s practical reasoning is
directed.”46 So constituted, the natural law individual displays a capacity and capability
for agency, choosing in and amongst the basic human goods developing as a moral
person. The natural law individual, on this account, is dynamic. Aware of his or her self
as an autonomous agent, engaged with other like-minded beings, she or he has always at
her disposal a chameleon like ability to change his or her self and future trajectory
through alternative decisions and actions so guided by the primary principle of natural
law. 47 With each decision the individual makes, he or she interacts with other agents
Five illustrate, building on the ideas of Anthony J. Lisska, it is possible to construct and account of Thomist
natural law void of the revelatory nature of divine law emphasizing the capacity of human reason.
Consequently, the role of God, understood as part and parcel of individual faith is not the absolute problem
so understood within debates of universality, relativism, and plurality in a diverse world.
45 Germain Grisez, “The Way of the Lord Jesus” op. cit., 124.
46 John Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 124.
47 Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, Fulfillment in Christ; A Summary of Christian Moral Principles
(Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 20-21.
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participating in the basic human goods developing his or her own morality increasing the
development of the natural law.
Like its historical predecessors this particular account of natural law revolves
around the idea of reasonableness, herein referred to as practical reasonableness. Itself a
basic human good, practical reasonableness is the capacity of the individual to make
morally upright decisions and act accordingly. “The term ‘practical reasoning’ signifies
all the thinking you need, to be doing what you are doing. Reason is practical not merely
devising intelligent ways of pursuing desires which are simply presented to one’s reason
as, so to say, independent of and prior to the workings of one’s intelligence,” writes John
Finnis. “Rather, reason is practical first of all by identifying the desirable (with a view,
of course, to pursuing it thereafter and pursuing it intelligently).”48 Practical reasoning is
thus a methodological device helping the agent to discern an appropriate mode of action
predicated on the natural law’s basic principle of morality, which states;
In voluntarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is opposed to
them, one ought to choose and otherwise will only those possibilities
whose willing is compatible with a will toward integral human
fulfillment.49
Derived from the natural law absolute of ‘the good’, namely integral human fulfillment,
this moral principle provides a basic level of guidance supporting moral action but, as
noted by the new natural lawyers, it falls short of a specific methodology. As a general
criticism, practical reasonableness fails to offer specific guidelines on human agency.
Bearing this in mind, these scholars offer what they call the basic requirements,
alternatively referred to as modes of responsibility, derived from the idea of practical
reasonableness, subtly guiding human engagement within the community sustaining the
48 John Finnis, “Fundamentals of Ethics” op. cit., 35.
49 Germain Grisez, “The Way of the Lord Jesus” op. cit., 184.
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natural law vision of integral human fulfillment through a shared understanding of
morality and justice.50
Distinctly normative, the requirements of practical reasonableness are dynamic
and can change to suit the values and ideals around which a community coalesces. So
conceptualized, they have three main objectives. First, the requirements seek to identify
immoral acts inconsistent with human fulfillment highlighting instead the morally sound
acts to pursue. Second, the requirements promote actions based on reason, and not on
emotion promoting in the final instance a respect for the basic human goods, respecting
the autonomy and freedom of other like-minded agents consequently avoiding immoral
or evil actions.51 These requirements seek to bridge the gap between the vague principles
of natural law and its methodology of reasonableness offering to the agent a means to
discern morally appropriate action and in so doing constitute him or her self in line with
the ideal of integral human fulfillment. The eight requirements are described below:
1. A Coherent Plan of Life, Detachment and Commitment.
One should not be deterred by felt inertia from action for intelligible
goods. In other words, once motivated towards the good, one should
actively pursue it in a balanced and harmonious fashion to achieve a
balanced personality and individuality.
2. No Arbitrary Preferences Amongst Values.
One should not be moved by a strong desire for one instance of an
intelligible good to act for it by choosing to destroy, damage or impede
some other instances of an intelligible good.
3. No Arbitrary Preferences Amongst Persons.
50 John Finnis, “Natural Law and Natural Rights” op. cit., 100.
51 Germain Grisez, “The Way of the Lord Jesus” op. cit., 189 & Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw,
“Fulfillment in Christ” op. cit., 83.
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One should not in response to different feelings towards different
persons, willingly proceed with a preference for anyone unless the
preference is required by intelligible goods themselves.
4. The (Limited) Relevance of Consequences: Efficiency, Within Reason.
One should not choose to act out of emotional aversion except as part
of one’s avoidance of some intelligible evil other than the inner
tension experienced in enduring that aversion.
5. Efficiency in Pursuing the Definite Goals Which We Adopt for
Ourselves and in Avoiding the Definite Harms Which We Choose to
Regard as Unacceptable.
One should not choose on the basis of emotions which bear upon
empirical aspects of intelligible goods (or bads) in a way which
interferes with a more perfect sharing in the good or avoidance of the
bad.
6. Respect for Every Basic Value in Every Act.
One should not be moved by hostility to freely accept or choose the
destruction, damaging, or impeding of any intelligible human good.
7. The Requirements of the Common Good.
One should not be pressed by enthusiasm or impatience to act
individualistically for intelligible goods.
8. Following One’s Conscience.
One should not choose to satisfy an emotional desire except as part of
one’s pursuit and/or attainment of an intelligible good other than the
satisfaction of the desire itself.52
The ability to reason is constitutive of what it is to be a natural law individual. On this
account all individuals possess the capacity to reason. The requirements described above
help individuals to deliberate and act aware of the fallibility of human nature.
This interpretation of natural law ethics relies heavily on choice. “Moral
goodness resides centrally in a person’s choice. One is not considered morally good
52 Germain Grisez, “The Way of the Lord Jesus” op. cit., 225-226.
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merely for having made a few good choices, but for making a set of morally upright
commitments and living by them consistently,” writes Grisez. Since moral goodness
depends on free choices, it is in one’s own power.”53 The ability to choose freely is of
utmost importance for it is in freely choosing to participate in the basic human goods that
an individual constitutes herself as a moral individual.54 Moral constitution, as Robert P.
George goes on to note, is inviolably tied to internal acts of will placing individual
freedom at the epicenter of moral development. “Ultimate reasons for action are
conditions of free choice. Free choice is the principle of self constitution. And, in an
important sense, self-constitution is what the moral life is about,” he goes on to write.
“When one makes morally significant choices, that is, choices in which one has ultimate
reasons for action (together, of course, with emotional and other subrational motives) one
exercises autonomy and constitutes oneself as one sort of person rather than another.”55
Experience and practical reason culminate in the idea of conscience, that sight which
combines the theoretical and practical knowledge of the agent generating an acute
understanding of morality and fashioning goals and values which are integrally related to
human development within a community of like-minded individuals.
The idea of a moral conscience is that sight whereby the responsibilities and
obligations of reasonableness coalesce with real action generating human experience and
knowledge. Properly developed an agent’s conscience assumes three things; first, that an
individual possesses the ability to distinguish right from wrong; second, that she has
amassed the requisite knowledge of the sensory world to ascertain in advance the
53 Germain Grisez, “The Way of the Lord Jesus” op. cit., 128.
54 John Finnis, Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision, and Truth (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic
University of America Press, 1991), 42.
55 Robert P. George, Making Men Moral (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 180 & 181.
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potential outcome of her decisions; and, finally, that she is able to recognize the
relationship that exists between right and wrong, morality and immorality and its bearing
on the outcome of her actions.56 One cannot legislate for the development of human
conscience, yet at the end of the day, it, alongside practical reasonableness is responsible
for the upright action and behavior of the agent. While practical reasonableness provides
the means to deliberate and choose in and amongst a variety of goods, it is one’s
conscience that orientates decisions towards the good and thus preserves individual
freedom and autonomy demonstrating that as capable agents, individuals are respectful of
one another’s needs within the community, aware of the danger associated with the
encroachment of human development. Yet what this idea of conscience does not speak
of is that which motivates individual action in and of itself. This distinction falls to the
natural law idea of love.
Understood as “interpersonal communion, a unity of two or more persons which
respects and even perfects their uniqueness,”57 love is that which motivates individuals to
act in a reasonable fashion. It is neither a passion, nor is it a desire. Love is simply a
positive orientation towards an object which presupposes knowledge. “Love’s direct
object, the something loved, is often confused with the object of desire. But even before
one desires a particular good, one must have a positive orientation toward it, and that
56 Germain Grisez, “The Way of the Lord Jesus” op. cit., 82. Interestingly enough, it is this third
component of a moral conscience that is absent from an individual’s constitution and development in the
social contract tradition. Recall the point made earlier that with the distinction of teleology and deontology
investigated alongside the ends of conformity and stability of society meant that right and wrong were
typically associated with what was good and desired and what was deemed unwanted. The idea of morality
and conscience was easily side-stepped as individuals were singular and not communal individuals. When
you situate the individual within a community, construct them as an agent and place them in a relationship
in which they play at times a dominant and subservient role, the idea of conscience becomes increasingly
important as a means to protect the autonomy and freedom of both agents within the relationship and the
agents within the broader community. This is something that the social contract tradition neatly ties up in
the ideal of negative liberty which as the thesis progresses will be found increasingly wanting.
57 Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, “Fulfillment in Christ” op. cit, 279.
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orientation is love,’ write Grisez and Shaw. “Again, when desire is satisfied, one enjoys
the good one previously desired and continues to love it; love therefore underlies joy as
well. Thus, love is a disposition which orients one to the good which fulfills.”58 It is to
return to the idea of practical reason and recall its goal of a harmonious interaction of the
basic human goods. The natural law idea of love will be further developed in the final
chapter of this work. Needless to say however, love is intrinsically related to the essence
and being of individuality. It recognizes a shared sameness of self reinforcing an idea of
mutual well-being. Moreover, the idea of love, as a motivating force and an actual
engagement relies on both participation in the basic human goods and thus, a community
in which to access them. Key to love is the innate sociability of the individual
underscoring the very real need for relationships creating opportunities to participate and
experience the basic human goods in a moral community oriented towards ‘the good’;
namely, mutual and reciprocal integral human fulfillment.
The community, within the new natural law tradition, is premised on the
ontological foundations of the basic human goods and grows out of the personal
relationships linking all individuals united by a common goal.59 It understands the
primary importance of the common good, the shared commitments and values of a group
of people, and seeks to carve out the most efficient manner to attain such ends.60
Recognizing the intrinsic importance of the basic human goods, the natural law
community coalesces around the idea of integral human fulfillment premised on the
moral constitution of each individual member and endeavoring to provide for them every
58 Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, “Fulfillment in Christ” op. cit., 280.
59 Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, “Beyond the New Morality” op. cit., 56.
60 John Finnis, “Natural law and Natural Rights” op. cit., 155 & 156.
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opportunity to develop their latent potential.61 “Community is based,” write Grisez and
Shaw, “on a shared commitment in which each individual shoulders his or her special
share of the responsibility for realizing the values which originally drew separate persons
into the relationships called ‘community’”.62 The community has an overt interest in the
moral development of its citizens and promotes always the idea of integral human
fulfillment. For, just as the individual is comprised of the basic human goods, so to is the
community. Coalescing around ‘the good’, it seeks, as its primary objective, to support
the values and ideals emerging out of the relationships of individuals participating in the
basic human goods. A natural law community is the outcome of a myriad of human
relationships and engagements oriented around the moral constitution of the natural law
individual. It is thus to note that only by encouraging and furthering these relationships
communities act as agents seeking always a greater understanding of justice.63
Articulating this vision of community, the new natural lawyers envision two
distinct but interrelated tasks for the community. First, it fosters the common good.
“Properly conceived, the common good,” writes Finnis, “is a set of conditions which
enables the members of a community to attain for themselves reasonable objective, or to
realize reasonably for themselves the value(s), for the sake of which they have reason to
collaborate with each other (positively and/or negatively) in a community.”64 Arising out
61 John Finnis, The Fundamentals of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 131.
62 Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, “Beyond the New Morality” op. cit., 56.
63 The distinction between a new natural law account of the community and that developed and articulated
throughout this work rests on the virtue of charity. Charity, so the argument goes, reflects the interpersonal
ethic of love at a transnational level of community demonstrating how the natural law, beyond an internal
ordering principle and a commitment to morality is in point of fact, the ordering principle guiding the
community. In this way, it distinsuishes itself from the common good of the new natural lawyers which
rests on the notion of human rights, and articulates instead, a mutual account of well-being supporting the
claim that a natural law ethic is, above all else, an outward looking ethic.
64 John Finnis, “Natural Law and Natural Rights” op. cit., 155 & 156. This is in contrast to the idea of
common morality which, as Joseph Boyle argues in “Natural Law and the Ethics of Tradition” in Natural
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of human relationships, the common good embodies practical reasonableness on a much
larger scale. It notes that which brought individuals together in the first instance, well-
being and fulfillment, and etches out a particular means to achieve a higher level of
mutual well-being and development aware always of one’s autonomy and freedom. The
common good is thus one tool whereby individuals can act on their innate potential
developing, in line with their innate teleology, their own moral constitution. “It is
therefore a fundamental aspect of general justice that common enterprise should be
regarded, and practically conducted, not as ends in themselves,” writes Finnis, “but as a
means of assistance, as ways of helping individuals to ‘help themselves’ or, more
precisely, to constitute themselves.”65 The purpose of the community, on this
interpretation, is to help individuals achieve their own moral constitution sustaining the
requisite relationships necessary to do so.
Emerging out of this idea of the common good is a very real need for regulation
and authority. “These essential conditions of a complete society reveal the core content
of the common good of political society,” writes Joseph Boyle, “this good must include
all the interests human beings might have insofar as the pursuit of the interests has a
communal dimension which requires the decisive regulation and coordination provided
Law Theory; Contemporary Essays, ed. Robert P. George, 124 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), fails to
offer any realistic conception of resolving moral dilemmas, nor does it offer any practical conception of
political life and authority. In the same vein as Onora O’Neill writes in ‘Who Can Endeavor Peace”
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12, Supplementary Volume (1986): 41-73, common morality fails to
provide the key requisite of political agency at the community level; namely, a method to discern the
morally appropriate action thus capturing the ability of the individual, or community, to engage in genuine
and realistic agency.
65 John Finnis, “Natural Law and Natural Rights” op. cit., 169. The argument will be made in the final
section of this chapter that this idea of the common good relies on a distinct understanding of justice that
upholds the traditional boundaries of IR, related, as it is to proportional justice and, the idea of a rights
bearing agent, thus denying a key component of individuality and integral human fulfillment, teleology.
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by public authority.”66 The new natural lawyers provide an interpretation of political
authority. “Authority (and thus the responsibility of governing) in a community is to be
exercised by those who can in fact effectively settle coordination problems for that
community,” writes Finnis. “This principle is not the last word on the requirements of
practical reasonableness in locating authority; but it is the first and most fundamental.”67
Aware of the chaos emerging from the multitude of personal relationships this
interpretation bypasses the alternative of local reasoning, culminating in unanimity in
favor of an authoritative body capable of legislating laws and creating institutions in
accord with the common good.68 It is, as Grisez and Shaw point out, that “in a very large
community, such as a nation, there is a need for an extremely complicated intermediate
structure-laws, institutions- between the joint social act constituting the community and
the multitude of individual acts performed by the community members as they work to
realize their shared commitment.”69 This need for intermediate structures, however, is
tempered by the observation that individuals must, within this setting, always remain free
and autonomous being. “An attempt, for the sake of the common good, to absorb the
individual altogether into common enterprise would thus be disastrous for the common
good,” writes Finnis, “however much the common enterprise might prosper.”70 This
point is further noted by Grisez and Shaw who argue, in the same vein, that “genuine
community does not come about by denying our individuality, our otherness, in a blind
66 Joseph Boyle, “Natural Law and International Ethics”, in Traditions of International Ethics, eds. Terry
Nardin & David R. Mapel, 132 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
67 John Finnis, “Natural Law and Natural Rights” op. cit., 246.
68 This point becomes increasingly important in light of the argument for casuistry to be made in the
ensuing section of this chapter.
69 Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, “Beyond the New Morality” op. cit., 49.
70 John Finnis, “Natural Law and Natural Rights” op. cit., 169.
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effort to submerge ourselves in an anthill society.”71 Thus, laws and institutions are
created at the behest of the governing authority to safeguard the freedom and autonomy
of the individual.
An extension of the governing authority, itself an extension of the common good,
laws and institutions, it is hoped, will foster an atmosphere in which relationships will
flourish providing all individuals with access to the basic human goods. Laws perform a
twofold function, reinforcing the freedom and self-determination of the individual while
at the same time promoting a moral environment. “Laws can forbid the grosser forms of
vice, but certainly cannot prescribe the finer points of virtue. Nevertheless, laws that
effectively uphold public morality,” writes Robert P. George, “may contribute
significantly to the common good of any community by helping to preserve the moral
ecology which will help to shape, for better or worse, the morally self-constituting
choices by which people form their character, and in turn affect the milieu in which they
and others will in future have to make such choices.”72 Noting the impossibility of
legislating for the upright and moral development of the individual, a task for the
individual’s conscience, legislators develop laws prohibiting those actions which deny
pride of place to morality within the community. In order to achieve this, laws subtly
guide individuals to make choices in line with practical reasonableness aiding individuals
in their ultimate task of moral constitution. For new natural lawyers, then, laws will
ultimately yield the greatest achievements when working alongside the governing
71 Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, “Beyond the New Morality” op. cit., 56.
72 Robert P. George, “Making Men Moral” op. cit., 47.
• Chapter Two • 114
authority offering to the individual the opportunity to ever engage with others
participating in the basic human goods.73
Alongside the laws of the community, institutions exists coordinating human
interactions. Institutions, mitigating the chaos of ever larger communities, ensure that
individuals are able to constitute themselves morally.74 Promoting the ontological
foundations of both the community and the individual, they work side by each, at the
behest of the political authority ensuring a just distribution of the basic human goods.
Justice, on this account, represents the norms of morality, embodied in the laws and
institutions of the political community. The common good, on this account represents a
proportional interpretation of political interaction assuming that equal distribution will
ensure equal developmental potential. So construed, the new natural lawyers provide one
means of understanding the remit of the political and offer one way of constituting
international affairs; however, this particular interpretation is not without its difficulties.
In fact, it represents a rational account of ethics articulating, like its ethical predecessors a
subjective account of the political agent. Moving into the final section it seeks to
highlight the shortcomings of this particular interpretation, noting how it is captured by
the self-same assumptions of Modernity, highlighted in the previous chapter.
Part III: Natural Law, Aquinas & Casuistry
73 Laws, interpreted within the assumptions of the new natural lawyers are similarly conceptualized as those
cosmopolitan scholars advocating an international constitutional order. This is countered in the ensuing
development of charity offered in Chapter Five. Charity incorporates the personal love ethic of the agent
which guides the casuistry of the virtuous agent and in so doing highlights the necessity of an agent
centered account of institutional design. In this way, the value of a community understood as degrees of
relationships of interest is revealed, a point which is further discussed in the Epilogue. Casuistry provides
on of the many necessary supports to the account of ‘the international’ offered herein as one way of
improving upon the structural inequalities which exist in the current institutionalization of international
politics.
74 Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, “Beyond the New Morality” op. cit., 49.
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Returning quickly to the arguments opening this work is to recall the rational
social blueprint stemming from the social contract tradition. Centered on individual
liberty producing a particular account of order, domestic and international alike, the
dominant form of argumentation evident therein sustains over-arching theories dependent
on universal values, concrete methodologies elucidating the technical agenda of politics.
Theoretical forms of argumentation are constituted by a series of related propositions,
derived from a universally accepted maxim upon which its conclusion ultimately rests.
Influenced by the idea of Euclidean geometry and seeking the certainty and mathematical
rigor associated with its conclusions, modernity influenced the discipline of ethics
placing practical reasoning outside the sphere of public agency offering a subjective
account of the individual and community which is above all else, rational, amoral and
isolated.75 Bearing in mind the influential nature of modernity articulated by Alasdair
MacIntyre and Richard Rorty, supported again by the previous interpretations of
modernity, it is not surprising that the new natural lawyers fell prey to the assumptions
associated with the received view of Modernity.
A tradition that focuses on human experience, on action supported by proper
deliberation, natural law is an ethical tradition that is interested in practice and for that
very reason provides a large degree of individual freedom tempered by an acute
understanding of the teleological ends of morality.76 Similar to its historical
predecessors, the new natural law, upon first glance, seems to uphold the teleology of
being incorporating theoretical and practical first principles. Its methodology revolves
75 For a valuable depiction of the historical development of ethics, as a discipline, see Alasdair MacIntyre,
“A Short History of Ethics” op. cit.
76 The nature of freedom and St. Thomas Aquinas’s interpretation is investigated in the ensuing chapter, as
will the link between his doctrines of freedom and epistemology be established as they relate to his
ontology of being.
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around the individual as a site of knowledge and a community of relationships supporting
those endeavoring to achieve a higher degree of moral development; however, the
requirements of practical reasonableness shift the traditional focus facilitating a
methodology geared towards the theoretical application of rules, principles, and maxims
in line with the boundaries of traditional ethics. “Nowadays the received view is that
particular moral decisions simply apply universal ethical rules to particular cases;” write
Jonsen and Toulmin, “while moral decisions are sound to the extent that they are validly
deduced from such rules.”77 This particular approach, influenced by the epistemological
developments of Modernity proffers one particular mode of constructing moral
arguments as a technique conforming to universal laws.78 It is this understanding of
ethics and morality framing a subjective account of being political within international
affairs influencing the discourses of world order and human well-being.79 It is related to
the distinction between theory and practice, originating within Modernity, supporting
theoretical forms of argumentation, to the detriment of practical modes of reasoning. A
problem to be sure, the appeal of the natural law framework lies in its teleological
orientation revealing the developmental potential of individuals as moral beings.
The requirements of practical reasonableness considerably reduce the role of
individual conscience in moral deliberations. The dynamic and innovative capacity and
capability of individuals as agents of justice is limited and the potentiality of human
moral development is marginalized. Individual conscience is key to the natural law
77 Albert R. Jonsen & Stephen Toulmin, op. cit., 23.
78 For a particularly interesting critique of this problem with relevance to International Relations, look at
the work of Fiona Robinson, op. cit., whose investigation of humanitarian intervention notes the lack of
mutuality, contextuality and local insight into a practice that is, on the face of things, other regarding.
79 The link between International Relations, pragmatic communities, and pragmatic morality is my own, but
links to arguments found within the first and final chapter of this work, building on my idea of personal
politics, stemming from human relationships, a theme that flows throughout the entirety of this work.
• Chapter Two • 117
tradition. It provides the individual with the requisite freedom and autonomy to reason in
an ethical and moral manner. As second order claims, these normative requirements are
capable of change over time; what is important to note however, is that their development
sustains a rational account of ethics well suited to a subject account of politics, sustaining
the contemporary liberal individual. The requirements of practical reasonableness and
the laws which outline acceptable modes of behavior mitigating the interaction of isolated
individuals represent a morality concerned with right and wrong and not with the ultimate
attainment of integral human fulfillment. In other words, it is a pragmatic morality
sustaining a contractual state/individual relationship. In one fell swoop, a seemingly
innovative theoretical argument was lost as its argumentation moved from loosely based
principles, in line with human action into a theoretical form of argumentation, focused on
processes and not a natural teleology. Moving beyond the original purpose of community
within the tradition of natural law, the boundaries of knowledge associated with
modernity limited communal agency to the process of government and not, as it ought to
have been, on the achievement of higher levels of being. Indeed, an in-depth
examination of the common good, articulated by the new natural lawyers reveals a
community heavily reliant on the rhetoric of negative liberty, self-determination and
above all else, human rights.
The idea of the common good is a series of conditions, premised on the
requirements of practical reasonableness, fostering equal access to the basic human goods
within the community. It highlights the fact, noted by Joseph Boyle, Jr., that “morality is
a matter of thoroughgoing practical reasonableness and practical reason is consistent and
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sufficient for the conduction of human affairs.”80 Noting the compatibility of a rights
discourse with the common good, Finnis further points out to the reader that, ‘[w]hat the
reference to rights contributes in this sketch is simply a pointed expression of what is
implicit in the term ‘common good’, namely that each and everyone’s well-being, in each
of its basic aspects, must be considered and favored at all times by those responsible for
the co-ordination of the common life.”81 The common good sustains the idea of a
common authority, making decisions, creating laws, and developing institutions seeking
above all else to marginalize the chaos emerging out of a myriad of individual
relationships sustaining the community. Emphasizing co-ordination in lieu of human
experience, the new natural lawyers provide a technical outline on how best to organize
contemporary political communities. Common authorities, on this account, guard the
freedom and autonomy of individuals limiting the negative consequences of human
interaction through laws in line with the boundaries of public and private agency as
opposed to the ends of integral human fulfillment.
Articulating a rhetoric echoing faintly of liberty, and negative liberty at that,
Finnis’s account of the common good sustains a subjective account of being political.82
Aware always of individual liberty, he outlines a mode of individual self-determination
focused on equality according to the tenets of distributive justice. Seeking to determine
the just distribution of the basic human goods the new natural lawyers contribute to the
recipient nature of contemporary society. That is to say, individuals are aware of their
80 Joseph Boyle, “Natural Law and International Ethics” op. cit., 127.
81 John Finnis, “Natural Law and Natural Rights” op. cit., 214.
82 Recall at this point may of the criticisms of modernity put forth by Alisdair MacIntyre in the opening
section of this chapter. He points out that the existence of the modern self is constructed without any
vestige of historical or social framework. On this account, rights and their discourses exist filling to void
between what the modern self is and how it defines itself in relation to the community. This task,
interpreted in light of the aims of this particular work, is failing due to the overarching theoretical
epistemology of Modernity.
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own particular rights, but remain unaware of the associated duties and obligations as
responsible agents.83 Rights, similar to basic human goods are distributed like property,
and are apportioned on the assumption that equal access sustains equal developmental
potential. Unaware of the diverse and unique environments in which each individual is
situated, this account of the common good fails to incorporate local characteristics and
personal requirements. Community structure, on this account, reveals a technical form of
organization which, similar to the loss of individual conscience, fails to understand the
contextual nature of moral development, offering a technical approach to communal
governance. Consequently, the manner in which the new natural lawyers conceptualize
freedom, and the role of authorities and institutions, sustains the contemporary pragmatic
society failing to recall the key role of human relationships facilitating community
development. Essentially personal, these relationships are fundamentally at odds with the
civil relationships of liberal societies yet it is these very civil relationships that the new
natural lawyers seek to establish as they bear an intrinsic relationship to the requirements
of practical reasonableness.84 Thus, at the end of the day common good, instead of
referring to the idea of being in common, highlighting the sociability of integral human
fulfillment, seeks rather to delineate, spheres of agency in order to apportion access to the
basic human goods. It is thus to note the distinct absence of a mutual and relational
ontology of being sustaining reasonableness, morality and justice required of being in
common and recalls the idea of possessive individualism, noted by Macpherson who
83 Onora O’Neill, “Agents of Justice” Metaphilosophy 32, nos. 1 & 2 (January 2001): 180-195.
84 This is a point which will be returned to in the final chapter on love which argues against the boundaries
that distinguish one individual from another. In light of the other-regarding nature of the love ethic
examined therein, it is interesting to note how it is only giving oneself up to another and allowing free
access to the basic human goods that mutual well-being can be sustained and the ideal of natural law justice
can be worked towards sustaining higher levels of being.
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highlights the intimate relationship of modern pragmatic societies and the relationship
they share with capitalist values further isolating the individual in soceity.85
In light of these shortcomings, the ends of this interpretation of natural law,
integral human fulfillment, remain central to the ensuing account of agency. Building on
this emphasis, the interpretation of natural law developed herein returns to the original
works of St. Thomas Aquinas invoking his idea of the ontology of being. In so doing, it
demonstrates how agents, communities and the laws that organize them relate not to the
boundaries of contemporary political systems but to the ends of being human. This must
be done in order to support the aforementioned interpretation of ‘the international’ and
the yet to be developed account of natural law agency and the natural law agent, all of
which revolve around the assumption of an innate teleology of being. Synthesizing the
ideas of the new natural lawyers and the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, the Salamanca
Theologians and other contemporary natural law scholars, this account of natural law
develop the pre-modern relationship of ontology, methodology, and epistemology anew
facilitating a casuist methodology. Building on the aims of Jacques Maritain, questioning
the centrality of cognitive epistemology over the ontology of being, it articulates an
objective account of politics which is agent centered. This interpretation places primary
85 This is not an isolated phenomenon within ethics and international affairs. As Nicholas Rengger
illustrates in his article “on the just war tradition in the twenty-first century” International Affairs 78 no. 2
(2002) pp. 353-363, this same type of evolution is also evident in the transition form a tradition of just war
to a contemporary theory of just war. Demonstrating a process whereby the idea of a just war tradition
revolving around practice has become increasingly legal and relevant to the practice of war in the 21st
century despite deep chasms in the arguments and assumptions of both the tradition and the modern
conception of the liberal state. What is interesting to note is the movement from practical to theoretical
argumentation as a tradition is molded so as to suite the needs and development of a contemporary society.
In like manner, the natural law is abused when it is transformed from a practice oriented tradition with an
anthropological understanding of the individual and community into a process oriented tradition, seeking
above all else, rules and principles from which to derive moral and ethical action.
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emphasis on individual conscience, and in so doing, reinstates the previously lost idea of
individual autonomy and freedom necessary for practical reasoning and human agency.
Similar to the malaise which Maritain and his fellow scholars sought to address at the end
of WWII, this interpretation of natural law distinguishes itself from modern cosmopolitan
endeavors investigated in the Introduction. It envisions an alternative approach to
international institutional design reflecting an overarching universal human equality
alongside a flexibility and relative moral reasoning process emphasizing the role of the
individual as an agent of justice.
Distinguishing itself from the process oriented methodology of Modernity the
tradition of casuistry emphasizes reason in moral deliberations. The appeal of a casuistic
natural law framework is nicely summarized by Richard B. Miller. A supporter of
casuistry, Miller demonstrates its value when the rules guiding the typical interactions of
the agent are called into question arguing that casuists investigate whether or not the rules
sustaining agency function in the face of moral problems arising in the quotidian
existence of agents.86 Casuistry supports practical arguments which, contrary to the
universal processes associated with Modernity, are not methods for resolving particular
problems with definite and guaranteed conclusions, but rather are aligned as closely as
possible to human action seeking to resolve practical human problems. Unlike traditional
theoretical forms of argumentation, practical argumentations are analogically associated
with networks and webs, capable of incorporating a wide variety of possibilities in order
to investigate the potential of any series of courses of actions determining the most
appropriate course of moral action as indicated by the particular situation. “Instead of
86 Richard B. Miller, Casuistry and Modern Ethics, A Poetics of Practical Reasoning (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1996), 4-5.
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aiming strict entailment,” practical arguments, note Jonsen and Toulmin, “draw on the
outcomes of previous experiences, carrying over the procedures used to resolve earlier
problems and reapply them in new problematic situations. Practical argument,” they go
on to note “depend for their power on how closely they present circumstances resemble
those of earlier precedent cases for which this particular type of argument was original
devised.”87 Casuistry, similar to natural law justice, understands that laws speak to the
quotidian events of individual experience and not to the extreme cases that test human
reason. On this account, laws represent the norms of justice and are mutable and
adaptable, a point further elaborated on in Chapter Four. The product of human reason,
laws represent the potential that agents possess to change the political structures in tune
with the changing values of the community and remain forever rooted in human agency.
Reasoning is the first step of casuistry moving quickly into the realm of human
action. “The derivation of precepts from principle requires specification of actions and
their morally relevant features. Thus, the task of moral reasoning is only begun, not
finished, by indicating the moral principle, writes Boyle, Jr. “The more complex part of
the reasoning is clarifying what makes actions of one kind or another compatible or
incompatible with the moral principles.”88 Casuistry requires, on this account an upright
and moral individual engaging in the practice of practical reasoning. Again, the morality
of natural law reveals its value offering the prudent individual to the particular task at
hand. Drawing on the works of Thomas Aquinas, Jonsen and Toulmin highlight the
necessary features of the prudent casuist. “Such a person possess knowledge both of
universal principle and of particular situations; is capable of drawing together memory of
87 Albert R Jonsen & Stephen Toulmin, op. cit., 35.
88 Joseph Boyle, “Just and Unjust Wars: Casuistry and the Boundaries of the Moral World” Ethics &
International Affairs 11 (1997): 87.
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past experiences and foresight into future possibilities; and is able to recognize what is at
issue in new and hitherto untried situations,” they write. “The prudent person is aware
that although the final end of human life is fixed by divine providence, the means to
achieving that end are ‘of manifold variety according to the variety of persons and
situations.’”89 Centered on human practice and the role of reasonable deliberation,
supported by the idea of natural law justice- ‘the good’, casuists situate their own moral
taxonomy within a natural law framework incorporating an idea of individual conscience,
alongside a particular understanding of human knowledge, both of which are derived
from the self-same ontology of being. Thus, natural law and casuistry work hand in hand
to avoid laxity and solipsism in the moral deliberations of individual agent situated within
a strong community, aware too of the nature of justice and morality and its role therein.
At the end of the day, casuistry and natural law combine providing an account of an
ethical tradition that is agent centered and in which individuals can work outside the
traditional sites of power and authority and begin to affect political change as empowered
and capable agents.
Moral action, for the casuist, lies not in the mastery and application of rules
derived from theoretical principles providing universally applicable processes, but rather,
in the history of human practice coupled with an ability to reason analogically. “Only
experience,” Toulmin and Jonsen note, “will give individual agents the particular
priorities they need in weighing moral consideration of different kinds and resolving
conflict between those different considerations.”90 One of the many appeals of casuistry
is its awareness of the delicate interplay of theoretical and practical knowledge sustaining
89 Albert R. Jonsen & Stephen Toulmin, op. cit., 130.
90 Albert R Jonsen & Stephen Toulmin, op. cit., 314.
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genuine human action. Moreover, as its emphasis is on the capacity for dynamism in the
face of individual problems of conscience, where appeals to natural obligation are vague,
casuistry reflects the teleology of being of the agent. With the onset of knew knowledge
and improved understanding, so to does the means of human action and its ends change
to accommodate a greater understanding of the nature of morality and ethics. Relying on
practical arguments, sustained by past experiences, unique situations and the ability to
reason out determinate ends casuistry has historically enjoyed a strong relationship with
the natural law tradition. Relying on the idea of a moral taxonomy, in which like cases
are compared and contrasted with one another, casuistry guides individuals combining
past experience with the ability to reason, supported by individual conscience in order to
decide upon a moral course of action. Situated in a firmly established paradigm, a
casuistic methodology reasons analogically appealing to maxims aware of the particularly
unique circumstances of every and any situation providing the opportunity for diversity in
action supporting a plurality of apaches, in line with a particular account of morality and
justice.
It is a point well noted by Richard B. Miller that casuistry, as an ethical tradition,
employs a vague epistemology. “Moreover, casuists boast the practical advantage of
tackling moral problems without having to enter into difficult philosophical debates that
may distract us from urgent issues of the day,” he goes on to write. “Casuists are
epistemologically modest: they embrace the idea that we need not establish the place of
reason in moral or political philosophy as a necessary step toward resolving practical
questions of virtue and decision making.”91 The seemingly lax nature of casuistic
91 Richard B. Miller, “Humanitarian Intervention, Altruism, and the Limits of Casuistry” The Journal of
Religions Ethics 28 no. 1 (2000): 8.
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reasoning is problematic only in light of the desire for certainty and stability, key features
of Modernity. In fact, it is this flexibility that appealed to those public intellectuals
charged with shaping The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. “No declaration of
the rights of man can ever be exhaustive and final. It must always be expressed in terms
of the state of the moral conscience and of civlisation at any given moment in history,”
writes Maritain. “And it is just for this reason that, since the considerable success
achieved at the end of the eighteenth century by the first written declarations, it has
always been a matter of major interest for men to renew these declarations from age to
age.”92 Similarly, Arnold J. Lein highlights the centrality of education in the
development and maintenance of any form of declaration. “Education seems to be the
only key that can release the creative energies of the individual for the new era. Self
interest is the force of gravity which draws individuals together. That is the force on
which the new order must be built,” he writes. “As individuals grow in knowledge,
understanding and wisdom, their perspectives will be more complete, their horizons
wider and their vision clearer. Their self-interest will find itself on ever higher levels
until it ultimately coincides with the common interest of all.”93 The seemingly
problematic lack of a distinct methodology disappears when casuistry is situated
alongside the ends of natural law. Its morality provides the necessary beacon orienting
the teology of the agent and the community sustaining a unified sense of purpose
motivating human action in line with the conscientious deliberations of the agent.
92 Jacques Maritain, “Communication” op. cit.
93 Arnold J. Lien, “A Fragment of Thoughts Concerning the Nature and the Fulfilment of Human Rights” in
Human Rights, Comments and Interpretations. A symposium edited by UNESCO with an introduction by
Jacques Maritain ed. The United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 39 & 30
(London & New York: Allan Wingate).
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On this account, natural law and casuistry knit together an ontology, epistemology
and methodology articulating a mutual and relational account of human development
stressing the contextual nature of moral reasoning. Individually natural law and casuistry
present a fragmented account of morality in contemporary affairs. Natural law faithfully
maintains the ontological equality of being while casuistry highlights the relativity of
moral reason and action. As a whole, natural law and casuistry present an epistemology
loyal to the moral ideal of integral human fulfillment recognizing the mutuality of ‘the
good’. Aware of the loving disposition motivating human action this account of morality
is well placed to challenge the contemporary state boundaries as they relate to
international political sovereignty articulating simultaneously an account of justice that is
transnational and commutative in its nature. Consequently this ontological and
epistemological synthesis is well placed to challenge the structures which limit human
agency endorsing an account of love and charity throughout the wider practices of
international affairs.
Conclusion
The appeal of natural law lies in its account of morality and derived
understanding of justice. Together, they provide both a normative account of right and
wrong, but also provide a philosophical account of the individual and the community
with which to criticism the current practices of international politics and the structures of
international relations. As was demonstrated in the historical depiction of natural law,
and its ensuing development, Antigone’s challenge of justice in the face of higher laws
provided a reoccurring theme throughout history with which to challenge political
injustice. In light of the desire to examine the problems of human suffering, and the
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inability of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to achieve its sought after ends,
the justice and morality of natural law has once again been granted a high degree of
prominence in the framing of both the questions and answers which this investigation
brings to bear. In light of the particular aims and ends framed in the Introduction and
Chapter One, with particular reference to the problems of human suffering and the static
accounts of world order and the closed political states which comprise its constituent
members, this second chapter has articulated a framework which will guide the ensuing
three chapters of this work. Yet it has not acknowledged outright the problems
associated with this tradition nor has it offered any recourse to their resolution. By way
of conclusion, this chapter first highlights the particular problems of natural law
assumptions and demonstrates how natural law, in its pre-modern interpretation is
adequately able to circumvent these particular problems.
Jurgen Habermas’s interpretation of modernity and ensuing account of
communicative action examined in Chapter One provides a well-rounded summary of the
problems of natural law. According to Habermas, who echoes a variety of authors, the
problematic nature of natural law morality rest in its ontological assumptions sustaining
its understanding of practical reasonableness. “In modern times, since the abandonment
of the concepts of substance and essence which anchored what out to be in the order of
things, the architectonics of reason has replaced objective teleology,” he writes. “This
means that normative content can only be derived reconstructively from the necessary
subjective conditions for the objective validity of our experiences and judgments. They
can no longer be derived ontologically from being itself.”94 This problem is similarly
94 Jurgen Habermas, Religion and Rationality: Essays on Reason, God and Morality edited with an
Introduction by Eduardo Mendieta (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 117.
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noted by Richard Rorty. He points out that with the onset of the enlightenment individual
look not to the community, but rather looks inwards in order to understand the nature of
morality and ethics.95 The onset of positive knowledge throughout the enlightenment
reflected the denigration of ontology to the outskirts of acceptable knowledge
highlighting, as was demonstrated in the opening two chapters, theoretical knowledge.
Moreover, it reflected the dominance of a positive methodology as was reflected in the
ideas of the social contract thinkers. These assumptions are similarly evident in the
ordering of the political community which seeks the isolation of the individual, to the
detriment of a mutual relationship of the individual and the community.
This problem was addressed by modern rational scholars. As the classical
interpretation of natural law exerted its influence on the emerging institutionalization of
International Relations, the responsibility of the individual to act as a moral being further
revealed itself. As society came to increasingly reflect the normative requirements of
right and wrong, articulating in the process a fascination with jurisprudential theory, as
evidenced in the works of Hugo Grotius, Samuel Puffendorf and Thomasius Wolff, the
lack of unifying relationships placed the burden of proof on the individual to develop a
moral code befitting the possessive individual. For Habermas, the answer to this problem
rests in his notion of communicative ethics. Yet, an examination of the pre-modern ideas
of natural law, begun in this chapter and continued in Chapters Three and Four reveals an
alternative method of achieving this notion of mutual self-interest.
The value of a natural law framework rests in the relationship of mutuality
enjoyed by the individual and the community. As Brian Tierney highlights, medieval
95 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1980).
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natural law scholars did not place individuals and the community in a relationship of
opposition, as is evident in contemporary accounts of world order. Rather, these two
entities were similarly constituted and sought the self-same ends of human well-being
and development.96 Both the individual and the community reflected the natural
teleology of being associated with the morality of natural law. This assumption
underscores the philosophical account of the agent as a social and moral being and places
primary emphasis on relationships in order to account for the development of the political
community. Thus, this account of natural law, and its ensuing development of agency
and the community distinguish themselves from discourse ethics articulating in the first
instance what is referred to throughout this work as a relational ontology.
A relational ontology draws on the teleology of being sustaining the morality of
natural law. It reflects the influence of the ethic of love and virtue of charity engendering
an account of agency which reflects the mutuality of being. It articulates the idea that
only through an understanding of the role of ‘others’ in the community, will one begin to
know and understand one’s self. Like the idea of solidarity reflected in the neo-roman
interpretation of liberty, a relational ontology articulates an order of charity uniting
individuals in the self-same desire for human development and well-being mediating the
idea of civic friendship through an investigation of agape and philia love. The mutuality
of being evident in these endeavors not only offers an account of justice with which to
challenges the proportional representations of social justice, as investigated in Chapter
Four, it also counters the egotistical expression of morality and ethics which challenge
modern natural law scholars and a classical interpretation of International Relations.
96 Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, natural law and church law, 1150-1625 (Grand Rapids,
Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2001).
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The ontological challenge of traditional accounts of natural law is mediated
through an awareness of the self in another. The order of charity which reflects both the
self-interested and selfless nature of the agent provides an account of obligation which
rests on the self-same desire to know ‘the good’ which intimately links the development
of the self with another. In this way a natural law ethic is an outward looking ethic and
distinguishes itself from the contemporary ethical discourses of cosmopolitan and
discourse ethics. This interpretation is limited to those who engage in a pre-modern
interpretation of natural law as it draws again on the mutuality of being and the symbiotic
nature of the individual and the community as moral beings in common. The essence and
being of the individual reflect the discourse of grace associated with the theology of
natural law consequently, it was increasingly problematic for those scholars associated
with the enlightenment.
Yet, the outward orientation of ethics achieved through an understanding of the
relationship of justice and virtue, alongside the individual ethic of love motivating agency
reveals a deep seated reliance on theological explanations in order to counter the
ontological problems of natural law. The possibility of a non-theistic approach to natural
law is not precluded by this particular response. The mutuality of the individual and the
community reveals an alternative interpretation of being sustaining a natural law ethic.
While Chapter Three offers one particular reconstruction of Thomistic ethics which
neatly sidesteps the problems of grace, there remains another feasible response. An
interpretation of the natural law which begins at the community levels offers an example
of the ends of agency with which to understand the ends of a love ethic and the associated
responsibilities of obligation and morality. The natural law community, albeit a product
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of a relational ontology, represents the actuality of being and provides an account of
moral politics which rests not on the faith of theism, but rather, on the faith of individuals
as moral agents. An account of natural law politics which rests on the faith of peoples
echoes the ideas of Max Weber and his examination of politics as a vocation.
Weber engages in his Politics as a Vocation in a critique of power politics noting
the inherent vanity which drives politicians who are political only for its own sake. In so
doing he notes the futility of politics without a particular end noting that it is this end,
however it is defined, which culminates in a shared sense of purpose; in other words,
faith. “This is fundamental to all history, a point to be proved in detail here. The final
result of political action often, no, even regularly, stands in completely inadequate and
often even paradoxical relation to its original meaning,” he writes. “But because of this
fact, the serving of a cause must not be absent if action is to have inner strength. Exactly
what the cause, in the service of which the politician strives for power and uses power,
looks like a matter of faith. The politician may serve national, humanitarian, social,
ethical, cultural, worldly, or religious ends. The politician may be sustained by a strong
belief in ‘progress’- no matter in which sense – or he may coolly reject this kind of belief.
He may claim to stand in the service of an ‘idea’ or, rejecting this in principle, he may
want to serve external ends of everyday life. However, some kind of faith must always
exist.”97 The assumptions of the enlightenment place their faith in a positive rationality,
as evidenced by the previous investigations of modernity. In so doing, scholars such as
Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau marginalized faith rooted in the potential of being. It is
possible however, on this understanding of faith to articulate a natural law ethic which
97 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology translated, edited, and
with an introduction by H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), 117.
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rests on the hope of individual to seek in common, the ends of well-being and
development.
It is bizarre to come across the works of Weber in order to defend the traditional
and contemporary criticisms of natural law. Yet there is value in this endeavor. As his
definition of faith reveals, faith implies a system of beliefs. For enlightenment thinkers,
as he goes on to show, it is rational knowledge evident in the dominance of positivism.
All three thinkers previously examined; namely, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau all
demonstrate this idea. In a similar fashion, the cosmopolitan thinkers demonstrate the
liberal idea of progress as evidenced in the articulation of harm conventions and the duty
to protect. Above all else however, his definition of faith provides the necessary
framework in which to situate the politics of potential articulated in the final chapter of
this work. It provides the necessary space whereby individual choice, the pinnacle of
natural law agency, and the unity of human purpose can come together and achieve the
requisite just structures. In so doing, it is possible to articulate a non-ontological and
non-theological foundation of natural law morality presupposing the capacity and
capability of agents, working in common, to achieve a mutually sought after end. In a
manner which recalls, but does not necessitate, a relational ontology, the morality of
natural law is revealed to function as a critique and accompaniment to a rational account
of politics. In so doing, it paves the way for an account of agency in common with which
to challenge the primacy of the state as the pre-eminent actor in International Affairs.
Chapter Three
Agency à la Aquinas:
Developing an account of Natural law Agents
Making oneself accessible to the transcendental attributes of being means that one gives
preference to being over having. In the heart of being lie unity, truth, goodness and
beauty which invite us to a community with being and fills our minds with perfection.
Leo J. Elders,
The Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas
(in a historical perspective)
Introduction
Having established the nature of the problem under investigation, namely human
suffering, and how it relates to the structures and agents that sustain international affairs,
the previous chapter sought to provide an alternative framework upon which an
unconventional account of being political could ultimately rest. The description of the
natural law as an historical and moral tradition was situated alongside the tradition of
casuistry illustrating the similar historical foundations upon which both rested. It
demonstrated the influence of Aquinas on both traditions ultimately interweaving them
anew providing an alternative understanding of reasonable capacities and capabilities of
the moral agent. Moreover, it hinted at a commutative notion of transnational justice
affecting the structural arrangements of world order in which individuals and
communities worked through relational institutional patterns subtly influencing the
practice of politics. Highlighting the central role that reason and practice play in the
ethical and moral deliberations of agents’, natural law proffers one particular manner of
conceptualizing agents outside contemporary subjectivity. Building on this account, this
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chapter offers an image of the prudent agent emerging out of the tapestry of natural law
and casuistry.
With his works Hobbes offered to the world the idea of man in motion, building
on the assumptions of modern physicists. The idea of man as a machine comprised of
various component parts, arms, legs, head and heart, building on the analogy of medicine,
provided one particular means of understanding what it was to be a political agent.1 But
as the previous chapters make clear, it is an image of the agent distinguishing ethics from
politics breaking from the assumptions of pre-modern philosophers and theologians. This
image of man is the focus of the second section of this chapter. Illustrating how the
image of the individual as a rights bearing subject, drawn from the human rights regime
is influenced by the social contract position and the works of Hobbes, Locke and
Rousseau in particular, it seeks to show the shortcomings associated with a philosophical
understanding of human nature and its implications for human agency. It is contrasted
with the works of Aquinas and his ontology of being. Within the assumptions of Thomas
Aquinas there exists another idea of man in motion comprised of a telos residing in the
will and intellect sustaining a desire for ‘the good’ revolving around Aquinas’s
conception of the graceful individual. This account of the individual provides a cyclical
image of man in motion. The focus of the first section of this chapter, the natural law
individual is understood as the product of a corporeal and incorporeal union of the body
and soul represented in the theoretical and practical principles of life. Through the
development of moral habits, individuals are capable of developing ‘the good’
consequently engendering a practical understanding of morality and justice underscoring
1 See for example the works of Gabriella Slomp, Thomas Hobbes and the political philosophy of Glory
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Press , 2000) which offers a striking account of Hobbes’ conception of the
individual as a political agent.
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the ontological equality of being.2 Chief among these virtues is prudence, evident within
the development of one’s conscience, as it relates to Aquinas’s order of Charity.3 Thus it
is that the individual, as an agent, is the source of morality whose actions and relations
further develop the first principles of life influencing the moral structures of the political
community.
Key to Aquinas’s account of agency and the natural law agent is the notion of
grace. A wholly Christian concept, grace represents one mode of investigating the
fallible nature of human reasoning; however, this very fact denies for the some, the value
of Aquinas’s assumptions in light of the dominant cognitive epistemologies of
Modernity. For theologians grace is intimately tied up with conceptions of the will and
ultimately, the human soul bringing to bear the role of a higher authority, or God, in the
creation of agents. Aquinas represents a positive orientation motivating human action,
highlighting the potential of individuals to do good, aware of the equal capacity to do
evil. On this account, he distinguishes himself from Augustine who forcefully argues
that individuals, after the original sin, lost their god given grace.4 Bearing this in mind,
the role of God as creator, in the ontology of Aquinas is incontrovertible.5 Indeed, his
ontology sustains grace, beyond the original sin, locating it in the natural component of
being human. On this account, God’s benevolence allows individuals to choose to
overcome their shortcoming; however, alternative interpretations of these ends are
possible. It is possible to show the value of Aquinas’s ethics, in light of these
2 Simon Oliver, “The Sweet Delight of Virtue and Grace in Aquinas’s Ethics” International Journal of
Systematic Theology 7, no. 1 (January 2005): 58-61.
3 More will be said on the order of charity in chapter five when it is discussed in reference to civic
friendship and in the epilogue when the effects of transnational justice are investigated in more depth.
4 Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, ed.
R. W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
5 This point is made clear in Roger Ruston, Human Rights and the Image of God (London: SCM-
Canterbury Press, 2004).
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investigations, demonstrating how Aquinas’s representation of law provides a means of
constructing an account of ethics, without the representation of a higher authority or God.
Aquinas’s account of being rests on the actualities which constitute human
existence. As individuals develop they move from one actuality to the next and in so
doing progress further along the chain of being. Ultimate happiness for Aquinas is the
union of the individual with God. Happiness, on this interpretation, is limited to the
ethereal existence of the individual. Anthony Lisska, however, argues forcefully that is
this one of many ways of interpreting the works of Aquinas. Arguing forcefully that it is
possible to understand within Aquinas a metaphysics of morals without a particular role
for eternal laws, Lisska highlights the central importance of practical reason in the
ontology of Aquinas. Distinguishing between the essence of being, and the content of
being, Lisska demonstrates how a reasonable account of morality can exist for Aquinas,
with or without the grace of God. “An essence accounts for the regular causal relations
existing in nature. Furthermore, Aquinas can account for this analysis of the concept of
essence with or without God,” he writes. “Hence, Aquinas’s account of natural law –
which is in effect an account of an essence of human nature – is independent
conceptually from his account of natural law. One need not know the eternal law prior to
knowledge of the natural law. Natural law,” he concludes, “makes sense in terms of a
consideration of the development of dispositional prosperities.”6 Building on this
distinction, the first section of this chapter focuses specifically on the essence of being in
6 Anthony J. Lisska, Aquinas: An Analytical Reconstruction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 105 & 106.
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and of itself in order to ground a normative account of agency, the focus of the final
section of this chapter.7
A variety of methods exist with which to account for a theological or non-
theological grounding of ethics. One can endorse an analytical reconstructive approach,
as referenced above. On the other hand, one can investigate traditional historical and
contemporary texts employing the methods of discourse analysis, and in other instances,
develop a hermeneutical interpretation to demonstrate the relevance of previously
discarded ideas. With this in mind, Susanne M. Decrane offers a hermeneutical
interpretation of Aquinas’s account of the common good with reference to feminist
ethics. “In fact, classical texts of a tradition may serve as sources of insight and wisdom
if retrieved through a rigorous, critical process. To reject classic texts leaves the human
community stripped of enduring sources of human wisdom and moral insight,” she
writes. “This is essential,” she concludes, if one is to prevent merely cosmetic
realignments of the same oppressive insights and conclusions.”8 Bearing all this in mind,
it is not the object of this work to offer an interpretation of the works of Aquinas, in light
of the aforementioned problem of being. As the examples of Lisska and DeCrane
illustrate, it is possible to interpret anew the ideas and ends of Aquinas, in light of the
cognitive epistemology dominating contemporary ethics and morals. In light of the
7 This particular representation of the individual as an agent can thus be interpreted in a theological or non-
theological manner. That being said, the non-theological interpretation endorsed by Lisska should not been
read as existing in contradiction to the ideas offered in the Conclusion to Chapter Two. The point
articulated by Lisska which ought to be reinforced at this point is that the interpretation is mutually
constituted the choice lies with the reader to determine which series of assumptions provide the soundest
foundation for the works of Aquinas and the application of natural law morality to contemporary ethics.
8 Suanne M. Decrane, Aquinas, Feminism, and the Common Good (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown
University Press, 2004), xiii.
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objectives of this work, it suffices to note that grace represents a pre-modern account of
human fallibility.9
Human fallibility links the investigation of structure and agency culminating in
contemporary ideas of world order. As the realist discourse investigated in Chapter One
reveals, the structuring of international affairs, both historical and contemporary, seeks to
temper human fallibility resting on a negative assumption of human nature. Similarly,
the English School tradition articulated a particular role for institutions tempering the
negative self-interest of the individual. On the other hand, a variety of cosmopolitan
interpretations running throughout this work examine the tension of moral progress in
light of the fallible nature of human reasoning. Indeed, the examination of human rights,
in light of the problems of world order represents one method of protecting the essence of
being in light of these negative assumptions. On this account, it is notable that grace,
emerging from a distincty Christian theology represents a greater purpose, namely, a
means to understand human action in a positive light. Bearing this distinction, when the
ideas and discourses of Aquinas are employed, so to will his language of nature and grace
remain. Similarly, contemporary discussions will revolve around the idea of human
nature, as it remains the primary discourse of philosophy and international affairs;
however, with reference to natural law agency and the natural law agency, this work
speaks of ‘being human’ representing the idea to be elaborated on in the final chapter of
the works; namely, the politics of potential. Representing both the fallible nature of
human reasoning alongside the desire and motivation for agents to act as agents of
9 These different interpretations represent a complementary interpretation to that offered by the texts of
Weber in the conclusion of chapter two. This chapter seeks to reinforce the individual as part of a
relational ontology which supports an outward looking ethic and the mutuality of well-being and
development articulated through an ethic of love, friendship and the order of charity to be elaborated on in
Chapters Four and Five.
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justice, the politics of potential reflects a positive orientation, albeit a tempered one, with
which to contrast the inevitability of universal moral progress associated with a modern
account of morals, and in particular, the cosmopolitan discourses investigated in the
Introduction.
Part I: Thomas Aquinas & the Metaphysics of Being
Ontology is that branch of philosophy concerned with the essence of being. It is
Aquinas, the preeminent natural law scholar, whose ontological assumptions influence
the tradition.10 Providing the foundation for individual being situating morality within
this self-same structure of assumptions, he fosters a tradition capable of supporting the
casuist methodology previously examined.11 “There is no denying that St. Thomas
Aquinas’ doctrine of natural law,” writes A.P. d’Entreves, “still represents the most
carefully thought out presentation of the ontological view, the most complete and
thoroughgoing development of its assumptions and of its implication.”12 What Aquinas
understood, and what has been marginalized within contemporary debates of ethics and
international affairs, is that one must look to the anthropological nature of man in order to
understand the essence and being of the individual. Aquinas offers a philosophical image
of the individual in stark contrast to the rights bearing subject of the 21st century. As
reasonable beings intent on understanding the nature of their surroundings, it is only
through one’s actions that an individual comes to substantiate who they are potentially
and actually. This anthropology of being provides a unique alternative to understand
human agency as one’s desire for knowledge fosters human potential. In other words, to
10 Knud Haakonssen, op. cit., 15.
11 Albert R. Jonsen & Stephen Toulmin, op.cit., 135.
12 A.P. d’Entreves, “The Case for Natural Law Re-Examined” op. cit., 34 & 35.
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be human is to act and one’s actions represent the agent’s participation in the natural law
shaping a just community.
Being, for Aquinas, can not be separated from morality. One exists in the natural
world, yet displays a remarkable ignorance of its structures; however, his metaphysics
provide individuals with a means to engage and interact in this world predisposed to
morality and ethics. As Robert Pasnau points out, what Aquinas understood, and tried
to convey was “an extended lesson in morality not just because this is essential to human
well-being, but also because these matters are essential to being human.”13 Beginning
from the ground up, Aquinas premises his account of morality and justice in the natural
and social world on the one thing that makes individuals truly human- the capacity to
move independent of outside stimuli and come to understand, for themselves the
environment in which they are situated. Aquinas supports this anthropology with a
metaphysics imbued at the outset with a basic understanding of good and evil
complementing this capacity with a theory of knowledge incorporating human senses and
experiences within a community. It is for this reason that the most noble of tasks, for
individuals is to go out and experience the world for with experience comes knowledge
and with knowledge comes understanding culminating in the actualization of human
potential.
Questions seventy-five to one-hundred and two of the Summa Theologica, entitled
“A Treatise on Man”, outline Aquinas’ account of the nature of the individual. The
centrifugal component of Aquinas’ understanding of the individual is the soul. “To seek
the nature of the soul,” he writes, “we must premise that the soul is defined as the first
13 Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of the Summa theologiae Ia
75-89 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 20.
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principle of life in those things that live.”14 It is within the soul that the essence of the
individual is located; the component parts that deal with the nature of the soul itself and
the union of the soul with bodily matter proceeding on to earthly existence.15 The soul,
Aquinas writes, “is the highest and noblest of forms. Wherefore it excels corporeal
matter in its power by the fact that it has an operation and a power in which corporeal
matter has no share whatsoever.”16 The incorporeal component of individuals, it is the
soul shaping the metaphysical qualities of Aquinas’s individual. “Therefore the soul,
which is the first principle of life, is not a body, but the actuality of the body,” Aquinas
writes. “And this is so in just the way that heat, which is the principle of heating, is not a
body, but the actuality of the body.”17 The soul is of primary importance for Aquinas’
metaphysics for while all of nature’s creatures possess a soul, individual souls distinguish
themselves as rational beings. “For Aquinas a human being is not a soul plus a body but
a body which has a soul,” writes MacIntyre. “Human experience is bodily experience,
and the soul knows and knows about singulars only on the basis of that experience as
mediated by imagination-itself a bodily phenomenon-and structured in terms of form by
intellect.”18 The soul, united with the body provides the form of the individual dictating
the appetite and desire of the individual in keeping with its genus and species. Bearing
this in mind, Aquinas’ depiction of the soul becomes increasingly important and, as
James Lehrberger points out, “is the most potential and the least actual. Still, the soul as
we know it is the act of matter; but act can be best understood in light of the form-esse
14 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province
(London: Buns Oates & Washbourne Ltd. Publishers to the Holy See) Ia, q. 75, a. 1.
15 Robert Pasnau, op. cit., 29.
16 Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., Ia, q. 76, a. 1.
17 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., Ia, q. 75, a. 1.
18 Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition,
being Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Edinburgh in 1988 (Notre Dame, Indiana: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 153.
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relation.”19 Individual being, or becoming, is presented by Aquinas in varying degrees of
actuality. While the soul is one actuality, in and of itself, the union of the soul with the
body represents another stage of individual being. “Considered in itself, the nature of
man thus clearly abstracts from every act of existing, but in such a way that may not be
excluded from it,” writes Aquinas. “And it is nature considered in this way that we
predicate all individual beings.”20 Aquinas’s account of the soul and the subsequent
development of the human form, its teleological character goes on to sustain his account
of morality.21
With the union of the body and the soul, the individual further develops his or her
actuality and in so doing, comes to understand his or her quiddity. “And it is because of
this, that the human soul among all the intellectual substances has the greatest potency,
the human soul is closest to material things;” writes Aquinas. “Thus from the soul and
the body there results one act of being in one composite, although this act of being
belongs to the soul as not being bodily dependent.”22 Resulting in the production of the
intellect and the will, the union of the soul and matter sustain a moral and active
individual. The relationship of these two components provides the individual with an
innate grasp of the principles of life, morality and an orientation towards ‘the good’. As
the singular entity on earth possessing a rational soul, it is the cognitive capacities of the
agent sustaining the desires and appetite which, in light of all that has been said, sustains
19 James Lehrberger, “The anthropology of Aquinas’s ‘De ente et essentia’” The Review of Metaphysics 51,
no. 4 (June 1998): 6.
20 Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, translated with an introduction and notes by Armand Mauer
(Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), 40.
21 Robert Pasnau, op. cit., 29.
22 St. Thomas Aquinas, “On Being and Essence” op. cit., 4.
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an ontological framework in which all beings are, in and of themselves, predisposed
towards ‘the good’.23
It is the will that orients the natural telos toward the last ends of the individual;
namely ‘the good’. The good motivating human action highlights the natural desires of
the individual simultaneously demonstrating the freedom and autonomy of the agent. As
Aquinas explains in the Summa Contra Gentiles, the desire for the good is natural,
located in all of nature’s creatures. “There is a desire for good in everything: good, the
philosopher tells us, is what all desire,” writes Aquinas. “In things with understanding it
is called intellectual or rational desire: will. So created intellectual substances have
wills.”24 Comprised of a rational soul, individuals are epistemologically endowed, at the
outset, with an innate capacity to know ‘the good’ in its simplest of forms. “Since the
essence of good consists in this, that something perfects another as an end, whatever is
found to have the character of an end also has that of good,” writes Aquinas. “Now two
things are essential to an end: It must be sought or desired by things which have not
attained the end, and it must be loved by things which share the end, and be, as it were,
enjoyable to them.”25 This innate comprehension motivates action in the first instance,
indicative of the developmental potential within the capacities and capabilities of the
23 Quiddity, in the works of Aquinas is, at certain points in his text, used interchangeably with the idea of
essence, or nature. Quiddity is a more specific form of ens per se denoting to the reader the specific
characteristics of various entities as they are further classified and defined based on their individual
characteristics-it is the form of being. Thomas Aquinas, “On Being and Essence” op. cit., 27.
24 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa contra Gentiles, 2.47-8” text from Summa contra Gentiles (Opera Omnia,
Leonine edn., vol. xiii) in Thomas Aquinas, Selected Philosophical Writings, Selected and Translated with
an Introduction and notes by Timothy McDermott, 169 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
25 Thomas Aquinas, “Quaestiones Disputated De Veritate” Q. 21, a. 2 corpus as found in Truth, vol. 3, p.
10, a translation of the Deveritate by Robert W. Schmidt (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1954) as quoted in
Ronald Duska, “Aquinas’ Definition of The Good: Ethical-Theoretical Notes on De Veritate, Q. 21,” The
Monist 58, no. 1 (1974): 152. It should be noted that Aquinas discusses his idea of ‘the good’ in a variety
of his writings. To examine them in detail is beyond the space allotted, but Susanne DeCrane, op.cit.,
provides many similar definitions of ‘the good’ all premised on this same idea of happiness. What is
interesting to note is the relationship that exists between the idea of ‘the good’ human ‘telos’ and the ability
of the individual to achieve such ends.
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individual. “So note that in nature classification of actions comes from form, but its
exercise comes from an agent causing the action in pursuance of a goal, so that the first
source of an activity’s exercise is some goal,” writes Aquinas.26 The will motivates action
toward and end further developing the first principles of life. The goal, on this account,
is integral human fulfillment. Yet it is a task which can only be achieved with the help of
the intellect sustaining the reasoning capacities of the agent.
The intellect is the operation of the soul supporting the epistemological potential
of the individual. “Now man is the most perfect of all lower movers,” writes Aquinas.
“Therefore the respective principles of both, namely the active and possible intellects,
must be in man’s nature and neither of these must be separate, as to its being, from the
soul of man.”27 The intellect complements the natural desires of the will developing an
innate awareness of universal precepts alongside the first principles of life. As rational
beings, individuals are capable of reasoning through information organizing and applying
it to future deliberations and actions. “But man [unlike angels] arrives at the knowledge
of intelligible truth by advancing from one thing to another; and therefore he is called
rational. Reasoning, therefore, is compared to understanding as movement is to rest, or
acquisition to possession; of which one belongs to the perfect, the other the imperfect,”
he writes. “And since movement always proceeds from something immovable, and ends
in something at rest hence it is,” Aquinas further writes, “that human reasoning, by way
of inquiry and discovery, advances from certain things simply understood- namely, first
26 Thomas Aquinas, “Public disputations on Evil 6” Text from “Queastiones Disputatae de malo” (Opera
Omnia, Leonine edn., vol. xxiii) in Thomas Aquinas, Selected Philosophical Writings, Selected and
Translated with an Introduction and notes by Timothy McDermott, 176 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1993).
27 Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province
(London: Buns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., Publishers to the Holy See, 1923-1929.), 210.
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principles, and, again, by way of judgment, returns by analysis to first principles, in light
of which it examines what it has found.”28 Further distinguishing the capacities of the
intellect, Aquinas notes the symbiotic role of theoretical and practical knowledge residing
in the speculative and practical intellect of the agent. “For it is the speculative intellect
which directs what it apprehends, not to operation, but to the consideration of truth; while
the practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends to operation.”29 Reasoning,
on this account, is the movement between theoretical and practical first principles in light
of acquired experience generated through human action. Of equal importance, the
theoretical and practical principles reveal the nature of morality and the universal ends of
‘the good’.30
The will and intellect complement one another sustaining the desires of the agent
moving along the actualities of being. Aquinas understood this necessity distinguishing
between the absolute and relative superiority of things. “If therefore the intellect and will
be considered with regard to themselves, then the intellect is the higher power. And this
is clear if we compare their respective objects to one another. For the object of the
intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of the will;” writes Aquinas,
“since the object of the intellect is the very idea of the appetible good; and the appetible
good, the idea of which is in the intellect, is the object of the will.” The relationship of
the intellect and will, however, is not that simple. Aquinas further points out that “since
the proper nature of a power is in its order to its object, it follows that the intellect in
28 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., Ia, q. 79, a. 8.
29 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., Ia, q. 79, a. 11.
30 Aquinas is here drawing on the distinction made by Aristotle between theoretical and practical
knowledge offered in Nichomachean Ethics. Distinguishing further between generic and specific types of
knowledge he locates morality and the study of ethics in the specific type of practical knowledge
elucidating his idea of phronesis which went on to shape and influence Aquinas’s idea of prudence derived
from synderesis.
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itself and absolutely is higher and nobler than the will. But relatively and by comparison
with something else, we find that the will is sometimes higher than the intellect, from the
fact that the object of the will occurs in something higher than that in which occurs the
object of the intellect.”31 The mutuality of this relationship, in light of the developmental
potential of agents is of intrinsic importance to Aquinas’s ontology. “Indeed, more than
this, for as the intellect of necessity adheres to the first principles, the will must of
necessity, adhere to the last end, which is happiness: since the end is in practical matters
what the principle is in speculative matters,” writes Aquinas. “For what befits a thing
naturally and immovably must be the root and principles of all else appertaining thereto,
since the nature of a thing is the first in everything and every movement arises from
something immovable.32 The relationship of action and ends requires a holistic
epistemology of theoretical and practical knowledge sustaining the ontology of being in
and of itself. Supporting the morality of natural law, the individual and the community
for Aquinas, is this relationship of the will and the intellect.33
Like the intellect and the will, ‘the good’ and the first principles are related to one
another absolutely and relatively. It is the practical intellect noting the first principle of
natural law through the special habit synderesis substantiating the claim that, individuals,
in and of their very essence, are moral beings, in potential. “Wherefore the first
principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a special
natural habit, which we call ‘synderesis’,” writes Aquinas. “Whence ‘synderesis’ is said
31 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” Ia, q. 82, a. 3.
32 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit, Ia, q. 82, a. 1.
33 It should also be stated at this point that this distinction of knowledge types is only to note how the
different facets of knowledge are mutually symbiotic. This distinction is important in light of the point
made by Nick Rengger and Raymond Aron, arguing that conceptions of world order are the product of both
theoretical and practical knowledge which bears interesting conclusions for Aquinas’ theory of agency.
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to incite to good and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first principles we proceed
to discover, and judge of what we have discovered.”34 Synderesis provides the intellect
with the vaguest conception of the morality of natural law inciting good and murmuring
against evil. Firmly ensconced in the relationship of the will and intellect, it is part and
parcel of the first principles of life. On this account, synderesis maintains the primordial
claim that action and reason, on the part of the agent are, in and of themselves, moral.
Furthermore, the ontology sustaining this claim ensures that all agents are related in and
of themselves to the ends of natural law morality, ‘the good.’35 “And so it presupposes
that we are well disposed to our goals-the premises of our action-by a right will, in the
same way that we are disposed to the premises of speculative thought by the natural light
of our agent intellect,” writes Aquinas. “So that just as our speculative mind in
subordination to our agent intellect is disposed by science to rightly reason about
speculative matters, so our practical mind in subordination to right willing is disposed to
act by prudence.”36 Emphasizing human experiences activating the senses synthesizing
information in the intellect, Aquinas goes on to develop his idea of conscience, the
product of reason and synderesis. Situating this idea of conscience alongside the prudent
34 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., Ia, q. 72, a. 12.
35 Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Question on the Soul’s Knowledge of Itself, translated by Richard T. Lambert
(Stillwater, Oklahoma: Translation Clearing House, 1987), 2. Working alongside the physical sense of the
individual, the intellect via phantasms, acquire a wide variety of knowledge and begin to develop an
understanding of their surroundings. Unlike God and the angels, who do not require bodily matter to
acquire knowledge, individuals are not endowed with a natural capacity to know independently. The
acquisition of knowledge is a process requiring the use of sensible and intelligible functions, neither of
which resides singularly in the form or matter of the whole individual. Bearing this in mind Aquinas
elaborates on a five-stage process of knowledge originating at the most basic level of identification
generating a variety of taxonomies applied comfortably on a habitual basis. There are five stages to the
acquisition of knowledge: the sense must first abstract a sensible thing, it must then, in the second instance
store that sensible species in the imagination. Third, the agent intellect abstracts from the individuating
conditions the sensible species has preserved and then move on to the fourth stage whereby the abstracted
thing is transformed from its sensible to its intelligible forms where it is deposited in the possible intellect.
The process is finished when, in the final instance, the species is completely understood. This entire
process is embodied in the idea of rash reasoning substantiating the political agent and his or her actions.
36 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., Ia IIae q. 55 a.6.
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individual, Aquinas overcomes the vagueness of synderesis sustaining the casuistic
interpretation of practical reasoning and natural law morality.
Conscience, according to Aquinas “implies the relation of knowledge to
something,” furthermore going on to say that, “the application of knowledge to
something is done by some act. Wherefore form this explanation of the name it is clear
that conscience is an act.”37 Conscience, on this account, works alongside practical
reasoning determining the intentions of the agent and the realm of consequences
associated with each particular course of action. “This ‘synderesis rule’ is, he maintains,
a self-evident principle, such that anyone who understands it must assent to its truth,”
writes Haldane. “What it concerns, however, is not the rightness or wrongness of this or
that particular action, but rather the polarity of the axis on which conduct lies and the
intrinsic attraction of one pole and repulsion of the other. Even granting the truth of the
principle,” he furthermore points out, “knowledge of it will not suffice to guide on
through life without a more specific capacity to distinguish good from bad courses of
action, and it is this capacity which Aquinas follows tradition in identifying with
conscientia.”38 Capable of reasoning individuals are captured by a rational soul and are
prone to errors. Prudence, on this account, takes on an increasingly important role in any
account of moral and political agency. “Now in the genus of human acts, the highest
cause is the common end of all human life,” writes Aquinas, “and it is this end that
prudence intends.”39 Prudence exemplifies the wise individual capable of taking counsel
in order to determine the natural ends of his or her existence. Building on the idea of
37 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., Ia, q. 79, a. 13.
38 John Haldane, Faithful Reason, Essays Catholic and philosophical (London: Routledge, 2004), 117.
39 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., II-II, q. 47, a. 2.
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conscience as action, developing the requisite moral taxonomy prudence advises practical
reason sustaining good intentions and moral actions.
Prudence grows in importance in light of the first principles of knowledge.
Recalling the habitual nature of the first principles and the limitations of a rational soul,
the interpretation of morality, on this account, is limited to the capacities of the agent.
Bearing all of this in mind is to note the following points. First, that reason, according to
Aquinas, is concerned with universals, and it is the agent, aware of such universals, who
applies them to specific cases.40 The product of good habits, prudence is the ultimate
human virtue, which, when related to the intellect and will of the individual, demonstrates
its relation to the ultimate ends of being; namely, the good. Ultimately, upright moral
decisions require a virtuous agent. “It is because the infinite number of singulars cannot
be comprehended by human reason, that ‘our counsels are uncertain’. Nevertheless
experience reduces the infinity of singulars to a certain finite number which occur as a
general rule, and the knowledge of these suffices for human prudence.”41 On this
account, laws, custom and norms are mutable, related to the increasing knowledge and
cognitive capacities of the agent. Aquinas himself was aware of this mutability
concluding that “prudence does not reside in the external senses whereby we know
sensible objects, but in the interior sense, which is perfected by memory and experience
so as to judge promptly of particular case.”42 On this account it is the intentions of the
agent which bear scrutiny. In the same vein as casuistry, moral reasoning, on this
account, is unable to account for the myriad of possible ends and consequences; however,
reasoning and action, guided by prudence, linked as it is the ends of natural law morality,
40 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., II-II, q. 47, a. 3.
41 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., II-II, q. 47, a. 3.
42 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., II-II, q. 47, a. 3.
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outline action in line with such ends. The responsibility of the agent, in light of these
conclusions, lies in listening to the murmurings of synderesis and acting according to the
morality of natural law.
Agency, for Aquinas is rooted in the idea of a goal. As he himself states, “every
agent, whether it acts by nature or by will, tends towards a goal, though it doesn’t follow
that every agent is aware of a goal or deliberates about it.”43 While individuals are free
and autonomous agents, they are ordered around a particular end, ‘the good’. The
reasoning and actions of the individual are undertaken in light of this fact. “The free is
that which is its own cause. Wherefore that which is not the cause of its own acting is not
free in action. Now whatever things are not moved, nor act except they be moved by
others, are not a cause of their own action,” writes Aquinas. “Therefore self-movers
alone have liberty in acting. These alone act by judgment: because the self-mover is
divided into mover and moved; and the mover is the appetite moved by intellect,
imagination or sense, to which faculties judgment belong.”44 Predisposed towards these
ends, the will, coupled with the intellect, orients human agency towards the good. This is
agency in the general sense, promoting action unrestricted by overarching structures
shaping human experience. On the other hand, agency in particular, notes the specific
goals individuals seeking higher levels of actuality aware of the changing constitution of
the agent. The natural telos of the agent and the ends of the first principles of knowledge
complement one another ordering the desires of the agent shaping action geared towards
integral human fulfillment. The ontology of being thus requires that the intellect and the
43 Thomas Aquinas, “On the Principles of Nature (complete)” Text from De Principiis Naturae (Opera
Omnia, Leonine edn., vol. xliii) in Thomas Aquinas, Selected Philosophical Writings, Selected and
Translated with an Introduction and notes by Timothy McDermott, 72 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1993).
44 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa contra Gentiles” 1923-1929, op. cit., 114.
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will function as two parts of a greater whole and in so doing, fosters a free and
autonomous conception of being.
On this account, agency, according to Aquinas, is in and of itself, moral. One
cannot distinguish action from morality, because action is rooted in both the intellect and
the will wherein the first principles, both practical and theoretical are located. All of
which points to one particular conclusion; namely, that Aquinas could not conceptualize
an amoral individual. This interpretation of the individual relies on the key relationship
of the intellect and will, derived from the Aristotelian idea of knowledge, the distinction
between episteme and phronesis. As the opening chapter of this work highlighted, this
distinction became increasingly polarized as practical knowledge was placed outside
political agency, seeking universal standards; however, as the discussion of the prudent
individual illustrates moral knowledge and action, is constituted not by universals or
particulars, in and of themselves, but of a relationship between the two. The clear
distinction of these two facets of knowledge, upheld by Modernity, influenced the
understanding of morality, providing a theoretical process oriented approach to ethics, as
was highlighted in the Chapter Two, influencing a subjective interpretation of the
individual and the community. Morality, on this account, concerned itself with right and
wrong, not good and evil, and the problematic nature of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ came to be.45 As
Ralph McInerny highlights, all actions, can be examined in a moral light distinguishing,
like Aquinas, between technical and moral action. “The speculative virtues, having
geometry and quantum mechanics, say, enable us to perform well certain kinds of mental
activity, and to say of someone that she is a good geometer or physicist is not just as such
a moral commendation,” he writes. “But if we can appraise some human acts in a non-
45 G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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moral way, it seems wrong to identify human action and moral action.”46 The value of a
Thomist framework is that, the manner in which is understands knowledge, holistically,
incorporating both theory and practice as a complementary, and not binary, circuitously
avoids this problem noting that in and of themselves the ‘is’ of an action is also its
‘ought’ and in so doing, avoids the normative problems of the naturalistic fallacy.
Consequently, this framework of moral action provides the necessary framework for an
objective account of being political.
Part II: Modernity’s Individual: the rights bearing subject
While international relations, at its most basic concerns itself with the interactions
of states co-existing in the international system, there exists within the field the idea that
individuals, due to their common humanity deserved to be treated in an ethical manner.
Chris Brown points out that “there is a long tradition of interpretation that argues that
individuals are the ultimate members of international society, even if the immediate
members are states.”47 It is a point further noted by R.J. Vincent who, observing a
twofold revolution in the discipline highlights the emphasis placed on individuals. “The
46Ralph McInerny, “Ethics” in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, eds. Norman Kretzmann and
Eleonore Stump, 204 & 88 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). He goes on to say for
Aquinas, “any human action that can be appraised technically can also be appraised morally. In another
one of his works, Aquinas on Human Action: A Theory of Practice (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University
of America Press, 1992), he finds fault with Finnis noting that the distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ or
the idea that practical knowledge relies somehow on theoretical knowledge, according to Finnis, is faulty
and lies in a mistaken understanding of human function. “Practical arguments are often mixtures of
practical and theoretical considerations- of ‘ought’ and ‘is’ judgments- but what must be avoided like sin is
any suggestion that our first and primary practical knowledge is dependent on theoretical knowledge of
nature. That is Finnis’s fundamental point. It is on this basis that he takes to task other moral philosophers.
It is on this basis that he undertakes to save Aristotle from himself and dismiss the heart of his procedure as
an erratic boulder on the landscape. In short, Finnis is scandalized by the function argument.”
47 Chris Brown, International relations theory: new normative approaches (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf,
1992), 94. In this book, he makes the point that within the last twenty or so years there has been a revival
in the study of normative applied ethics within the field of International Relations and one of the direct
consequences of this has been a revival and re-emergence of ‘naturalism’ within the discipline itself. The
idea that, due to their very humanity, there are natural qualities that adhere to being human which are
innately discernable and provide a standard by which one can judge proper moral behavior.
• Chapter Three • 153
first is that while states still constitute the membership of international society, they have
taken on a revolutionary purpose, adding the needs and interests of individuals and
groups other than states to their traditional preoccupation with peace and security among
themselves,” he writes. “The second is that, in taking on these purposes, states have
dissolved international society into a world society in which groups and individuals have
equal standing with states.”48 One need only examine a cosmopolitan understanding of
world order in order to discern the nature of the rights-bearing individual. On the other
hand, a quick appraisal of the Just War Tradition highlights the ideas associated with Jus
in Bello, paying particular attention to the protection offered to non-combatants and the
indiscriminant use of force within the practice of war itself.49 Needless to say, the ethical
treatment of the individual, in and of itself, remains firmly embedded in the
state/individual relationship placing primary importance on the state as a taxonomical
device bringing with it a series of assumptions rooted in the aforementioned received
view of Modernity.50
Returning to the theme of Modernity that opened this work is to recall that it put
forward a series of assumptions rooted in the mathematical rigor of geometry seeking, in
the face of domestic political instability, theoretical certainty. In order to achieve this
end, a particular type of knowledge had to dominate the ideas of political thinkers. The
works of Thomas Hobbes and his descendents quashed the metaphysical and ontological
48 R.J. Vincent, Human rights and international relations (Cambridge: Published in association with the
Royal Institute of International Affairs, by Cambridge University Press, 1986), 93.
49 A good synopsis of these arguments is available in Michael Walzer, “Just and Unjust Wars” op. cit.
50 Indeed as Richard Falk points out in “The Rights of Peoples (In Particular Indigenous Peoples)” in The
Rights of Peoples, ed. James Crawford, 17 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), the tension remains as to
which actor, the state or the individual is paramount and which will successfully demand a greater amount
of attention within the discipline. I argue that this final conclusion is beside the point and recall that the
natural law tradition does not put one ahead of the other, but rather argues forcefully for a symbiotic
relationship between the individual and the community.
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assumptions put forward by Aquinas and the natural law tradition he went on to develop.
The emphasis on episteme, situated in opposition to phronesis altered the nature and
understanding of morality, affecting the relation of structure and agency. “It is indeed
very important to notice that the demands for a clear and sharp demarcation between law
and morals arises in the seventeenth century,” writes d’Entreves, “at the end of a long
period of religious strife and social insecurity, when the modern Leviathan comes
forward, saying as it were: I am giving you peace and security for which you crave
provided you obey my laws. But I am asking nothing from you except the mere fact of
obedience. Your religion, your Churches, proclaim da mihi animas cetera tolle. I shall
take the cetera and leave animas free, for I am not concerned with anything else than
outward conformity.”51 The idea of a human soul as the foundation of both religion and
political action was called into question. Moreover, the morality of human actions, in
and of itself, was forsaken. The boundaries of Modernity ensured the removal of a
reasonable and rational soul to be replaced by a civic account of political agency firmly
situated in the public sphere.52 Morality was divorced from human action furthering the
division of public politics and private morality.
Fostering the social contract tradition, and a series of assumptions rooted in
negative liberty, Modernity bears a significant influence on the contemporary ordering of
political affairs; namely, global governance and human wellbeing. Both contemporary
approaches to world order, as investigated in the opening chapter of this work, and
51 A.P. d’Entreves, “The Case for Natural Law Re-Examined” op. cit., 21 & 22.
52 Indeed, the idea of passion changed fundamentally at this point in time. For Aquinas, passion relates to
nature, to man in motion, because passion was the movement from one habit to another and that which
incited the development of good habits, namely virtues. On the other hand, Hobbes and his descendents
argued that passion was the domain of emotion and when unchecked produced turmoil and instability, it
could not be rational. For this reason, it had to be placed outside the boundaries of public agency for to
incorporate it would foster conflict and strife.
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contemporary approaches to human welfare, namely human rights, are influenced by and
remain firmly embedded within the assumptions of Modernity proffering a particular
understanding of the state, the individual, and the relationship they share with one
another. “The idea of human rights first appears in, and remains deeply enmeshed with,
liberal social contract theory,” writes Jack Donnelly, “the only major tradition of social
and political theory that begins with individuals endowed with equal and inalienable
rights.”53 Conceptualized first and foremost as an agent, the image of the individual
sustained by a rhetoric of rights, situated within a constitutional order, is a conception of
agency at odds with a Thomistic assumption of human potential. Whereas the Thomist
tradition professes a key relationship between the will and the intellect imbued with both
practical and theoretical principles, constitutionalism emphasizes episteme altering the
capacity for moral development. The loss of practical principles has had a detrimental
effect on agency, denying the development of prudence and therefore individual
conscience. Unable to participate in the universal natural law, individual desire, on this
account, is oriented towards the material existence of being, consequently hindering the
development of the common good and laws reflecting the normative conditions of justice.
On this account morality and action were divorced from one another and what was
natural and good was drastically altered as individuals turned towards human bodies to
understand the nature of morality and not the actualities of existence, as highlighted by
Aquinas.
With the onset of this particular political order, emotivism became the ethical
tradition guiding human agency. Evaluative judgments reflected community ideas of
53 Jack Donnelly, “The Social construction of international human rights” in Human Rights in Global
Politics, ed. Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, 86 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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right and wrong, related to the adherence to social customs reflecting pre-ordained social
roles.54 It is a tradition which has extended itself into modern understandings of the
individual witnessed in particular in the discourse of rights and its image of the rights
bearing subject. Rooted in the International Human Rights Regime, supported by the
International Bill of Human Rights,55 comprised of the United Nations Charter,56 the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,57 and the two Covenants on Human Rights and
the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,58 the idea of the
rights-bearing individual emerges. “In short, the classical rights-bearer is a public figure,
an active citizen, or at least someone who could become such if he or she wished. The
rights that he or she bears are held against those who would interfere with this role,”
writes Chris Brown, “the government, the powers that be.”59 The direct result of a scant
few years of negotiation, subtly guided by Eleanor Roosevelt at the behest of the newly
formed United Nations,60 and informally tied to a tradition of natural rights reaching back
many centuries,61 the Declaration offers a decidedly legal interpretation of the individual
seeking to protect each and every person from the tyranny of oppression guarding the
54 Alasdair Macintrye, After Virtue: a study in moral theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1981), 169. This transformation ushered in a new approach to ethics; namely, Emotivism. On this account,
evaluative judgments expressed preferences related to an altered understanding of human desires. It is a
link that will be made in the ensuing pages that the changed nature of the will altered the idea of human
desires which, with a morality related to right and wrong, and not the ends of human happiness, denied
pride of place to the moral development of the agent.
55 Thomas Buergental, International Human Rights, in a nutshell (Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1995),
28.
56 The United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations,’ The United Nations,
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html (accessed November 23 November 2003).
57 The United Nations, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,’ op. cit.
58 The United Nations, ‘The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” The United Nations,
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm (accessed November 24 2005).
59 Chris Brown, “Sovereignty, rights and justice” op. cit., 127.
60 Micheline R. Ishay, op. cit.
61 Brian Tierney, op. cit.
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sacrosanct right to life62 coalescing around a common understanding and commitment to
the dignity and respect for the value of life itself.63 Grounded in the liberal, social
contract tradition, human rights are assumed to be at once universally relevant and
applicable. “One of the firmest of liberal beliefs is that liberal values are indeed
universal, that we would all be liberals were it not for the distorting effects of ignorance
on the one hand and privilege on the other,” writes Chris Brown. “Such is the liberal
belief and the self-confident strength of this belief is one of liberalism’s greatest political
aspects.”64 Supported by this liberal ideal rights extend beyond state borders and
sustaining a common humanity, linking individuals throughout the world. Yet this idea
of ethicality associated with human rights misunderstands the nature and purpose
originally intended by the discourse itself. The idea of rights provides an outlined
modicum of behavior that is at once accepted because ultimately, it outlines not only the
relationship among individuals within society it provides an accepted way of
conceptualizing the relationship of individuals and political authority.65 Rights, on this
reading, seek to establish the elusively sought after political stability.
Contrary to popular belief, individual rights have little bearing on the nature of
individual well-being, development, and the idea of innate human potential. It is to note,
62 Rhona K. M. Smith, Textbook on International Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 205.
63 Mary Ann Glendon, “Foundations of Human Rights: The Unfinished Business” The American Journal of
Jurisprudence 1 (1999): 2 & 3.
64 Chris Brown, “Universal human rights: a critique” in Human Rights in Global Politics, ed. Tim Dunne
and Nicholas J. Wheeler, 86 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
65 I am indebted to Nick Onuf who points out that contemporary understanding of the individual come not
only from the human rights regime and cosmopolitan ideas of what it is to be a rights bearing agent but also
from the idea of a rational utility maximizer. It is worthwhile to acknowledge the existence of this image
and the importance it plays vis a vis more positive and rational accounts of politics. The distinctly
normative flavor of the argument of this work is better suited to the philosophical image of the normative
rights bearing agent. This image sustains the critique of Modernity’s fascination with theoretical
knowledge and how it isolates individuals sustaining a subjective account of being political. When
speaking of human welfare and human suffering, the image of the individual within the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is intrinsically important because at the end of the day it is not about welfare
at all, but rather about the relationships of authority within society.
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as Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler do, that rights, in and of themselves involve two
foundational claims. “First, that there is an identifiable subject who has entitlements; and
secondly,” they go on to write, “that to possess a right presupposes the existence of a
duty-bearer against whom the right is claimed.”66 There is within this understanding of
rights, the idea of a relationship between two specific components, the conferrer and the
recipient. This is an idea that is further noted by R.J. Vincent who offers a five part
definition of a rights. In his opinion, a right is comprised of the following, first, a right
holder; second, a claim to some substance; third, a claim which may be asserted,
demanded, enjoyed, or enforced; fourth, a claim asserted against some individual or
group; and finally, a claim cited in support of one’s particular ground.67 Noting the
nature of rights defined is to note two distinct problems, on the one hand, there is a
distinct lack of ontological status offered within this understanding of human rights.
Moreover, if rights are simply an extension of domestic civil society within international
affairs, they are incapable of protecting individuals on a global level.68 The distinct lack
of ontological foundations fail to protect those individuals who suffer, in light of the
66 Tim Dunne & Nicholas J. Wheeler, op. cit.
67 R.J. Vincent, op. cit., 8.
68 Mary Ann Glendon, “The Foundations of Human Rights: The Unfinished Business” op. cit., 2 & 3. The
underlying premise of the Declaration is the notion of human dignity. Inspired by the horrors of the Second
World War (WWII) and the atrocious acts of the Nazi regime the shock waves permeating the international
community lent support to a ‘never again’ mentality. That the nations of the international community had
allowed for such gross violations to occur against any one single individual, let alone an entire race of
people, fostered a collective sense of disgust, but to an even greater extent, a fear that individuals, part of a
greater collectivity of humanity could be so denigrated and treated in such a wholly unlawful and inhumane
manner at all. The overarching sense of urgency which guided the creation of the Declaration did not
investigate the source of such rights, nor did it speculate as to the origin of the adopted idea of dignity. At
the end of the day, however, this was not the issue of greatest importance for the framers of the
Declaration, while mindful of the fact that, at some point in the future ideological underpinnings would be
necessary, at the particular point in time when the document was being crafted, it designed pragmatically to
meet the needs of the world’s people. At the end of the day however, ideology was not wholly discounted,
the Declaration was designed, in a manner of speaking, like a growing tree, it was fashioned as an
interpretive device, as a dynamic force molding and shaping to the needs of the era. It did not foresee how
the oncoming political climate of the Cold War would work against such ideas and bear witness to the
kidnap, detention and ultimate death of a document as it became intermingled with the ensuing power
politics that embodied the Cold War Era.
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norms of sovereignty challenging intervention at the most basic of levels. It is to note, as
Brown does that “[r]ights have no separate ontological status; they are a by-product of a
particular kind of society, one in which the ‘state’ operates constitutionally under the rule
of law, is separate from ‘civil society’ and the ‘family’ and in which private and public
realms are, in principle, clearly demarcated.”69 It is to reiterate, as Costa Douzinas points
out, that there is no such thing as a right to rights. “Such a right would be the right of the
person to be himself or herself,” he writes, “a unique human being in common with
others, a right that would defeat the whole purpose of having rights.”70 On this account,
human rights fall prey to the bounded nature of contemporary international affairs and the
subjective account of being political focused on the recipient nature of the material world.
Bearing this in mind, it has not stopped a variety of authors from seeking a moral basis
for human rights and a common humanity.
Looking to ground rights within what it is to be a human being, theories of human
nature have been utilized as a means to provide a foundation for human rights and the
ethical treatment of individuals. As Jack Donnelly points out, there are roughly speaking
three different approaches to human nature, the Scientific, Moral/Philosophical, or
Social-Scientific/Anthropological perspective. Whereas the first school of thought
generally align their assumptions with theories of basic human needs the final approach
seeks cross cultural consensus looking at a plurality of norms and values that are at once
universal and cultural specific. A moral and philosophical understanding of human
nature, on the other hand, premises itself on the inherent belief that individuals are
capable of deliberation, reflection and action. Moreover, a philosophical and/or moral
69 Chris Brown, “Universal human rights, a critique” op. cit.
70 Costa Douzinas, the end of human rights, critical and legal thought at the turn of the century (Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 2000), 335.
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understanding of human nature assumes that as human beings, all individuals are capable
of acting morally. It is premised, as Jack Donnelly notes, on the idea of human dignity.
“Human rights rest on an account of a life of dignity of which human beings are ‘by
nature’ suited and the kind of person worthy of and entitled to such a life,” he writes.
“And if the rights specified by the underlying theory of human nature are implemented
and enforced, they should help to bring into being the envisioned type of person.”71 Yet
even this attempt to found human rights within a moral framework is not without its
critics. “The fundamental problem with defending the human rights regime in terms of
natural rights thinking is the failure of its advocates to provide a convincing theory of
nature which would ground notions of human dignity,” writes Dunne and Wheeler.72
Dignity, in and of itself, is also deeply problematic. It fails, on a daily basis, to withstand
the philosophical criticism and practical violations sustaining the grosser forms of human
suffering generated and sustained by the practices of international affairs.73
A human construct that looks to bodily existence in order to understand moral and
ethical behavior, dignity does not put forward a strong account of political obligation and
71 Jack Donnelly, International human rights (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993), 21.
72 Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, op. cit., 5. At this point on thing in particular should be noted. It is
common practice to place theories of natural rights within the tradition of natural law itself. This is a
mistake, both natural law and natural rights are distinct traditions that seek different ends and originated for
different purposes. The former account offers an objective philosophical image of the agent whereas the
latter proffers a subjective account of being human. To confuse the two is to mistake the nature of the
traditions themselves; space limitations deny the possibility of arguing this distinction further at this point.
The focus will remain on the natural law as a tradition of morality.
73 Dignity is the result, I argue, of looking for a theoretical foundation upon which to speak out against
harming other individuals; however, it falls prey to the point made by Robert Pasnau, op. cit., who
paraphrasing Aquinas, notes that it is a version of moral behavior that looks towards material and not
metaphysical understandings of what it is to be human being. Because it is created, dignity can also be
destroyed at will. Moreover, it can be offered and taken away by political authorities at their discretion.
For this reason it has little bearing on the ethical treatment of individuals both domestically and
internationally. Moreover, it fails to provide human potential because it does not have an ordering of ends
that allows individuals to develop in a holistic moral fashion. This can only happen when both theoretical
and practical precepts are allowed into the decision making paradigms of individuals. Contrary to the
normative value of dignity, the Chapter Five proposes an ethic of love, originating in the essence of being
fostering an inviolable account of political obligation and responsibility seeking to further develop and
perfect the uniqueness of the natural law agent as a being in common.
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responsibility in the face of gross human suffering. As Bhiku Parekh points out, dignity
is a comparative concept constructed to achieve a particular human end, and therefore is
fallible. “Human beings do not have dignity in the way that they have eyes and ears. It is
a human practice, something they choose to confer on themselves and each other because
of their mutual acknowledgment of their uniquely shared capacities,” he writes. “They
have dignity because they have capacities which non-human do not have and which they
consider so significant as to make them the basis of an appropriate and moral practice.”74
Dignity, relates both the rational capacities of the individual and the social roles to which
they conform as legal entities within the state. It speaks not the idea of being human, and
in so doing conforms to the problems associated with the image of man dealt with in
contemporary international relations. The problem ultimately lies with the quest to
determine morality in the bodily and not natural component of being, a problem noted by
Onora O’Neill in an alternative cosmopolitan discourse. “The Declaration approaches
justice by proclaiming rights. It proclaims what is to be received, what entitlements
everyone is to have; but it says very little about which agents and agencies must do what
if these rights are to be secured,” she writes. “Like other charters and declarations of
rights, the Universal Declaration looks at justice from the recipients perspective: its focus
is on recipience and rights rather than on action and obligation.”75 Rights, on this
account, are proclaimed with little understanding of the relationships that support them.
The dominance of episteme, to the detriment of phronesis ensures that the equal
and reciprocal relationships associated with an objective account of political agency
remain firmly outside the boundaries of contemporary political agency. There exists,
74 Bhikhu Parekh, “Non-ethnocentric universalism,” in Human Rights in Global Politics, ed. Tim Dunne
and Nicholas J. Wheeler, 147 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
75 Onora O’Neill, “Agents of Justice” op. cit., 183.
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within the ideas of the initial framers of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
the political structuring of society, a latent ontological tension. Whereas the framers of
the Declaration placed a high degree of faith in the inherent dignity of the human person,
rooted in a positive ontology, they failed to address the epistemology guiding the larger
goals of the community. In other words, what the framers of the declaration failed to
acknowledge was the relationship of liberal justice and capitalism enjoyed. Their
account of the political community could not withstand the discourses of scarcity and
abundance which structured the ends of the community and in so doing generated the
possessive individual noted by C.B. Macpherson.76 The isolated nature of the individual
within a community could not sustain the necessary relationships needed to foster and
sustain the values of well-being and human development. In the end, a culture of
recipience resulted whereby individuals were well aware of the necessary equity of goods
yet failed to grasp the natural equality of being which sustained not only oneself but
others as well. The subjective account of being political, further entrenched the
dominance of rational knowledge and failed to account for the necessary relationship of
theoretical and practical knowledge necessary to sustain a discourse of moral well-being
and justice both individually and within the community. Consequently, the associated
accounts of political responsibility and obligation necessary for the successful
implementation of a global common humanity were doomed to fail.
Objective relationships are equal and reciprocal. They understand the
responsibilities of morality and the obligations of justice. Oriented around the ends of
human action, an objective account of agency and being political moves beyond
76 C.B. Macpherson, C.B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).
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definitions of human rights previously examined simultaneously providing the necessary
ontological foundations required for a global conception of human well-being. The
original framers of the Declaration relied on a notion of human dignity to frame their
original arguments, as Mary Anne Glendon points out.77 The philosophical undertones of
the document, indicative of human potential and the natural law, as Jacques Maritain
writes, were left to another time and day.78 Falling prey to the cultural relativism debates,
the framers of the Declaration could not foresee the demise of their hopeful aspirations to
the assumptions of Modernity. Grounding their account of humanity in theories of
human nature, situated within a constitutional world order, the contemporary rights
discourse fails to provide individuals with a required understanding of what it is to be a
human and relate to other beings qua beings remaining firmly embedded in the
pragmatism of contemporary ethics and politics. It is a society relating morality to
conformity and above all else, the pre-eminence of social roles. Embedded in a
subjective account of being, the Declaration provides the useful function outlining the
nature and extent of political conformity within the relationship of power and authority
within the domestic and international community.
Part III: Natural Law Agency
Contemporary individuals are challenged by their theoretical make-up, on a daily
basis, to achieve a higher level of being unable to act as genuine agents. A result of their
isolated, amoral and asocial existence individuals lack a true conception of morality
77 Mary Anne Glendon, “Foundations of Human Rights: The Unfinished Business” op. cit., 1-14.
78 Jacques Maritain, “Introduction” in Human Rights, Comments and Interpretations. A Symposium edited
by UNESCO with an introduction by Jacques Maritain, ed. The United Nations Education, Scientific and
Cultural Organization, 9-17 (London & New York: Allan Wingate); and, “On the Philosophy of Human
Rights” ” in Human Rights, Comments and Interpretations. A Symposium edited by UNESCO with an
introduction by Jacques Maritain, ed. The United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
55-72 (London & New York: Allan Wingate).
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originating in the sameness of self, the telos of the natural law individual. Not only does
the union of the body and soul provide individuals with means to understand the nature of
justice, morality and obligation, it provides individuals with the ability to realize that
actions are taken for a multiplicity of purposes, revolving always around a shared end.
This sameness of self, one’s essence and being, is unfathomable in contemporary rights
discourses for it denies the ontological and metaphysical assumptions that support its
realization. To be human, in the contemporary discipline of international relations, is the
sum of the rights bestowed on any one person through the relationship he or she enjoys
with the state. Likewise, the state, working within the aforementioned domestic analogy,
is nothing more than the sum of the laws and treaties that recognize its existence.
Espousing the values of autonomy, self-determination and disinterested liberty, agency as
it relates to both the individual and the state, is limited to the boundaries distinguishing
acceptable and non-acceptable spheres of action. Laws, justice and morality speak not to
the ends of human action seeking a higher level of actuality, but rather, the action
undertaken in the material world failing, at the end of the day, to account for the requisite
obligation and responsibility within each and every human action.79
Distinguishing herself from typical accounts of human rights, Martha C.
Nussbaum provides an interesting alternative to human well-being and development.
Articulating “The Capabilities Approach” Nussbaum reinvigorates the Aristotelian study
of virtues in order to demonstrate how individuals are imbued with the ability to develop
a basic level of rights, but the global population, as a virtuous community must ensure
79 This is a very brief account of the origins of contemporary justice. The idea of justice, both liberal and
otherwise is investigated in depth in the final section of this work. Suffice to note at this point that the
argument will be made that justice can be understood outside its proportional representations that exist
within the state but not outside its boundaries. It pointes to an alternative idea of justice, understood as
creative justice, rooted in an alternative relationship of love and reason.
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that they have the necessary goods to do so. “The basic intuition from which the
capabilities approach begins, in the political arena, is that human abilities exert a moral
claim that they should be developed,” she writes. “Capability, not functioning, is the
appropriate political goal.”80 Fundamental to this idea is the question “What is the
individual able to do and to be?”81 Building on the idea that individuals are constituted
by a discernible qualities and that there are certain goods necessary to the development of
those qualities, Nussbaum articulates a list similar to that of the basic human goods of the
New Natural Lawyers.82 Moreover, the list of capabilities, she acknowledges, is open
ended and constantly changing, echoing of the teleological orentiation of a pre-modern
account of natural law. Approaching the problem of human well-being from a similar
Aristotelian framework adopted by Alastair MacIntyre, Nussbaum falls short of
articulating the idea of the virtuous Eudaimon; however, the presentation of this idea
distinguishes itself from contemporary understandings of international human rights.
That being said, it is insufficient for the task at hand as its focus rests primarily on how to
develop as individuals, failing to offer an account of agency which challenges the
structural inequalities of international affairs. Once again the value of a pre-modern
interpretation of natural law reveals itself. The morality of natural law articulates not
only an ethic of love, but the virtue of charity influencing an account of justice which
sustains agency and institutional design catering to human development and well-being.
80 Martha Nussbaum, “Capabilities and Social Justice” The International Studies Review 4, no. 2 (Summer
2002): 124.
81 Martha Nussbaum, “Women and equality: The Capabilities approach” International Labour Review 138,
no. 3 (1999): 233.
82 The list, articulated in Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Development: The Capabilities Approach
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), is comprised of Life; Bodily Health; Bodily Integrity;
Sense, imagination and thought; Emotions; Practical Reason; Affiliation, respect for the self and other;
Other Species, respecting other non-human sentient being; Play; and finally, Control over one’s
environment, both politically and materially.
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Agency, as Onora O’Neill writes, “is manifest in abilities to integrate capacities to
reason and to act, and to maintain some independence from other forces and agents.”83
Moral agency incorporates into this definition the inter-related ideas of obligation and
responsibility. Additionally, Alasdair MacIntyre writes, “to be an agent is to have the
potentiality for living and acting in a state of tension. And this is never simply or mainly
a tension or conflict between points of view at the level of abstraction or theory,” he
states. “It is always a tension or conflict between socially embodied points of view,
between modes of practice.”84 Politics, on this reading, simply becomes the union of a
variety of agents and actions working within a particular setting generating structures
complementing the values and ideals shaping the ends of political agents. On this
account, agency is the outcome of individuals being political. When actively engaged,
agents create, in the words of Fred Dallmayr, “a constitutive, quasi-transcendental setting
or matrix of political life.”85 Of utmost importance, these structures go on to develop an
agent’s conscience supported by the innate capacity to reason and participate in the
natural law. It is to note, as Anthony Lang, Jr. writes, that to engage in politics is a
highly personal endeavor which inhabits a particular space in the ambit of human life”.86
Consequently, agents have a vested interest in the values structuring their interaction as
they explicitly relate to the ends of action and the development of human potential as
beings in common.
83 Onora O’Neill, “Who Can Endeavor Peace?” op. cit., 51.
84 Alasdair MacIntyre, “Social Structures and their Threats to Moral Agency delivered as the Annual
Lecture to the Royal Institute of Philosophy on 24 February 1999” Philosophy 74 (1999): 318.
85 Fred Dallmayr, Beyond orientalism: essays on cross-cultural encounter (Albany, N.Y.: State University
of New York Press, 1996), 193.
86 Anthony F. Lang, Jr., Agency and Ethics: the politics of military intervention (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 2002), ix.
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Being, in common, similar to the individual agents, originates in the relationship
of the will and intellect sustained by the rational soul orienting the ends of human action.
Likewise, being in common relies on the holistic relationship of theoretical and practical
first principles sustaining moral action with which to achieve ‘the good’. Action, on this
account, is of intrinsic importance. “Aquinas distinguishes what he calls human actions
from the so-called acts of being human,” writes McCluskey. “He argues that all human
actions, insofar as they are human actions and not simply aimless motions, such as
twirling one’s hair or scratching one’s face, result from the interaction between the
intellect and will.”87 It is a point further commented on by Ralph McInerny. “Aquinas
maintains that the acts human agents perform are moral acts, which is why the theory of
them is moral theory. To be at all plausible, this requires the distinction Aquinas makes
between human acts (actus humani) and acts of a human being (actus hominis),” he
writes. “The latter are any and all activities or operations that can truly be attributed to
human beings, but not insofar as they are human, not qua human. Human acts constitute
the moral order.”88 Aquinas can make this distinction because of his metaphysics of
being, relating genuine action to the intellect and will consequently aligning them with
the capacity to reason. As he writes in the Summa Theologiae, “Human beings differ
from irrational creatures in this, that they have dominion over their actions. That is why
only those actions over which a human being has dominion are called human.”89
Dominion, on this account is objective and related, as it is to human action, provides the
87 Colleen McCluskey, op. cit., 70.
88 Ralph McInerny, “Ethics” op. cit., 196.
89 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., IaIIae, q. 1, a. 1. The idea of dominion takes on an even
more important role in the ensuing chapter. Moving into the works of the Salamanca theologians, they pick
up on the idea of dominion extending it globally developing an account of equality sustaining universal
obligation and a duty of care to those less fortunate and capable of developing their innate natural potential.
Dominion becomes a key component of political agency both at the local and distant level.
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beginnings of an objective account of being human with which to counter the pragmatic
and recipient societies of contemporary international affairs.
Human potential is rooted in the Thomistic notion of dominion, a theological
concept associated with the intellect and the will of the individual. “According to this
theology,” writes Roger Ruston, “all human beings thus exercise a dominion over
‘inferior creatures analogous to that which is enjoyed by God over the entire creation.”90
Dominion is distinguishable in its interior and external forms; namely, one has dominion
over the self and his or her actions, and dominion over a thing, for example a possession.
“The primary dominium of man is that which he has over his own will: a dominium so
inherent in any individual that no one but that individual himself may take it from him,”
writes Annabel S. Brett. “This dominium, moreover is precisely constitutive of
humanity; if a man renounces it, he annihilates himself as a human being or as a human
being simplicter.”91 Dominion grants to the will an inner freedom, the ability of
individuals to act in an unconstrained manner to develop according to his or her own
telos. “Dominium arises from the freedom of the rational person,” writes Ruston, “who
is able to use things and creatures for his or her own ends and who can choose between
one course of action and another, depending on whether it will lead to an end that is in
accordance with their nature.”92 Individual dominion provides a key link between
individual freedom and autonomy, action, and reason coalescing in a natural law account
of political agency.
90 Roger Ruston, op.cit., 49.
91 Annabel S. Brett, Liberty, right and nature: Individual Rights in Later Scholastic Thought (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 13.
92 Roger Ruston, op.cit., 82-83.
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Aquinas’s understanding of human potential does not seek to rectify the problems
associated with moral and philosophical accounts of human nature. Aquinas is not
concerned with an account of morality and ethics within the social world as his
framework does not distinguish between moral and amoral action. Moreover, he is not
concerned with a theory of natural rights, a point noted by Richard Tuck, writing that
“despite his use of the idea of natural dominion, his [Aquinas’s] general theory (and this
is of course true of all thirteenth-century theories) was not a genuine natural rights
theory.”93 Dominion, on this account sustains the moral framework related as it is to the
ontology of being. Natural dominion, Ruston points out, “is a fist of nature, not of grace,
and a major part of what makes us human beings. If sinners were to lose their natural
dominion they would no longer be fully human.”94 Aquinas illustrates how dominion
sustains the autonomy and freedom of the individual simultaneously illustrating how
human action and reason facilitates the participation of the agent in the natural law.
Moreover, this participatory engagement in morality reveals to individuals, in common,
the nature of the laws shaping their community reflecting the norms of justice. Human
potential, on this account, is intimately related to natural dominion which, situated
alongside grace, sustains the capacity of individuals to reason facilitating an objective
understanding of the self, the community, and the nature of political engagement
engendering a positive orientation addressing the very real problem of human fallibility.
93 Richard Tuck, Natural Rights theories: Their origin and development (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1979), 19.
94 Roger Ruston, op. cit., 81 & 82. This was very much the idea put forth by Vitoria, but there were others,
such as John Wyclif, who argued against such a notion of natural dominion and postulated that with the fall
of man, so to was natural dominion lost, for it was only granted to individuals at the behest of God, the only
being in possession of true grace. Vitoria, for obvious reasons, did not agree and claimed that natural
dominion was an inherent constitutive part of man found at the outset of his creation to remain with him for
all of his days, being a sinner did not remove that part of him.
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According to Aquinas, grace perfects nature.95 “For grace,” he writes, “is the
principle of meritorious works through the medium of virtues, as the essence of the soul
is the principles of vital deeds through the medium of powers.”96 Grace helps individuals
to achieve ‘the good’ residing in the soul refuting the assumption of Augustine; namely
that the capacity to do good was lost with the original sin of Adam and Eve. “But in the
state of corrupt nature, man falls short of what he could do by his nature, so that he is
unable to fulfill it by his own natural powers. Yet because human nature is not altogether
corrupted by sin,” writes Aquinas, “so as to be shorn of every natural good, even in the
state of corrupted nature, it can, by virtue of its natural endowments, work some
particular good, as to build dwellings, plant vineyards, and the like;”97 Reason and grace
fosters the habits of faith, hope and charity sustaining the cycles of being and actuality
within all of nature’s creatures. “Grace is principally the communication of divine
goodness so that humanity may move and be moved to its appropriate end,” writes
Oliver. “As has been seen, this grace is something internalized with human beings, either
by fusion or mediation, raising human nature ecstatically to partake of its final,
supernatural end.”98 Grace, on this account, complements synderesis generating a
prudent agent. Aware of the morality of natural law, the desires of this agent are firmly
oriented around a desire for ‘the good’, always aware of the vicious capacity to act
contrary to its ends. In other words, the natural law agent sustains hope, in the face of
human suffering supporting the ends of practical reasoning prompting moral action in an
environment filled with the potential for evil.
95 Ralph McInerny, Ethica Thomistica, The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, Revised Edition
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 68.
96 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., II-II, q. 110, a. 4.
97 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., I.II, q. 109, a. 2.
98 Simon Oliver, op. cit., 66.
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Grace represents the idea of human potential. “Hence we must say that for the
knowledge of any truth whatsoever man needs Divine help, that the intellect may be
moved by God to act,” writes Aquinas. “But he does not need a new light added to his
natural light, in order to know the truth in all things, but only in some that surpass his
natural knowledge. And yet at times God miraculously instructs some by His grace in
things that can be known by natural reason, even as He sometimes brings about
miraculously what nature can do.”99 Grace is a key component of human agency. Part
and parcel of natural dominion grace cultivates prudence supporting the image of the
conscientious individual tempering the fallible nature of human reason. Similar to
Augustine, Aquinas was acutely aware of the negative consequences of corruption in the
material world. “Thomas holds that we have been more wounded by sin in the moral
order than in the intellectual order,” writes McInerny. “The lives we lead can cloud our
minds, with the result that there is confusion about principles that are all but self-
evident.”100 Situated in the will and intellect, grace works alongside reason cultivating
the prudent individual further developing the first principles located therein. Synderesis,
grace and natural dominion are all tightly interwoven on this account of moral and
political agency. Resting on the potentiality of being, Aquinas elicits an account of
agency with which to contrast to the idea of human progress associated with the received
view of Modernity.101 Viewed in light the image of the prudent individual, capable of
discerning moral and immoral behavior, guided by the method of casuistry, the image of
99 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., Ia-.IIae, q. 109, a. 1.
100 Ralph McInerny, “Ethica Thomistica” op. cit., 119.
101 It is the argument of this work that the epistemology associated with modern constructions of world
order and human well-being are ill-equipped to discern human potential as it requires an understanding of
both the theoretical and practical components of being. Moreover, when the notion of human potential is
adequately addressed and explained it moves towards a particular understanding of obligation and
responsibility, key components of political and moral agency that are decidedly absent within the rhetoric
of rights associated with a constitutional world order.
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the natural law agents provides an alternative manner to conceptualize, beyond human
rights and the capabilities approach, human well being placing the onus of security and
development, in other words, trust, squarely in the hands of the moral agent. Focusing on
the pre-eminent virtue, prudence, the natural law agent provides a living example of
morality in action. It represents the moral character of the agent, aware of the fallibility
of human nature, couple with the positive assumptions of natural law morality. Prudent,
on this interpretation, characterizes the form and function of the agent distinguishing the
ontological essence and the actualities of being sustaining the plausibility of Aquinas’s
metaphysics. On this account, the natural law agent is well suited to the casuistic art of
being political to be elaborated on in further detail in Chapters Four and Five.
The natural law individual is the embodiment of political and moral agency.
Through deliberation, action and interaction, supported by an awareness of the first
principles, the capacity to reason, and the means to acquire independent knowledge and
awareness, the natural law agent articulates the required structures necessary to support
the well-being and development of human potential. Carving out the requisite space
whereby alternative agents, working outside traditional sites of power and authority can
effect change, Aquinas’ account of agency provides a living example of how to achieve a
more just union of individuals and communities alike. The natural law agent is capable
of noting the discord arising within competing structures and act, as obliged and
responsible agents to remedy the situation. For recall at this point, to be an agent of
justice is not only to be constituted by the capacity to deliberate and act in a moral
fashion, but to be aware of one’s responsibilities therein and in the face of tension and
conflict, seek to change the environment accordingly. Emphasizing moral intentions
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relating to the ends of ‘the good’, this account of agency is rooted in the conscientious
deliberations of the agent. For this reason, the natural law agent is predisposed to the
methodology of casuistry seeking moral constitution through the practice of reason and
action. Moreover, as free and autonomous beings, working within the moral taxonomy
of natural law, agents, on this account are predisposed to act outside the traditional
structures of contemporary political affairs articulation through action, the required
ethical treatment of all individuals similarly constituted. The notion that the life of the
natural law agent is a life of example places a heavy burden on the individual, yet as
responsible and obligated agents, ontologically united to other individuals similarly
constituted, it is a burden that must be bourn.
The natural law agent, so conceptualized, is the root source of morality. Morality,
on this account is related to reason and action. In light of the sameness of self, rooted in
reason, all individuals are capable of understanding the true nature of natural law
morality. “In other words,” writes Jean Porter, “in order to be a morally good person, it
is only necessary that one be able to reason and to will the good accordingly. One need
not be capable of an especially high quality of reasoning.”102 Highlighting again the
centrality of reason and intention, the natural law individual, as a free and autonomous
being is able to adapt and react to the contextual nature of injustice. Moreover, rooted as
it is in the sameness of self, it is a morality that sustains the equality of being of all of
nature’s creations. “Aquinas’s commitment to equality as a constitutive dimension of
justice is based on a conviction that human beings, while they might share different
functional roles (such as masters and salves), share a basic human nature that establishes
a foundational equality between people,” writes Decrane. “He also is committed to
102 Jean Porter, “The Recovery of Virtue” op. cit., 140.
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equality based on his belief that all people are equal in their capacity to attain moral
virtue.”103 The equality of being increases in importance as the morality of natural law
extends outwards beyond the actions of the individual and into the relationships which
constitute the natural law community. It is indicative of a twofold account of agency
situating the individual and the community alongside one another striving to achieve the
ends of ‘the good’. On this account, structure and agency are not bounded, but rather
symbiotic parts of a larger whole.104
Aquinas’s account of agency is unique, combining anthropological and political
assumptions rooted in the self-same ontology of being. Eliciting a metaphysics in which
all individuals, while unique, are beings in common, he generates a moral framework in
which political obligations and responsible action emerge out of a common essence and
being. To that end, agents are social and agency is a mutual affair. As Aquinas himself
points out, “man is naturally a social being, and so in the state of innocence he would
have led a social life.”105 Beyond this statement however, Aquinas recognizes the
mutuality of ‘the good’. “He that seeks the good of the many, seeks in consequence his
own good, for two reasons. First, because the individual good is impossible without the
common good of the family, state, or kingdom,” writes Aquinas. “Secondly, because,
since man is part of the home and state, he must needs consider what is good for him by
being prudent about the good of the many. For the good disposition of parts depends on
103 Susanne M. DeCrane, op. cit., 78.
104 This twofold account of agency is reflected in his account of love and how it mediates friendship
articulating an order of charity. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five. Suffice to note charity
distinguishes this work from Aristotelian, Neo-Aristotelian and Virtue Ethics. It also presupposes an
outward orientation to ethics and in this way distinguishes itself from communicative action and discourse
ethics although it shares many of the same assumptions, as outlined in Chapter One.
105 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., Ia, q. 96, a. 4.
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their relation to the whole.”106 While individuals are always working to achieve their
own telos, it is an endeavor that is limited by the ability of others to achieve higher levels
of actuality as well. In other words, one can only develop and actualize to a higher level
of being, limited to the being and actuality of those with whom he or she is engaged.
This account of human agency provides individuals with the motivation to act improving
their own existence, but also the existence of others rectifying the inequalities associated
with a subjective account of political engagement. Natural law agents are, on this
interpretation, obligated to one another because they are linked ontologically and
understand the shared desire to become. Ontologically similar, and actually unique, all
individual action remains oriented towards the final ends of ‘the good’. Understanding,
without a measure of a doubt that obligation originates in the shared desire for ‘the good’
and that responsibility is obligation actualized through human action seeking to rectify
injustice all individuals, are bound by their very being to help those in need. In direct
contradiction to the egocentric rights bearing subject, conceptualized as isolated, amoral
and lacking any sense of emotion or passion, natural law agents are obliged to one
another because of the very relationships that constitutes who and what they are, naturally
socially and politically as beings tending always toward ‘the good’.107 Aquinas offers a
vision of political society in which individuals, and governing authorities work alongside
one another to achieve a higher level of well-being and in so doing provides all
106 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., II.II, q. 47, a. 10.
107 Upon first glance, this account of obligation and responsibility is seemingly self-interested and
motivated for purely singular ends; however, as the final chapter of this work aims to show such is not the
case. Underscoring the mutual ontology of being is a series of relationships rooted in the natural law idea
of love which is related to the idea of natural law justice tempering the egocentric motivation sustaining a
communal approach to well-being.
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individuals with the potential to create and re-create the boundaries that structure human
agency.
Conclusion
The natural law agent provides an alternative account of man in motion. In the
first instance, it comprises all beings, male and female as equally endowed with the
rational capacities to become, noting in the first instance that it is being in common
empowering individual action. Furthermore, it paves the way for a dynamic relationship
of human agency and structure, contrary to the ideals of world order associated first with
Modernity evident in contemporary international affairs. The nature of the telos of being,
its understanding of morality and justice all rely on human reason in order to develop in
complexity. It is only with increasing awareness of being, and the achievement of higher
levels of actuality that this knowledge increases in complexity. It is thus to note that with
each new revelation the potential for agency and structures to evolve and adapt exists.
What an account of natural law agency and agents offers is a demonstration of how the
tension that resides in the daily lives of individuals can be used as a means to foster and
generate positive change. Premised as it is on individual action, it highlights the
centrality of institutional design as a means to remedy problematic social structures and
the ethical and moral ideals which communities seek to put into place. The burden and
onus of agency were firmly placed in the hands of the individual with the acceptance of
the works of Hobbes and his followers; yet, they failed to provide the individuals with the
requisite knowledge to fully engage in the task at hand. 108
108 Political accounts of agency come from a variety of discourses within international relations; for a wide
variety of works see for instance, Alexader Wendt, Social theory of international politics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999); Onora O’Neill, “Agents of Justice” op. cit., or Kenneth Waltz, “Theory
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Divorced from the ontological origins of essence and being, the agent, within the
social contract tradition is the embodiment of self-love, self-determination and individual
well-being. Consequently, emotive and passionate individual actions are curtailed by the
boundaries and political structures of international affairs denying the ability of
individuals to develop mutually sustaining relationships.109 This is not to deny that
individuals the constitutive members of states, who bear witness to the suffering of
others, both near and far, lack empathy and fail to comprehend the very real nature of the
pain and suffering experienced by others. It is in fact that contrary, as emotive social
beings, individuals are motivated to act; however, the current political structures which
situate authority and power in state governments and their institutions inadvertently
curtails the ability of individuals as agents of justice to adequately act on their capacities
and capabilities. Sustained by an account of ethical potential, rooted in the will of the
individual, itself joined to the intellect, the natural law agent provides the means to
understand the source of political obligation and responsibility currently missing from
contemporary investigations of human agency and in so doing challenge the accepted
forms of human suffering that permeate international affairs. What Aquinas labeled as
grace, referred to hear as human potential, represents a positive orientation to understand
the shortcomings of individuals in relations, hopeful of human progress, but aware that
moral development ultimately lies within the will of the agent. The politics of potential,
so interpreted, present a key feature of a pre-modern approach with which to understand
of international politics” op. cit., all of which utilized different assumptions in order to explain the actions
of states and individuals in international affairs.
109 It is an argument that will pursued in the conclusions of this work that such relationships are key to
developing trust which is one alternative to the rule based methodology of the social contract tradition
seeking to quell insecurity rooted in a lack of knowledge sustaining anarchy and crisis oriented
international affairs.
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human suffering, further distinguishing it from its cosmopolitan cousins, endorsing
always the universality of equality and moral progress alongside a bounded vision of
international affairs.
The natural law agent, holistically comprised of an intellect and will, working in
unison, is well-equipped to understand the nature of morality in and of itself and
therefore capable of providing an account of justice with which to re-orient the
boundaries of politics and provide a more personal motivation to overcome the pervasive
otherness of international affairs that challenge the achievement of ‘the good’. Moving
beyond the metaphysical essence of the agent, Aquinas articulates a form and function for
the agent resting on the development of the virtues. This movement, from one habit to
the next, sustaining the morality of natural law is described by Aquinas “Passions are
intense motions of the sensitive appetite within the soul which are, in themselves, neither
good nor evil,” writes Oliver. “Thus a passion, like any motion always exists between
contraries, for example, love and hatred, desire and aversion, joy and sadness. Virtue,”
he furthermore writes, “establishes a mean between passions, which is to say that virtue
directs the motions of the soul – the passions – to an appropriate rest in fulfillment.”110
Passion provides each and every agent with a natural momentum to experience one good
habit after another. Not only does passion motivate human action, it provides the means
to develop the moral taxonomy of the casuistic agent. Tempered by the ultimate virtue of
prudence, supporting the individual conscience, passions are key to the development of
the moral agent. Describing the natural desire of the individual, rooted in the intellect
and the will, alongside the capacity of each individual to move independently and acquire
knowledge Aquinas describes a circular path of becoming. Linking the essence of being
110 Simon Oliver, op. cit., 59.
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and the principle of nature, Aquinas’s portrayal of moral agency ascribes to the individual
the capacity to act and know in line with his or her form and function described within
his or her genus or species. The life of one individual represents a series of repeated
habits, the motion of the soul, seeking out the virtues, the positive habits of man’s
disposition, in particular prudence, the primary virtue of the intellect sustaining moral and
ethical behavior.111 It is this conception of the moral agent, developing relationships with
which to cultivate the habits, that sustains the foundation of the moral community, itself
the topic of the ensuing chapter.
111 Simon Oliver, op. cit., 52-71.
Chapter Four
Being Human as Human Beings:
Equality, Justice & the Natural Law Community
Individualism and collectivism are two opposed destructive movements in societies.
Individualism would destroy society by eliminating its unity, by breaking its members up
into a collection of selfish individuals all trying to reduce one another to functions of
themselves. Collectivism would destroy society by eliminating its members in an attempt
to overcome selfishness by eliminating selves. People very often suppose that the only
solution is a compromise between individualism and collectivism: libertarian anarchy up
to a point, beyond which selves become slaves.
Germain Grisez
The Way of the Lord Jesus, Christian Moral Principles Vol. 1
Introduction
To date the focus of this work has been on the nature and being of the individual.
Describing in some depth the problems associated with the contemporary rights bearing
subject, the previous chapter described the ontology and metaphysics of Aquinas framing
an account of the natural law agent. It is an image of the individual relying on the
combined role of the intellect and will, associated with an understanding of nature,
revealing a reasonable function of the agent. The nature of the community substantiating
the agent has not been examined. Recall the point made in Chapter Two that the
individual is constituted by his or her relationships with others. These relationships
support and build a community of like minded and goal oriented individuals. Facilitating
the ends of being human, this chapter offers an account of a moral community,
complementing the sociability of the agent and the mutuality of ‘the good’.
At this point however, it behooves one to return to the idea of natural law noting
an important distinction. As illustrated in Chapter Two, one can distinguish the idea of
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natural law as an historical tradition and a contemporary account of morality. “There are
(at least) two ways to look at the natural law,” writes Jean Porter. “Seen from one
perspective, the natural law is more or less equivalent to a universal morality, whether
this is seen as grounded in nature in some general sense, or more specifically in the
deliverances of practical reason. Seen from another perspective,” she further tells her
readers, “the natural law is a specific tradition which cannot be adequately understood
apart from some account of its historical development and social location.”1 Natural law
understands itself as a moral tradition. The combination of historical and contemporary
ideas, centered on the capacity to reason provides a mutable account of laws, norms and
customs related to the ends of human action, framing a particular account of ethical
living.2 On this account, the value of tradition lies not in its authorities or the boundaries
it upholds. “Rather,” as Nicholas Rengger writes, “one has to understand a tradition as
part of an ongoing and potentially never-ending conversation in which many different
assumptions will take centre stage at various points. What matters,” he concludes, “is the
continuity of the tradition.”3 The current interpretation of natural law provides an
objective account of agents and communities, remaining faithful to the original equality
of being. At the same time, it is an innovative understanding of natural law
demonstrating through reason, the casuistic nature of natural law morality articulating the
art, and not the science, of being political.
Traditions are influenced by a wide variety of sources. Aquinas proved to be the
most influential natural law scholar combining an Aristotelian understanding of nature
1 Jean Porter, “A tradition of civility: the natural law as a tradition of moral inquiry” Scottish Journal of
Theology 6 no. 1 (2003): 27.
2 This idea of tradition is drawn from Jean Porter, herself reliant on Alastair MacIntyre, Edwar Shils, and
Hilliard Aronovitch.
3 Nicholas Rengger, “on the just war tradition in the twenty-first century” op. cit., 362.
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with the Christian notion of grace. “The Thomistic genius lay in the capacity to see how
Greek thought and Catholic doctrine might be synthesized into a Christian philosophy.
So far as this vision concerned ethics, it took the form of showing that the previously
noted parallels between ideas of virtue originating in the philosophy of classical antiquity
and those recurrent within Christian thought could be developed so as to give a rational
foundation to ethics,” writes Haldane, “and thereby demonstrate an account of true virtue
which could be compelling to any intelligent human being.”4 This synthesis produced an
account of the prudent agent influencing the tradition of casuistry. “The theological
doctrines of circumstance and conscience, prudence and natural law provided the casuists
of the high era with an understanding of morality that made casuistry a feasible,
respectable, and even necessary activity,” write Jonsen and Toulmin. “The doctrine of
natural law gave them a strong but limited system of principles: strong because the
principles, though few, were definitely stated and rooted in a generally accepted moral
psychology and metaphysics; limited because the principles were of the most general
purview.”5 On this account, the continuity and dynamism of natural law offer an
alternative structure within which to engage in the particular task of institutional design.
Moving beyond the bounded nature of international affairs emphasizing, human action
this account focuses on the unity of ends and not the ends of pragmatic morality.
Sustaining the idea of the prudent individual and the tradition of casuistry is
Aquinas’ understanding of natural law. Building on his synthesis of human action and
practical reason, Aquinas shows how natural law is the participation of reasonable beings
in the eternal law. “Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine providence are rules
4 John Haldane, op. cit.
5 Albert Jonsen & Stephen Toulmin, op.cit.,
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and measured by the eternal law, as was stated above; it is evident that all things partake
somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they
derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends,” writes Aquinas. “It is
therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creatures
participation of the eternal law.”6 Natural law, on this account, is part and parcel of the
actions constituting the life and development of the individual related to the first
principles of life. “To speak of the ‘natural law’ is thus to refer to that part of the general
order of things which involves human kind and its progress towards perfection,” writes
Haldane. “This law is embodied in natural human tendencies, such as the inclinations to
preserve one’s life, to mate and rear children, to co-operate with others in society, and so
on.”7 Building on the theme of human practices, reflecting the natural equality of being,
this chapter illustrates how cultural norms and practices provide one means of
interpreting the potentiality of beings in common. Supporting this claim is an
examination of the works of the Salamanca Theologians.
Building on the Thomist framework of natural law, Francisco de Vitoria and
Bartolomeo de Las Casas elicit an account of human equality further developing the
natural dominion of Aquinas. An examination of distant and less educated cultures
reveals a shared ontology evident in the practices that constitute being human. This
account of equality remains faithful to the emphasis on human action, sustaining a
universal understanding of ethical treatment derived from the morality of natural law.
Aware of the shared ends of being human the Scholastic scholars frame their ideas of
human equality alongside the autonomy and freedom and the natural law agent.
6 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., Ia-.IIae, q. 91, a. 2.
7 John Haldane, op. cit., 124.
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Consequently, they offer a universal account of equality accepting the plurality and
diversity of moral communities throughout the world. Aware of this account of equality,
this first section critiques the traditional account of political communities within the
discourses of International Relations paying particular attention to critical theories of
discursive ethics. This is then followed by an examination of the ideas of the Salamanca
Theologians. Identifying human equality rooted in the rhetoric of human potential, this
middle section paves the way for a natural law interpretation of the community.
Ultimately, this conception of the community articulates a relationship of mutuality
supporting agency and structure. It simultaneously reveals the ends of commutative
justice in order to demonstrate how laws unify individuals consequently orienting the
political trajectory of beings in common towards the ultimate ends of human happiness.
Part I: International Relations, Political Communities & Discursive Ethics
Ultimately politics is about human potential. It is to note as Jean Bethke Elshtain
does that who we are as individuals and the understanding we have of ourselves both
individually and communally, cannot be divorced from political thought. “Without the
articulation of what persons are, or can become, a theory of politics remains, at best,
incomplete.” Writing further that, “a vision of the complex human subject, a coherent
account of the nature of the relations between individuals and society, and an assessment
of those moral determinations any responsible theory of historic agency requires.”8 Any
account of the politics of potential, contrary to the politics of progress flowing through
contemporary political communities ultimately relies on an objective conception of being
reflecting a social account of morality. The morality of natural law is an objective
8 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Real Politics: At the Center of Everyday Life (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1997), 14-15 & 179.
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interpretation of being that is contrary to a pragmatic and ultimately isolated morality,
shaping contemporary political communities. Sustaining a subjective account of being
political, morality in its pragmatic form, relates to a subjective notion of dominion
focusing on possessions and relationships of power; limiting individual freedom, and in
so doing challenging their natural moral development. Emerging out of the theological
debates on property and poverty, the idea of dominion increasingly reflected upon
ownership and the use of goods. “Right or dominium is the relation of power or authority
over other person or things,” writes Brett, “which the pauper lacks.”9 Flying in the face
of the equality of being characteristic of the natural law agent, this interpretation of
dominion bore significant consequences for the nature of the individual, the political
community, and the relationship they share with one another.10
Throughout this work it has been argued that the modern purpose of the state was
stability achieved with the outward conformity of its subjects. To achieve this end,
political communities elevated the rational capacities of the individual, failing to account
for the relationship of passion and emotion in reasoning deliberations. Conceptually, the
division of rational and reasonable brought about an alternative understanding of the
individual subsequently altering the values of freedom and autonomy within the
community. Moreover, the nature of human desire was also transformed. At once it was
located outside the will and intellect, and situated within a relationship of passion linked
to the newly emerging ideas of utilitarianism and emotivism. Passion, on this account, is
irrational; consequently, it must be situated outside the boundaries of public agency
9 Annabel S. Brett, op. cit., 12.
10 A link can be established whereby the discourses of scarcity and abundance noted by C.B. Macpherson
among others is tied to the development of private property, the onset of a possessive market economy and
the ability of individuals to labor and save the products of their labor. In this way subjective dominion is
intimately tied up in the relationship of pragmatic morality and the ends of capitalism within the state.
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facilitating political stability. “Calculation was enthroned as the distinctive virtue of the
human reason; and the life of the emotions was repudiated, as it distracted one from the
demands of clear-headed deliberation,” writes Toulmin. “What began as a theoretical
distinction in Descartes, between the intellectual power of human ‘reason’ and the
physiological ‘causes’ of emotions, turned into a practical contrast between (good)
rationality and (bad) sentiment or impulsiveness.”11 Actions on this account were no
longer associated with ‘the good’ but rather, with a newly emerging doctrine of human
pleasure and pain.12
The evolution of passion, and the ends its sought to achieve, instantaneously
transformed the individual from moral beings into agents interested in the accumulation
of power. The agent, divorced from his or her actions procures an amoral and agnostic
individual. The teleology of being, central to the essence of the individual was lost and
subjective dominion came to play a key role in the development of the individual and the
community. “On the horizon of western man an attitude of dominating nature emerges,”
Elders writes. “It becomes his aim to rearrange the world on the basis of his
knowledge.”13 Nature’s grace was removed from the individual and being human
reflected not one’s inner moral development, but rather their social status within society
and the power it bestowed upon them. The emphasis of subjectivity fed into a
11 Stephen Toulmin, op.cit., 134 & 135.
12 Alasdair MacIntyre, “After Virtue” op. cit., & “A Short History of Ethics” op.cit, 169. Moral
judgments, so Hume argues, cannot be judgments of reason because reason can never move us to action,
while the whole point and purpose of the use of moral judgments is to guide our actions. Reason is
concerned either with relations of ideas, as in mathematics, or with matters of fact. Neither of these can
move us to act. We are moved to act not by this or that being the case, but by the prospect of pleasure or
pain from what is or will be the case. It is the passions and not reason which are aroused by the prospect of
pleasure and pain. Reason can inform the passions as to whether the object they seek exists and as to what
the most economical and effective means of seeking it may be.
13 Leo J. Elders, The Metaphysics of Being of St. Thomas Aquinas, in a historical perspective, translated
from Dutch by Dr. John Dudley (New York: E.J. Brill, 1993), 69.
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contemporary fascination with hierarchical political structures. Emphasizing power
relationships, outlined in the rhetoric of civic rights, examined in Chapter Three,
subjective dominion, emerging alongside the received view of Modernity sustained a
political vision incorporating the ideals of positive science. In so doing, it cast aside the
idea of human potential, emphasizing above all else, human progress offering an account
of politics which was decidedly amoral, static, and above all else, scientific. The notion
that politics was an art, an ever evolving process was cast aside as static and rigid
structures were put in place seeking to guard against the compulsive abuse of power.
Power, on this account is the primary concept guiding the creation of political
structures. The constitutional approach to world order, examined in Chapter One,
illustrates how political structures can be designed so as to reduce the returns to power
tempering the anarchy of international affairs. Power, on this interpretation, is
Hobbesian, reflecting the natural equality of all individuals seeking survival in light of
insecurity. As Hobbes himself wrote, “power simply is no more, but the excess of the
power of one above that of another. For equal powers opposed, destroy one another, and
such their oppositions is called contention.”14 Linked as it is to subjective notions of
being, power, on this account, according to C.B. Macpherson, is extractive, and central to
the liberal individualist tradition, is agent centric.15 Contrary to those who understand the
14 Thomas Hobbes, The elements of law, natural & political, ed. Ferdinand Tonnies (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1928), 36.
15 C.B. Macpherson, Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 9-11 & 40-
51. Power, in the liberal economic sense, named here, descriptive powers, refers to an individual’s ability
to acquire goods so as to overcome scarcity. With regards to ethical power, it denotes not only the ability
to acquire goods, necessary to human flourishing and is further sub-divided into developmental power and
extractive power. The former refers to the ability to use and develop one’s capacities while the later is
power over others, but more specifically, it is the ability to extract benefit from others. It is this form of
power that is central to the liberal individualist tradition sustaining a subjective account of political
engagement at odds with the developmental potential of the natural law agent.
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communal nature of power, 16 extractive power poses problems for the political
community constituted by dynamic agents. “If I apperceive life in this way, my goal
must be the appropriation of power; and the relation of agents becomes a competition for
power,” writes MacMurray. “The problematic of action becomes the effort to achieve
my own purpose in the face of resistance from the other. But because of the
interdependence of agents, this must be limited by the necessity to maintain the unity of
society, that is, the systematic cooperation of agents.”17 Power, on this account, threatens
the elusively sought after political stability. In light of this interpretation, it must be
harnessed, reigned in, and controlled.
Seeking to guard against the compulsive abuse of power, individuals, as political
agents, have structured their political communities assuming at the outset the intrinsic
negative qualities of being human. “This pragmatic mode of society, then, is society
maintained by power, and it identifies society with the State, since the power of
government is a necessary condition for the existence of such a society,” writes
MacMurray. “It conceives the structure of society in terms of law- whether moral or civil
–and its maintenance as achieved by power. This yields a mechanical concept of society.
Its components are atomic units, inherently isolated or unrelated, and ideally equal.”18
Aware of the isolated nature of the contemporary agent, Jacques Maritain goes on to
comment on its negative consequences for political communities. “Here we have a
glimpse into the great defect of classical humanism, the brand of humanism which, since
16 Hannah Arendt’s, On Violence (London: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1970), 122, proposes a communal
notion of power. “Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert,” she writes.
“Power is never the property of the individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long
as the group keeps together.”
17 John MacMurray, “Persons in relation” op.cit., 125.
18 John MacMurray, “Persons in relation” op. cit., 137.
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the Renaissance, has occupied the last three centuries,” he writes. “This defect, it seems
to me, lies not so much in that which is affirmed in this sort of humanism, as in that
which consists of negation, denial, and separation;” he writes. Furthermore saying that
the problem ultimately “lies in what one might call an anthropocentric concept of man
and culture. One might add that the error involved boils down into affirming that human
nature as closed in upon itself or absolutely self-sufficient.”19 On this account, the agent
and the political community are sustained in opposition to one another as they adhere to
the pre-ordained rules of social conduct structured by the laws of the state.
Law and power are of the highest importance on this account of the pragmatic
society working in communion to sustain political stability. “Law, backed by force, is
the technical solution to the problem of a society of persons, and the creation of the state
is the highest achievement of technological reason, of our human capacity to devise
efficient means to achieve our natural ends,”20 writes MacMurray. Rights are the primary
vehicle through which acceptable and non-acceptable forms of behavior temper the
compulsive use of power. “The state indeed creates and enforces the right which each
individual has in the thing the state declares to be for common use,” writes Macpherson.
“In both cases what is created is a right of individuals. The state creates the rights, the
individuals have the rights.”21 On this account, the function of morality is decidedly
different then the notion of morality offered in Chapter Two sustained through the
19 Jacques Maritain, The Twilight of Civilization, translated by Lionel Landry (London: Sheed & Ward,
1946), 10.
20 John MacMurray, “Persons in relation” op. cit., 137.
21 C.B. Macpherson, op.cit., 124. On this account of rights, the discourse is not concerned with the well-
being and development of the individual as articulated in the United Nations Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Instead, rights outline the nature of civic engagements best suited to a
constitutional ordering of political affairs, both domestic and international. Modernity’s influence thus runs
rampant in this particular interpretation of power focused as it is on limited the returns to power of political
authorities competing with one another as equally endowed, but negatively motivated actors.
• Chapter Four • 190
account of the natural law agent in Chapter Three. Premised on the inherently negative
assumptions of human nature, conceptualized as amoral, self-interested, and ultimately
isolated, it represents not the development of human potential, but rather, conformity to
the law itself.22 “The pragmatic mode of morality will then be conceived as obedience to
law-to a moral law which the individual imposes upon himself, and through which he
secures the universal intention to maintain the community of action. It will be a morality
of self-control, of power over the self, limiting its own freedom for the sake of
maintaining community,” writes MacMuray. “It will be expressed in terms of will,
obligation and duty, as a set of rules or principles, which are the same for all, and which
limit for each the use of his own power to do what he pleases.”23 Laws, on this account
temper desire at odds with the needs of others similarly situated within the community
sustaining the negativity of human nature.
From an historical perspective, the problem of establishing any vestige of
individual liberty, in light of the problems of political authority and community, became
the overarching concern, notes Etienne Balibar, for the social contract theorists examined
in Chapter One. “In Locke’s case this limit is represented as natural positivity: it is the
general horizon in which a notion of ‘human rights’ will subsequently be inscribed-the
natural rights to live, or live ‘a human life,’ which a republican constitution transforms
into civic rights, mutually granted and limiting the power of the state,” he writes. “In
contrast, in Hobbes the limit is represented negatively, as a potential void, perhaps an
abyss, arising from the thesis that every individual has a natural capacity to resist in
death, by putting her own life at stake among others-an idea that is frighteningly close to
22 Nowhere is this understanding of the individual better encapsulated then with the realist discourse of
international affairs.
23 John MacMurray, “Persons in relation” op. cit., 125.
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the idea that equality basically lies in the capacity of people to endanger each other’s
lives, and therefore to the idea that a violent ‘state of nature,’ albeit repressed through the
civil institutions of the state and the law, always remain latent within or under their
authority.”24 Laws seek to guide human interaction, and are interwoven with a particular
understanding of morality, seeking as A.P. D’Entreves has shown, outward conformity,
and not, inner development.25 On this account, laws are related to the boundaries of
political communities established to limit the abuse of power stemming from a subjective
account of being political.
Building on the negative assumptions of human nature, realism and liberalism
alike, both investigated in Chapter One, demonstrate how these assumptions permeate
international affairs. Moreover, the point was made that the development of international
constitutional political structures and international law, seek to establish political
authority challenging the anarchy of international relations. As Tony Lang, Nicholas
Rengger and William Walker note, constitutionalism “reflects a just distribution of power
and influence within a system.”26 As Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley shows, the
disciplines of International Law and International Relations, when combined, have much
to offer the practice of international politics. “The liberal emphasis on domestic and
transnational civil society and the representation of patterns of interest emerging from
that society points to the importance of domestic constitutional law as a determinant of
international behavior,” she writes. “To the extent that a government and its relationship
with the society it governs are in fact constituted by a constitution, the limitations placed
24 Etienne Balibar, “‘Possessive Individualism’ Reversed: From Locke to Derrida” Constellations 9, no. 3
(2002): 300-305.
25 A.P. d’Entreves, “The Case for Natural Law Re-Examined” op. cit., 5-52.
26 Anthony F. Lang, Jr,, Nicholas Rengger, and William Walker, “The Role(s) of Rules: Some Conceptual
Clarifications” International Relations 20, no. 2 (2006): 22.
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on that government will establish the boundaries of its ability to encumber or foster the
ongoing development of civil society both within and across state borders.”27 Laws, on
this interpretation function as rules outlining acceptable and unacceptable behavior at the
international level. International law like its domestic counterpart, relate and uphold, the
boundaries of political communities limiting the abuse of power. Beyond the function of
the law however, lies an even greater problem; namely the ends which the laws serve.
Upholding the distinction of international and domestic, international laws further
entrenches the pervasive sense of otherness limiting agency. On this account, justice and
morality exist within the state and assumptions of international and transnational justice
are forsaken in lieu of anarchy.
The recent trend in international relations theory distinguishes cosmopolitan and
communitarian communities providing a stark contrast to the realist and liberal
interpretations of international affairs.28 Representative of the assumptions of
communitarianism, Michael Walzer describes political communities as the primary site
of morality and justice established through a collectivization process in which the
individuality of the agent is neatly sidestepped. “The moral standing of any particular
state depends upon the reality of the common life it protects and the extent to which the
sacrifices required by that protection are willingly accepted and thought worthwhile,”
writes Walzer. “If no common life exists, or if the state doesn’t defend the life that does
exist, its own defense may have no moral justification.”29 On the other hand,
cosmopolitanism, as shown in the Introduction, situates the moral individual in a
27 Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, “International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda”
The American Journal of International Law 87, no. 2 (April 1993): 228.
28 Chris Brown, “International Relations Theory” op. cit.
29 Michael Walzer, “Just and Unjust Wars” op. cit., 54.
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relationship with the larger cosmos, or world view. Distinguishing a moral and a legal
conception of cosmopolitanism, Patrick Hayden demonstrates the validity of this
particular epistemology. “Moral cosmopolitanism holds that all persons stand in certain
moral relations with one another by virtue of the fact that they are all members of a
universal community,” he writes. “Legal cosmopolitanism contends that a global
political order ought to be constructed, grounded on the equal legal rights and duties of
individuals.”30 Whereas Onora O’Neill and Charles Beitz represent the former approach,
it is in the works of David Held and Danielle Archibuggi that a legal cosmopolitan order
comes to light.
The ends of cosmopolitanism, relying on the rights-bearing subject and
international law criticize the bounded nature of political justice simultaneously
remaining captive to a subjective account of international political engagement.
Articulating an agenda of social justice in order to further develop the potential of the
global population, cosmopolitans assume a just distribution of goods in common. Social
justice, according to Charles Beitz “applies to the whole world the maxim that choices
about what policies we should prefer, or what institutions we should establish, should be
based on an impartial consideration of the claims of each person who would be affected.”
He goes on to conclude, that this cosmopolitanism, “aims to identify principles that are
acceptable when each person’s prospects, rather than the prospects of each society or
people, are taken fairly into account.”31 Offering an alternative to this Rawlsian
30 Patrick Hayden, op. cit., 3.
31 Charles R. Beitz, “Social and Liberal Cosmopolitanism” International Affairs 75, no. 3 (1999): 519.
Commenting on the nature of international liberalism he notes that any relevant account of liberal
internationalism, in and amongst a variety of tenets, must include and account of distributive justice
incorporating “the distributive responsibilities of states and the extent, if any to which the institutional
structure of international order should seek to influence the global distribution of resources and wealth.”
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interpretation, Onora O’Neill, drawing on the works of Immanuel Kant, seeks to extend
the nature of justice outwith the domestic borders of contemporary states. “In my view
this strategy may provide a better route for thinking about justice beyond boundaries than
the one Rawls offers, not only because Kant’s strategy of vindication aims deeper, but
because it is more realistic and more open,” she writes. “The greater realism lies in
Kant’s clear acknowledgment that republican states are not ideally just: they are a
compromise we have to make in order to start security freedom under real world
conditions, furthermore noting that “Kant’s views on justice are also more open in that
they do not preclude the possibility that institutions other than states may contribute
towards the institutionalization of justice.”32 Despite the different approaches, both
account of distributive justice sustains laws relating not to the equality of being, but
rather, to resources, and the power they provide. Laws, on this account, reflect the
material existence of the political subject.
A primary appraisal of the ends of cosmopolitan justice would seem to reveal an
account of being political endorsing the ideal of human potential. Yet the notion of
equality sustaining the laws of social justice relates not to the objective account of social
morality but rather to the subjectivity of pragmatism. It is an account of political justice
that reveals a remarkable similarity to Aquinas’s concept of epikeia. As he writes,
“‘epikeia’ is a part of justice taken in a general sense,” furthermore noting that “‘epikeia’
is a subjective part of justice; and justice is predicated of it with priority to being
Charles Beitz, Charles R. Beitz, “International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A Survey of Recent
Literature” World Politics 51, no. 2 (1999): 270.
32 Onora O’Neill, “Bounded and Cosmopolitan Justice” Review of International Studies 26 (2000): 60 &
61.
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predicated of legal justice, since legal justice is subjective to the direction of ‘epikeia’”.33
Likened to contemporary ideas of equity, ‘epikeia’ relates to distributive forms of justice
focused on the just distribution of goods within the community. “The act of distributing
the goods of the community, belongs to none but those who exercise authority over those
goods; and yet distributive justice is also in the subjects to whom those goods are
distributed in so far as they are contented by a just distribution,” writes Aquinas.
“Moreover distribution of common goods is sometimes made not to the state but to the
members of a family, and such distribution can be made by authority of a private
individual.”34 Epikeia, relates to subjective forms of dominion, revolving around ideas of
ownership, in isolation and in common helping the agent to align the ends of the law and
the ends of justice. “In those cases where there seems to be a conflict between the
common good and the letter of the law, then Thomistic theory speaks of understanding
the intention of the law,” writes Westberg. “The limitations of all human legislation must
recognized, i.e., that the wisdom of legislators is insufficient to anticipate all
circumstances. The notion of equity,” he concludes “(epikeia in the Catholic moral
tradition), is to describe the kind of wisdom needed by the judge to apply the law flexibly
or to ameliorate the letter of the law as it is applied to particular circumstances.”35 This
notion of equality, like the distributive form of justice it is associated it, speaks not to the
natural potential of the natural law agent. Moreover, it is a form of justice which fails to
articulate a viable understanding of political obligation outside those boundaries. Similar
to communitarian conceptions of justice which remain firmly embedded within the
33 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., II-II, q. 120, a. 2.
34 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., II-II, q. 61, a. 1.
35 Daniel Westberg, “The Relation between Positive and Natural Law in Aquinas” Journal of Law and
Religion 11, no. 1 (1994-1995): 19.
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domestic community, these two normative conceptions of community are challenged,
albeit for different reason, by the ends of international law failing to note the natural
equality and the associated obligation of moral relations.
Critical theorists, further distinguish themselves from communitarian and
cosmopolitan epistemologies challenging the isolation and otherness of contemporary
international affairs. Investigating the normative tension resonant in the relationship of
domestic duty and international obligations, Andrew Linklater establishes political
communities “as systems of inclusion and exclusion” revealing how communities, so
defined, are one means of safeguarding cultural differences simultaneously extending the
ethical obligations of humanity outside the modern nation state.36 In the same vein,
Richard Shapcott notes the different epistemological origins of cosmopolitanism and
communitarianism. “Liberal and communitarian positions,” he notes, “begin with
different conceptions of the moral self, and derive from them different conceptions of
community.”37 Articulating a dialogic ethic, he argues that communication communities,
in the same vein as Linklater’s communities, can recognize cultural diversity
simultaneously avoiding the pitfalls of cultural relativism. “To summarise this argument
briefly, because interpretative approaches understand that normative principles are
generated by historically and culturally located agents, agents whose identities are not
fixed and absolute, then they argue it is possible for those agents to successfully engage
in dialogue, he writes. “As a result it follows that recognition is most successfully
36 Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Communities, Ethical Foundations of the Post-
Westphalian Era (Oxford: Polity Press, 1997), 2.
37 Richard Shapcott, Justice, Community and Dialogue in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), 33.
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accomplished through acts of communication.”38 Dialogue, on this account, is the
vehicle through which ‘the other’ is welcomed into the previously exclusionary political
community. Consequently, justice is able to permeate the otherwise exclusive boundaries
of the contemporary nation state.
The discursive ethics put forth by critical theorists provides an interesting model
guiding the formation and assimilation of a natural law community within the discourses
of international relations. Similar to natural law, this approach is premised on the role of
human reason. “The philosophical hermeneutic model is based on the premise that
reason is akin to understanding and understanding is essentially linguistic,” writes
Shapcott. “Understanding, or the fusion of horizons, through conversation, can and does
occur in any human society or individual.”39 Discursive ethics locates the central human
capacity in language which, when rooted in human agency, provides a discourse
extending justice throughout the world. Juxtapose language and communication with
action, and the natural law agent begins to situate him or herself within a like-minded
community. Above all else the ethical and political account of being human developed
by Aquinas is an account of action. Bearing this in mind, subtle, yet crucial differences
begin to emerge between the two approaches. An examination of the nature of justice
and equality shaping the overall aims of the discourse reveal how natural law, unlike
discourse ethics, incorporates an objective sense of justice articulating an idea of equality
rooted in the capacities and capabilities of the agents. The objectivity of being is itself
possible due to the outward orientation of natural law ethics and recalls that which
originally distinguished natural law from discourse ethics and the notion of
38 Richard Shapcott, “Cosmopolitan Conversations: Justice Dialogue and the Cosmopolitan Project,”
Global Society 16, no. 3 (2002): 222.
39 Richard Shapcott, “Cosmopolitan Conversations” op. cit., 237.
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communicative action articulated by Habermas. Moreover, its rhetoric of human
potential guiding the overall endeavor that is politics sustains a more personal approach
to being political. It facilitates a commutative account of justice that is at once
unbounded challenging the isolation and self-sufficiency embodied in the contemporary
rights bearing subject.
Part II: The School of Salamanca
The scholars within the School of Salamanca commented on a wide variety of
topics. Ranging from economic theory to the laws of motion, from eschatology to the
laws of contract, Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence note their diverse interests
highlighting the preeminent role of jurisprudence and moral philosophy.40 As Annabel S.
Brett writes, “The term ‘School of Salamanca’ and ‘second scholastic’ usually apply to
the entire period of sixteenth-century scholasticism, from Vitoria to Suarez.”41 Building
on Aquinas’s idea of dominion, Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolomeo Las Casas furthered
the ideals of nature and grace sustaining the metaphysical and anthropological agent.
Tempering all of their works was a moral theology which, as Roger Ruston writes, was
based “upon a view of the human being as a self-directing, rational animal, having
control over his or her own actions, being made in the image of God and requiring for his
or her fulfillment to live in an autonomous community.”42 All the authors of the school
shared one major ambition which, as Anthony Pagden highlights is “the creation of a
moral ordo based on Aquinas’s singular merger of ancient philosophy and Christian
40 Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrence, “Introduction” in Cambridge Texts in the History of Political
Thought, Vitoria: Political Writings eds. Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrence, xiii (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991).
41 Annabel S. Brett, op. cit., 1.
42 Roger Ruston, op. cit., 168.
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theology, which would afford a greater understanding of man’s essential humanitas.”43
The cumulative effect of their works paved the way for a universal account of obligation
rooted in the essence of being itself resting on an objective account of the political agent;
namely, relationships.
Embroiled in the debates surrounding the well-being and ethical treatment of the
American Indians at the hands of the Spanish Crown, brought to light in 1511 by
Antionio de Montesino, the School gained a high degree of notoriety arguing the plight of
the Indians. Building on the questions of Montesino himself, who in his sermon asks
“with what justice do you hold these Indians in such cruel and horrible slavery? With
what authority have you waged such detestable wars against these people who were
living in their lands so mildly and peacefully, where you have consumed such huge
members of them, what unheard-of death and destruction?”44 the Salamanca theologians
were well situated to ponder the nature and being of the Indians. Professing the innate
and natural freedom of all nature’s creatures, Vitoria and Las Casas argued that similar to
their Spanish conquerors, the American Indians possessed the same likeness of mind
providing them with the means to develop their capacities and capabilities as rational
beings. Constituted by a rational soul, displayed by their ability to form communities and
develop institutions, in the words of Montesino, the Indians were “worthy of love”.45
The American Indians, on this account, were accorded a level of natural dominion
43 Anthony Pagden, The fall of natural man: The American Indian and the origins of comparative
ethnology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 147.
44 Text recorded by Bartolome de Las Casas, Historia de Las Indias in Obras escogidas (OE), studio critico
y educion por Juan Perez de Tedula Bueso, Madrid: Atlans, 1957-58, 5 vols, vo.. 2, col. 176 (translated by
Roger Ruston). As quoted in Roger Ruston, op. cit., 67.
45 Text recorded by Bartolome de Las Casas, Historia de Las Indias in Obras escogidas (OE), studio critico
y educion por Juan Perez de Tedula Bueso, Madrid: Atlans, 1957-58, 5 vols, vo.. 2, col. 176 (translated by
Roger Ruston). As quoted in Roger Ruston, op. cit., 67.
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consequently they were capable of participating in the natural law as equal and moral
beings in potential.
The works of the Salamanca theologians are important as they uphold Aquinas’s
original account of natural dominion. It was at this time that dominion, as Annabel S.
Brett points out, became increasingly tied to an emerging tradition of natural rights
evinced by the wide variety of interpretations of the Salamanca Theologies. “In broad
terms, the issue lies between those who hold that the School represents a return to an
authentic Thomist-Aristotelian theory, depending on the notions of natural law and of
right as the object of justice (‘objective right’)” writes Brett, “and those who, although on
the surface may appear faithful to Aristotle and Aquinas, in reality they thought of right
as a faculty or liberty of the individual (subjective ‘right’) and that their political theory is
based on such rights and is a forerunner of Hobbes.”46 As the idea of dominion was
further divided into subjective and objective types, the Scholastics neatly side-stepped
this problem proffering an account of equality building on the idea of natural dominion.47
Complementing the social and political nature of the individual and the ends of justice
articulated by Aquinas, the rhetoric of equality substantiated the idea of moral action
oriented towards the ends of human happiness. “The scholastics did not just develop the
ideal of natural equality from – so to speak the top down. They also elaborated the
practical meaning of this ideal in and through a process of reflection and reform directed
towards the central institutions of their society, particularly marriage and religious life,”
46 Annabel S. Brett, op. cit., I.
47 The difference between objective and subjective right is eloquently explained by Roger Ruston, op. cit.,
46-48. Objective right refers to a state of affairs describing a relationship between two people- the object
of justice, ‘the right thing’ whereas a subjective right is something possessed by a person. It is objective
right that was emphasized in the works of Aquinas and it is subjective rights that have gone on to foster the
rights tradition of the contemporary era and shape the rhetoric of rights that supports the rights bearing
agent investigated in the previous chapter.
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writes Porter. “But as these institutions were transformed, they tended to be rationalized
through appeals to an ideal of equality, and by the same token, they became themselves
part of the concrete meaning of equality as a social norm.”48
Equality, for the Scholastics provided the necessary link between morality and
justice within the community. “Justice is the virtue that demands recognition of and
respect for the equality between people, established by their shared human nature,” writes
Lisa Decrane.49 The Scholastics understood the ontology of being and the metaphysics of
morals put forth by Aquinas demonstrating that justice and equality are part and parcel of
the relationships constituting the political agent and community.50 “For Aquinas true
friendship (amor amicitiae, as opposed to amor concupiscentiae) can only be shared by
those who are equals in some sense, particularly in their rational nature,” writes Stephen
J. Pope. “Friendship reflects the voluntary decision of a free agent to regard another free
agent with affection and benevolence, a choice obviously possible only for beings
possessing the capacity of a free will.”51 Understanding the social and political nature of
the individual, alongside the relationship of justice and morality, the Salamanca
48 Jean Porter, “A tradition of civility” op. cit., 37.
49 Susanne M. DeCrane, op. cit., 78.
50 It is common held within the discipline of International Relations that the works of Vitoria and Las Casas
provide the first in-depth analysis of the beginnings of natural rights and upon which the idea of
contemporary human rights ultimately rest. It is the inherent belief of this work that such is not the case
and that Aquinas’s work does not distinguish between subjective and objective dominion. On this account,
the Scholastics ought not to be used to provide a foundation for human rights but rather to offer a dialogue
on how best to achieve a higher level of well being, both individually and in common. In fact, as the
ensuing section of this chapter will highlight, it is the subjective component of dominion that went on to
shape society and in so doing, perpetuating the culture of recipience with which scholars now contend the
assumption of which are at odds with the ends of the Scholastic interpretation of natural law morality.
51 Stephen J. Pope, “Neither Enemy nor Friend: Nature as Creation in the Theology of Saint Thomas
Aquinas” Zygon 32, no. 2 (June 1997): 225.
• Chapter Four • 202
Theologians were able to build upon the anthropology of being articulated by Aquinas
and proliferate a universal account of obligation.52
Francisco de Vitoria opens his arguments in a swift and concise manner
immediately positioning himself in such a way to employ the Thomist idea of dominium.
Shocked and appalled at the recounting of the events in Peru which, he claims, “freezes
the blood in my veins”53, he quickly centers the debate in the capacities and capabilities
of the American Indians. “In truth, if the Indians are not men but monkey, they are
incapable of injury,” he writes to Miguel de Arcos. “But if they are men, and our
neighbors, and as they claim vassals of the emperor, I cannot see how to excuse these
conquistadors of utter impiety and tyranny; nor can I see what great service they do to
His Majesty by ruining his vassals.”54 Establishing the naturalness of the Indians and
therefore the presence of a rational soul, Vitoria argues they are capable of intentional
action. “Where we most differ from other animals is in this capacity for intentional
action,” writes G. Scott Davis, “and to have an intention means to initiate a chain of
events having an end. Intention makes something our act and thus locates it in a moral
species.”55 Intentionality, on this account, is indicative of reason. It sustains the
52 The rhetoric of equality articulated by the Salamanca Theologians only grows in importance throughout
this work. It is a necessary component of friendship leading into an account of charity. Charity mediates
the Aristotelian account of civic friendship in the works of Aquinas an in so doing distinguishes the unity
of purpose and human agency of a natural law ethic from that of the rhetoric of solidarity and liberty
associated with the republican stream of modernity and the associated notion of renaissance humanism. In
fact, the works of the Salamanca Theologians argued in direct contradiction to the renaissance humanists
who used Aristotle’s account of natural slaves to defense the papacy and crown against the crimes they
committed against the native Americans.
53 Fransisco de Vitoria, “Letter 1: Letter Miguel de Arcos, OP, Salamanca, 8 November [1534]” in
Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, Vitoria: Political Writings eds. Anthony Pagden &
Jeremy Lawrence, 331 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
54 Fransisco de Vitoria, “Letter 1” op. cit., 333.
55 G. Scott Davis, “Conscience and Conquest: Francisco de Vitoria on Justice in the New World” Modern
Theology 13, no. 4 (October 1997): 479.
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potentiality of moral beings articulating ethical behavior countering the injustice of
development.
Vitoria looked to the customs and practices within the community of the Indians
as an indication of the potential capacity to experience the natural law. Political
organization and cohesive structures of order within the quotidian existence of the
Indians provided the requisite foundation upon which Vitoria could argue a position at
odds with both the Papacy and the Spanish Crown. “This is self-evident, because they
have some order (ordo) in their affairs; they have properly organized cities, proper
marriages, magistrates and overlords (domini), laws, industries, and commerce, all of
which require the use of reason,” he writes. “They likewise have a form (species) of
religion, and they correctly apprehend things which are evident to other men, which
indicates the use of reason. Furthermore,” he goes on to say, “God and nature never fail
in things necessary’ for the majority of the species, and the chief attribute of man is
reason; but the potential (potentia) which is incapable of being realized is in the act
(actus) is in vain (frustra).56 Vitoria presented to the Spanish public a work which
lambasted the treatment of the Indians at the hands of the Spanish Crown and the Papacy.
As Pagden and Lawrence point out, the Indians, in the opinion of Vitoria, “were in full
possession of their rights, but without the capacity to exercise them. Their status was
similar to that of children, who in Aristotle’s definition were only potentially, but not
actually rational beings.”57 Similar to the Conquistadors, the American Indians,
56 Fransisco de Vitoria, “On the American Indians” in Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought,
Vitoria, Political Writings, eds. Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrence, 250 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991).
57 Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrence, “Introduction,” op. cit., xxv-xxvi.
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constituted by a rational soul, were capable, as natural creatures, of developing the
virtuous habits of prudence and justice.
Vitoria’s works, as Davis points out, sustains the idea of virtue beyond the
bounded nature of political communities. “Vitoria was fully aware, as his discussion of
the unjust titles makes clear, that the language of the law could not be justly extended
across cultures that were not themselves bound by positive law,” he writes. “His
rejection of those titles in itself marks a commitment to the primacy of virtue, above all
the virtue of justice in international affairs.”58 Resting on potentiality, and the ability to
reason, Vitoria sustains an objective account of political engagement relying on the
epistemology of being associated with Aquinas’s ontology. Writing in On Dietary Laws,
he investigates the practice of cannibalism and debates the merits of intervening to halt
this practice demonstrating the capacity of the natural law as a yardstick against which
actions and intentions can be measured.59 Paving the way for communal plurality
alongside the freedom and autonomy of the agent, Vitoria expresses a mutable account of
justice resting on the participatory engagement of the natural law. As Davis further
points out, “because the principle reason for invoking the natural law is not to clarify the
judgments that the prudent person can already make, but to measure the propriety of
positive law as a rational external constraint on social interaction,”60 Vitoria offers an
account of universal responsibility. “This is the broadest assertion that Vitoria made
about the right or the responsibility of civilized societies, Christian or not, to punish those
who were ‘sinners against nature’,” writes Cardozza. “It suggests a universal
58 G. Scott Davis, “Conscience and Conquest” op. cit., 493.
59 Vitoria, “On Dietary Laws, or Self-Restraint” in Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought,
Vitoria, Political Writings, eds. Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrence, 205-230 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991).
60 G. Scott Davis, “Conscience and Conquest” op. cit., 482.
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responsibility for the well being of one another and, apparently, the right to intervene
whenever other people are engaging in practices deemed ‘nefarious’.”61 The social
morality originating in Aquinas, ultimately shapes Vitoria’s account of morality and
ethics sustaining a universal mode of ethical engagement at odds with contemporary
boundaries, morality and justice.
Deploring the unethical treatment of the American Indians Vitoria provides an
anthropology of being like Aquinas before him. “All the rights Vitoria ascribed to the
Spaniards required the assumption of the natural sociability of the human species, the
bedrock feature of natural law,” writes Streski.62 Consequently, Vitoria is able to identify
within each being a developmental potential sustaining his account of human equality.
Yet Vitoria never experienced first hand the ways of the American Indians. It is the
works of Bartolomeo de Las Casas offering a first hand experience of the New World. In
his various writings he depicts the abuse suffered by the Indians at the hands of the
Spanish conquistadors. “The history written by Las Casas is by no means a desperate
enterprise; it seeks to bridge the gap between the representative capacity of discourse and
the demands of intolerable events,” writes de Courcelles, “it is conscious of having a
beneficial influence on the elaboration of new social norms, on the one hand, and on
61 James Muldoon, “Francisco De Vitoria and Humanitarian Intervention” Journal of Military Ethics 5, no.
2: 136. The author goes on to employ the ideas of Vitoria to discern a natural and a spiritual defense for
intervention. “In each case, the goal would be to intervene for the benefit of the people involved. In
spiritual terms, the command to teach all nations, the concept with which Vitoria began, could obviously be
construed as a good of such value that for a ruler to prevent missionaries from entering his country or for a
people to harass and otherwise hinder the work of peaceful missionaries would justify a Christian ruler
sending troops to protect the missionaries. In terms of natural law, the refusal to admit peaceful
missionaries or merchants or to engage in ‘nefarious’ practices might also justify intervention because
missionaries and merchants would enable the members of a society to participate fully in the universal
human community and thereby receive numerous benefits.”
62 Ivan Streski, “The Religion in Globalization” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 72, no. 3
(September 2004): 639.
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collective memory, on the other.”63 More importantly, within his works, he records the
developmental potential of each being as they acquire the skills identified with modern
communities demonstrating the primary epistemonical capacity, the capability to reason.
Bartolomeo de Las Casas accepted the social and political nature of man.64 “His
project has always been to establish the Amerindians as peoples who could be made fully
familiar to the European gaze,” writes Pagden. If not entirely civil, he argued, they were
no more ‘barbarous’ than some of the remote cultural ancestors- the Greeks, Egyptians,
and Romans – of the modern Europeans had been.”65 He looked to the capacities and
capabilities of each individual discerning the plausibility of a reasonable disposition.
“For the good and all-powerful God, in his love for mankind, has created all things for
man’s use and protects him whom he has endowed with so many qualities by a singular
affection and care (as we have said), and guides his actions and enlightens each one’s
mind and disposes him for virtue in accordance with the ability given to him,” writes Las
Casas. “Hence it necessarily follows that a rational nature, receiving its power from the
63 Dominique de Courcelles, “Managing the World: The Development of Jus Gentium by the Theologians
of Salamanca in the Sixteenth Century” Philosophy and Rhetoric 38, no. 1, (2005): 7.
64 The majority of the works of Las Casas come to us as a script he prepared for a debate against Juan
Gines de Sepulveda held in 1550 surrounding the legality of the imperialism of the Americas by Spain at
the behest of the Papacy. The debate that occurred between the noted Dominican Theologian and heralded
Aristotelian has been studied at great length. A small account of the origins of the debate is interesting and
useful to international relations generally and will be given the briefest account at present. On the 16th of
April, 1550, Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor declared a halt to the conquest of America until an answer to
the question: Is it lawful for the King of Spain to wage war on the Indians, before preaching the faith to
them, in order to subject them to his rule, so that afterward they may be more easily instructed in the faith?
At its outset, this debate was premised on the Aristotelian theory of natural slavery, that there existed, in the
world, a category of individual that lacks the necessary capacities to reason right and is therefore never able
to attain a virtuous state of living, the goal of every individual living in the Greek city-states. The cessation
of colonization, for whatever period of time, was an outright victory for Las Casas, who had been
campaigning for such an act for quite a long time and it set the stage for a debate between the two scholars
about the nature of the capacities of the Indians. For an in depth examination of the history and lead up to
this debate see, Lewis Hanke, All Mankind is One: A Study of the Disputation Between Bartolome de Las
Casas and Juan Gines de Sepulveda in 1550 on the Intellectual and Religious Capacity of the American
Indians (Illinois: Northern Illinois Press, 1974).
65 Anthony Pagden, “Ius et Factum: Text and Experience in the Writings of Bartolome de Las Casas”
Representations 33, Special Issue: The New World (Winter 1991): 157.
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Creator alone, should include men who, as a rule, are endowed with the best gifts of their
nature and are rarely slow witted or barbarous.”66 Building on the metaphysical and
anthropological assumptions supporting a reasonable disposition, Las Casas demonstrates
the existence of political communities long before the arrival of the Spanish settlers.
“For Las Casas, no less Vitoria, culture is primarily the medium through which men learn
to exploit the God-given potential in nature,” writes Pagden. “Once this initial culture
acquiring stage of human development has been reached, the social order of each race
begins to grow in complexity, until finally it reaches the level of civility prior to the final
step forward.”67 On this account, dominion is best exemplified through the customs and
norms of the community. “Rather, long before they had heard the word Spaniard they had
properly organized states, wisely ordered by excellent laws, religion, and custom,” writes
Las Casas. “They cultivated friendship and, bound together in common fellowship, lived
in populous cities in which they wisely administered the affairs of both peace and war
justly and equitably, truly governed by laws that at very many points surpass ours, and
could have won the admiration of the sages of Athens.”68 Social communities, on this
interpretation, bear witness to the universality of reason substantiating the potential of
moral development supporting the natural equality of being.
Las Casas quickly became the noted expert on the daily lives of the Indians
mixing his empirical observations with noted sources such as Aquinas and Aristotle.69
66 Bartolome de Las Casas, In Defense of the Indians. The Defense of the Most Reverend Lord, Don Fray
Bartolome de Las Casas, of the Order of Preachers, Late Bishop of Chiapa, Against the Persecutors and
Slanderes of the Peoples of the New World Discovered Across the Seas, Translated, Edited, and Annotated
by Stafford Poole, C.M. (Illinois: Northern Illinois Press, 1974), 35.
67 Anthony Pagden, “The fall of natural man” op. cit., 142
68 Bartolome de Las Casas, “In Defense of the Indians” op. cit., 42 & 43.
69 This was an important point to be made by Las Casas, for he was fighting against a descriptive history
stemming from the works of a noted historian, Oviedo, whose account of the Indians came via second hand
accounts. Unlike Las Casas, Oviedo himself had never set foot in the colonies. In its pages it depicted a
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From this vantage point he observed, “they [the Indians] are of such gentleness and
decency that they are, more than the other nations of the entire world, supremely fitted
and prepared to abandon the worship of idols and to accept, province by province and
people by people, the world of God and the preaching of the truth.70 He demonstrates
how having been introduced not only to the teachings of Christ, but also the Arts and
Sciences more generally, the Indians possess a keen intellect. “In the liberal arts that they
have been taught up to now such as grammar and logic, they are remarkably adept,”
recounts Las Casas. “With every kind of music they charm the ears of the audience with
wonderful sweetness. They write skillfully and quite elegantly, so that most often we are
at a loss to know whether the characters are handwritten or printed.”71 On this evidence
Las Casas articulates an equality of being so powerful it opposes the violent and unjust
conduct of the Conquistadors. Arguing that the Indians “are our brothers” the Spaniards,
on this account, are obliged as the more enlightened of the species to act in as charitable
and benevolent a manner educating the Indians on the ways of civil society. As he points
out, “we must consider it possible that some of them are predestined to become renowned
and glorious in Christ’s kingdom.”72 Furthermore writing “we have no choice but to
conclude that the rulers of such nations enjoy the use of reason and that their people and
the inhabitants of their provinces do not lack peace and justice. Otherwise they could not
race of beings that were self-less brutes who performed ritual sacrifice and lacked the capacities to
understand a chance for a better way of life and the acceptance of Christianity. It was, in actual fact, a
battle for authority. As there were no known experts in the field of the nature of the Indians, Bartolome de
Las Casas felt that in appealing to past authorities, such as Aquinas and Aristotle, combined with his first
hand experience of the Indians, he could dispel the myths that had been propagated about the nature of the
Indians by those who had never left Spain, a point that is made by Anthony Pagden in “Ius et Factum: Text
and Experience in the Writings of Bartolome de Las Casas” Representations 33, Special Issue: The New
World (Winter, 1991): 147-162.
70 Bartolome de Las Casas, “In Defense of the Indians” op. cit., 28.
71 Bartolome de Las Casas, “In Defense of the Indians” op. cit., 44.
72 Bartolome de Las Casas, “In Defense of the Indians” op. cit. 39.
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be established or preserved as political entities for long.”73 Similar to Vitoria, Las Casas
extends the morality of natural law beyond the modern nation state articulating a
universal equality of being. It is an account that rests on an objective ontology building
on the natural law tradition first set out by Aquinas.
Vitoria and Las Casas employ the tradition of natural law challenging the
accepted social customs and norms of their time. Justice and morality, interpreted in this
light, are not bound by the modern political structures shaping political communities.
Offering to the discourse of natural law the rhetoric of equality, stemming from the
shared capacity to develop the virtues of justice and prudence, the Salamanca
Theologians demonstrated that all individuals, united in the teleological quest for ‘the
good’ are aware of justice and the ethical treatment with which it is associated.
Articulating an equality of being arising from the capacity to reason and the capability to
act as free and autonomous agents, Las Casas and Vitoria extend the ends of dominion
beyond domestic communities into the international realm. On this account, equality of
being is yet to be associated with a universal account cognitive epistemology, typical of
enlightenment accounts of human beings. In light of this fact, the Salamanca theologians
could endorse moral customs and practices seemingly at odds with the over-arching
morality of being within the natural law. Bearing this in mind, the particular problem of
‘otherness’ typical of modern accounts of international affairs did not feature in the
pluralism sustained by this particular interpretation of moral equality. The idea of moral
favoritism and the obligations of distant others remains a problem of contemporary
political discourses, rooted in the universality of moral equality and the bounded nature
of political arrangements. As the ensuing section illustrates, the rhetoric of equality
73 Bartolome de Las Casas, “In Defense of the Indians” op. cit., 42.
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conceptualizes anew the nature of the political community articulating an objective
account of being political stemming from the relationships of the natural law agent.
Part III: The Natural Law Community
The preceding chapters have all focused on the morality of being locating the
potential to be in the capacity and capabilities of the individual as a rational and
reasonable being. Building on the ideas of Aquinas and the natural law tradition he
fathers, this work puts forth an anthropology and metaphysics which is at once both
social and moral. As Aquinas points out, agents are social beings. “First, because man is
naturally a social being, and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social life,”
writes Aquinas. “Now a social life cannot exist among a number of people unless under
the presidency of one to look after the common good; for many, as such, seek many
things, whereas one attends only to one.”74 Aquinas further states that while good in
isolation, any thing is better in common noting that “the common good is better than the
particular good of one person.”75 On this account, the political community plays a key
role in the moral development of the individual. Revolving around the idea of the
common good, Aquinas outlines a vision of politics as practice sustaining the idea of
mutual and relational development. As Jean Porter notes, “for Aquinas, individual and
communal good stand in a reciprocal relationships such that the good of the individual is
intrinsic to the common good”.76 Aquinas himself states as much in the Summa
Theologiae writing, “it is proper to justice, as compared with the other virtues, to direct
man in his relations with others; because it denotes a kind of equality, as its very name
74 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., Ia-IIae, q. 96, a. 4.
75 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book III: Providence, Part II, (ed) Vernon J. Bourke, (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975) p. 220
76 Jean Porter, “The Recovery of Virtue” op. cit., 125.
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implies;” furthermore noting that “on the other hand the other virtues perfect man in
those matters only which befit him in relation to himself.”77 Supporting the symbiotic
relationship of the individual and the community then is the pre-eminent virtue of justice.
Justice reflects the morality of first principles located in the will revealed by the
practical deliberations of the agent. Justice, on this account, reflects the agent’s function
evident in the institutional patterns of relationships. “Justice has will or rational appetite
for its subject and enables us so to act that we pursue our private ends with an eye to what
is due others,” writes Ralph McInerny, “whether because of special business we have
undertaken with them or because of the comprehensive good we share as members of the
same city, nation, and eventually, species.”78 Justice, so understood, is part and parcel of
one’s telos. It channels action in accordance with the good not only for the self, but for
others as well, noting above all else the mutuality of being evident in the relationship of
‘the good’. “Justice orients the will of the person and the corporate will of the
community to attend to the needs of others who have a claim on them,” writes DeCrane,
“rather than attending only to the needs of the individual herself or the needs of a
particular constituency within the larger group. It is inclusive and comprehensive in its
focus. One behaves justly not only with one’s friends, but with all people.”79
Emphasizing relationships in and amongst individuals, and not the distribution of
resources, Aquinas’s account of commutative justice complements the relational ontology
sustaining the natural equality of agents. “Now a twofold order may be considered in
77 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., II-II, q. 57, a. 1. More will be said about the nature of
justice, in and of itself, and the way in which it relates to natural law and the formation of communities and
the development of individuals in the final two chapters of this work. It is suffice to note that as justice is
that concept that links individuals at a metaphysical level it is linked to obligation.
78 Ralph McInerny, “Ethics” op. cit., 205.
79 Susanne DeCrane, op. cit., 79.
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relation to a part. On the first place there is the order of one part to another, to which
corresponds the order of one private individual to another,” writes Aquinas. “This order
is directed by commutative justice, which is concerned about the mutual dealings
between two persons.”80 Unlike distributive justice, or social justice, evident within
normative accounts of political order and political communities, commutative justice
remains aware of the natural sociability and equality of individuals.
Chapter Two outlines a vision of the natural law community. Originating in the
actions and interactions of the individual, the political community reflects the
institutionalization of relationships sustaining beings in common. Reflecting the virtue of
justice, it is an account of the political community that is intrinsically related to the
morality of natural law. “In order to understand why Aquinas holds this view, it is
necessary to realized that the natural law as he understands it is not just a source of
private morality, but the basis of a rational public order,” writes Porter. “To put it
another way, the natural law is to the community what humanity is to a human being.
That is, it represents the rational character of the community, according to our best
understanding of it.”81 At the most basic of levels, a natural law community, as John
Finnis writes, “is a form of unifying relationships between human beings.”82 The
unification of the community, like the relationships of agents themselves, is motivated by
an ethos of love.83 Love, unlike its contemporary conceptions, represents the mutuality
of being. Sustaining a relational account of ‘the good’ love mirrors the equality and
80 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., II-II, q. 61, a. 1.
81 Jean Porter, “The Recovery of Virtue” op. cit., 147.
82 John Finnis, “Natural Law and Natural Rights” op. cit., 136.
83 This point will be elaborated in on detail in the final chapter of this work. The relationship between love
and the notion of equal regard will be used to develop a ‘personal account’ of politics supporting human
action within ‘the international’ moving beyond the domestic ordering of political affairs proliferating an
ethic of love in international affairs with which to counter the grosser forms of human suffering.
• Chapter Four • 213
justice necessitating a relational ontology.84 “We love the deepest, most substantial and
hidden, the most existing reality of the beloved thing. This is a metaphysical center
deeper than all the qualities and essence which we can find and enumerate in the
beloved,” writes Maritain. “Love seeks out this center, not, to be sure, as separated from
its qualities, but as one with them. This is inexhaustible,” furthermore writing, “so to
speak, of existence, bounty and action; capable of giving and of giving itself; another self
as a gift, another self which bestows itself.”85 Love, on this interpretation, represents the
institutionalization of relationships reflected in the just political structures of the
community. “Good community implies proper commitment to good purposes expressed
in suitable behavior;” write Grisez and Shaw, “ a bad community is one in which either
the purposes or the behavior are morally wrong.”86 The natural law community, contrary
to the boundaries and laws organizing contemporary world order exist wherever two or
more individuals, united in a shared interest, work together. Community, reflected in the
ends of ‘the good’ unifies individuals and is, in and of itself, unbounded.87
‘The good’, according to Aquinas, is human happiness. Happiness, on this
account, as Russell Pannier points out, “is understood as a mode of activity, rather than a
84 As was highlighted in Chapter Three and the discussion of political and moral agency, obligation is
ontological and responsible action is obligation actualized. Love thus represents the movement from
reason to act. As will be demonstrated in Chapter Five, love links the idea of power, as becoming with
commutative forms of justice which shape the political community which, when investigated in light of the
works of the Salamanca Theologians shows can be viewed as an international moral obligation rooted in
human nature, a point which is made in Anthony J. Lisska, op. cit., 89-100.
85 Jacques Martian, The Person and the Common Good (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966),
32.
86 Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, “Beyond the New Morality” op. cit., 48.
87 This account of the community reflected in the ends of ‘the good’ is unbounded. One ought to
conceptualize it not in geographic and territorial terms associated with the state in International Relations.
Instead, one ought to conceptualize the community in terms of degrees of interest which reflect the interests
of the natural law agent. On this interpretation ‘the international’ is the largest degree of community
possible and it is within this community that agents interact within pre-existing institutions in order to
proliferate their notion of morality and justice. All of this will be elaborated in Chapter Five and the
Epilogue.
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state of emotion.”88 It is an end reflected in the twofold distinction of natural law agency.
“Every human action is aimed, directly or indirectly, at the attainment or preservation of
some one good which the agent believes will perfect him as a human being,” writes
Porter, “that is, render him happy; and there is in fact, one end, and one end only, in
which human happiness truly can be found.”89 Ralph McInerny’s account of human
action builds on this particular thought. “When Aquinas speaks of every human agent
necessarily seeking the same ultimate end, he means that each and every human agent
does good, that is, fulfilling of the kind of agent he is, a human agent,” he writes. “The
notion of the human good is implicit in any human action.”90 Consequently, the structure
of the community is of direct importance for the development of the individual. It
sustains the necessary freedom required of particular agency facilitating simultanesouly
the unifying structures of general agency evidenced in the institutionalization of a
relational ontology. On this account the laws of the community coordinate being in
common synthesizing particular and communal needs, aware always of the ends of
natural law morality.91
88 Russell Pannier “Aquinas on the Ultimate End of Human Existence” Logos: A Journal of Catholic
Philosophical Thought 3, no. 4 (2000): 184.
89 Jean Porter, “The Recovery of Virtue” op. cit., 72.
90 Ralph McInerny, “Ethics” op. cit., 200 & 201.
91 The notion of freedom, within the writings of Aquinas, is not without its difficulties. He maintains that
all individuals are free, that is to say, they determine their proper course of action and proceed according to
the directives of the will. Yet, the will is a direct result of the divine and all powerful knowledge of God.
Thus, the question begs to be asked, is any individual, divinely created, actually free, or, are their actions
predicated on the knowledge and will of God? It is with this in mind that John F. Wippel, Metaphysical
Themes in Thomas Aquinas: Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, Volume 10 (Washington
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1984), 256, writes; “To the extent that divine knowledge
causes creatures and, more important for our purposes, the actions of creatures, the problem of
safeguarding a place for free creaturely activity becomes more complex. Yet, as he further reminds the
reader, the Divine being is both a principle and secondary causal agent and the will of the individual acts as
an intermediate between the self-mover and God. Thus, while the creation of an act requires an agent, the
agent can be God itself or one step removed and a secondary agent, such as a divinely created creature
possessing an intellect and will. However, at this point another problem presents itself. If God is the
creator of the will, does God not, indirectly still control the actions and motivations of the will? The short
answer is, yes, of course; however, this is not a problem. All individuals possess a teleological drive
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Contemporary political interpretations of ‘the good’ are connected to the idea of
human well-being and development which, in light of the over-arching theme of human
suffering motivating this work, are particularly relevant. Further developing this idea of
integral human fulfillment is an account of ‘the good’, emphasizing the natural equality
in the actuality of being. At the most basic of levels, this account of ‘the good’ is rooted
in the first principles combining theoretical and practical knowledge. “Necessarily and
naturally we desire a happiness that is absolute: happiness by virtue of a desire which is
unconditional and connatural, or tending toward something required by the capacities of
our being,” writes Martian, “absolute happiness, by virtue of a desire which is conditional
and transnatural, tending toward something superior to our natural limitations and
concerning the constitution of which, consequently, nature cannot possess the idea.”92
Reliant on the relationship of nature and grace, ‘the good’ in its original form, in and of
itself is teleological; it is dynamic and fluid, increasing in complexity as the knowledge
sustaining the actions and interactions of the agent develops. A functional account of
‘the good’, namely, integral human fulfillment, is represented in the developmental
potential of every agent. Consequently, this account of ‘the good’ is necessarily related
to an understanding of human capacities and capabilities and the particular requirements
tending them towards the ultimate good and the desire one possesses to fulfill this drive is natural and
possessed by all creatures in a natural environment. Within the scholastic tradition, one’s teleology
revolves around the notion of beatitude, the ultimate happiness, which is union with God. Thus, God
serves as a motivating agent of the will in that God, and knowledge and union with him, is, in actual fact,
the end towards individuals freely strive towards. As Wippel further points out, in a. 4 of q. 105 of the
Summa Theologiae, Aquinas argues that God can move the human will by serving as its object (and hence
as its final cause) in that God alone is the universal good capable of moving man’s will both sufficiently
and efficaciously, p. 256. Thus to understand God as having removed the freedom of the individual in
acting towards the ultimate good is to misunderstand the ultimate good as conceived by Aquinas and the
derived scholastic tradition. The absolute divine knowledge possessed by God does not remove the
freedom and self-determination of the individual, but rather fosters the drive, latent within the will of the
individual to fulfill her telos, thereby fostering a healthy idea of human flourishing and well-being.
92 Jacques Martian, Scholasticism and Politics, translated by Mortimer J. Adler (London: Geoffrey Bles,
The Centenary Press, 1940), 121.
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of community.93 Individuals function as key agents of justice generating this particular
information working within the institutional patterns of the community gaining a working
knowledge of others. Reflecting the ends of natural law morality agents influence and
alter political structures in light of this information aware of the particular needs of
others. Their own personal limitations are tempered b the coordinated efforts of others
working within those self-same channels.
Jacques Maritian offers a contemporary vision of a natural law community
encapsulated in his Humanism of the Incarnation. “A characteristic of the humanism,
which I call integral, would be that, for from being limited to the elite, it would care for
the masses, for their right to work and to a spiritual life, and for the movement which
brings them, we may say to an historically full age,” he writes. “On the social
significance of such a humanism, I will simply say that in my opinion it should assume
the task of radically transforming the temporal order,” furthermore noting that this vision
of community would be based around a “‘personalistic’ civilization and a ‘personalistic’
economy, through which would steam a temporal refraction of the truths of the
Gospel.”94 Working within the anthropological and metaphysical assumptions of
Aquinas, Maritain highlights the personal, communal, pluralist, and Christian, tenets
which shape his community. It is a vision of community which, as he writes,
“recognizes justice and civic friendship as the essential foundation of that community of
human persons which is political society.” Furthermore, he goes on to write, “it holds
93 I am thinking at this point in particular of the idea elaborated on by Martha Nussbaum, The Capabilities
Approach, which like the new natural lawyers offers a series of requirements that constitute the agent
against which his or her development can be monitored. This approach is document in a variety of her
works, in particular; “Women and Human Development” op. cit.; “Capabilities and Human Rights” op. cit.;
and finally, “Women and equality: The capabilities approach” op. cit.
94 Jacques Maritain, “Scholasticism and Politics” op. cit., 21 & 22.
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also to the fundamental role of equality, not only the equality of nature, which is at the
root, but the equality to be won as an offspring of justice and as a fruit of the common
good flowing back over all.”95 Maritain proffers a vision of the community sustaining
the freedom of the agent pursuing his or her own needs as distinct individuals within the
community. Moreover, he furthers the twofold distinction of first order absolutes and
second order normative claims simultaneously providing an account of diversity and
plurality within a relational institutional setting.
Communities, according to the natural law tradition, are integrally related to the
values of freedom96 and autonomy97 articulated in the ontology of being. They represent
a vision of diversity and plurality at odds with the ethical universalism traditionally
associated with discourses of moral absolutes. Natural law communities are as diverse as
the agents who constitute them. Consequently, one of the primary tenets of the natural
95 Jacques Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law (London: Geoffrey Bles: The Centenary Press,
1945), 24.
96 Freedom, on this account, is a two-fold distinction. Drawing on the original ideas of Aquinas, it
concerns itself with first, the absence of constraint and second, the absence of necessitation. This
distinction is noted by Jacques Maritain’s “Scholasticism and Politics” op. cit., 118. Freedom from
constraint concerns itself with the freedom and autonomy of the individual and is intrinsically related to the
casuistry of reasoning of the natural law individual. Whereas the absence of necessitation is more closely
aligned with the theoretical conception of man and occupies the thoughts of philosophers and theologians,
the absence of constraint concerns itself with the actualization of the individual as an epistemonical agent.
Yet it is also to note that two components, like much of Aquinas’s thought, can not be separated from each
other. Working in communion with each other, they provides the means for the intellect to develop, the
individual to acquire a knowledge of the world in which he or she is situated, and in so doing develop the
habits and virtues of the prudent individual related to the ultimate ends of the happiness.
97 It is important, in this instance, to distinguish between autonomy and sovereignty of the individual. This
distinction relates to the ability of the individual, living within the community, to achieve his or her
ultimate ends. As Jacques Maritain describes in “The Concept of Sovereignty” The American Political
Science Review 44, no. 2 (June 1950): 352, it is important because it distinguishes between the individual
as an isolated atomic unit, similar to liberal ideas of individuals and communities and provides the freedom
to understand human beings in relationships. “It is therefore better to say of the people, as of the body
politics, that they have a natural and inalienable right to full autonomy, that is, to comparatively supreme
independence and power with regard to any part of the whole itself which is composed of them, and in
order to have this very whole brought into existence and into activity,” he writes. “It would simply be
nonsensical to conceive of the people as governing themselves separately from themselves and from above
themselves.”
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law community is the ideal of pluralism.98 “To me this principles signifies that in order
to avoid greater evils (which would be the ruin of the community’s peace and lead to the
petrifaction – or even the disintegration – of consciences) the commonwealth could and
should tolerate (to tolerate is not to approve) ways of worship more or less distant from
the truth;” writes Maritain furthermore noting that, “in consequence the commonwealth
would decide to accord to the various spiritual groups which live within it the juridical
status which the city itself in its political wisdom adapts on the one hand to their
condition and, to the general line of legislation leading towards the virtuous life, and to
the prescriptions of the moral law, towards whose fulfillment in the fullest obtainable
degree it should endeavor to direct this diversity of forms.”99 Emphasizing reason and
practice over technical processes, natural law, on this interpretation, is well suited to
incorporate ethical plurality. Commenting on this particular attribute, John Haldane
writes that natural law, “recognizes that life has departments, and thus that there are
activity-specific values and virtues. On the other hand it sees that departments can only
be viewed as such when seen as parts of a greater whole. That greater whole, is human
life.”100 It is these departments that reflect the diverse interests of the agent highlighting
the multiple opportunities for human interaction. In this way an agent’s love disperses
itself in a web-like fashion at odds with the algebraic modes of interaction. It provides
multiple avenues of inclusion aware that the diversity within the agent must resonate
98 The idea of pluralism elaborated on here is also of significance to ideas of world order which seek above
all else, universal ends. Like the distinctions of practical reasoning distinguishing between primary
absolutes and second order normative claims, it is pluralism, in and of itself safeguarding the equality of
being in common while at the same time promoting the positive values of cultural pluralism at odds with
universal notions of human thriving and well-being.
99 Jacques Maritain, True Humanism, translated by M. R. Adamson, (London: Geoffrey Bles, The
Centenary Press, 1938), 160 & 161.
100 John Haldane, op. cit., 35. He furthermore makes the point that this account is possible as value resides
in nature which understands that each form has a variety of functions thus making it possible to provide an
account of ethical pluralism that is, in and of itself, foundational.
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within the community negating a sense of otherness. Consequently it sustains the
requisite freedom for agents to develop as unique beings propelled towards the unifying
act of mutual self-revelation.
Politics and political governance are, on this account, an art and not a science.
“Because they answer to practical and contingent matters, government and legislation can
never be deduced strictly from premises, nor legitimated absolutely by any philosophical
or theological reason,” Lisa Sowle Cahill writes.101 In the same vein A.P. d’Entreves
notes how politics is not a technical skill, capable of being learnt through the proper
application of technique and an understanding of the rules. “It cannot and must not be
measured solely by its achievements, by standards of efficiency and success. And the
reason for this is that politics always imply a moral responsibility, a deliberation, a
willing, a choice. They are not a purely pragmatic science,” he goes on to note, but
rather, “deal with the choice of means, but the means are dependent on the end, and the
end is a moral one. This end,” he concludes, “is the common good, an end which is
higher in value than that of the individual and that of the family, and which constitutes
the proper object of politics.”102 Politics, on this account are a decidedly personal
endeavor, revolving around the agent’s capacity to reason. On this account politics
represents the interfacing of moral values, blending, in the process, the distinction of
public and private agency.
It ought to be clear that this conception of the community does not begin, nor
justify its existence on notions of exclusivity. “Political communities endure because
101 Lisa Sowle Cahill, Love Your Enemies: discipleship, Pacifism, and Just War Theory (Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 1994), 84.
102 A.P. d’Entreves, Aquinas: Selected Political Writings, translated J.G. Dawson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1959), xii.
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they are exclusive, and most establish their peculiar identities by accentuating the
differences between insider and aliens,” writes Linklater. “In the history of political
community, distinctiveness has often been forged in war or in unifying struggles for
national independence.”103 As the opening section of this chapter demonstrated, the
Salamanca Theologians contributed in their own unique way to moral tradition of natural
law, extending a particular version of being human that denied, in the first instance, the
boundaries of ‘us and them’ of ‘inside and outside’.104 Espousing a discourse of equality
rooted in the potential capacity and capabilities of agents the Scholastics further
developed communities oriented around ‘the good’ recognizing ultimately that not only is
‘the good’. The natural equality they articulated reflected the capacity of one to
recognize in another the desire and ability to know ‘the good’. It is this equality of being
which underscores the relational ontology and the mutuality of being articulating an open
ended conception of the community premised on the loving relationships of the
individual as an agent of justice.105
Love, on this interpretation of community, builds in importance developing the
ontological sameness sustaining the relationships of agents. “Genuine community is
formed by unselfish love which unites two or many persons. Those who share in
community are one insofar as they love the same good; they are disposed together to a
103 Andrew Linklater, “The Transformation of Political Community” op. cit., 1 & 2.
104 Tvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America, The Question of the Other, translated from the French by
Richard Howard; forward by Anthony Pagden (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 247. His
examination of ‘the other’ arising out of his investigation of the conquest of America, like Las Casas stems
from am obligation to speak knowledge and understanding and our common failure to do this if we do not
seek to better understand that which is baffling within a closed off and unknown community. “I believe in
the necessity of ‘seeking the truth’ and in the obligation of making it known; I know that the function of
information exists, and that the effect of information can be powerful,” he writes noting that “we remember
what can happen if we do not succeed in discovering the other.”
105 It is this notion of equality which sustains the necessary friendships needed to understand the order of
charity linking love and friendship providing the necessary institutionalization in order to influence an
interpersonal and transnational account of justice with which to temper the inequalities of international
political structures. This justice, commutative justice, is elaborated on in detail in Chapter Five.
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common fulfillment, writes Germain Grisez. “The one which is the real community is
also many insofar as it fulfills its members in their diverse and complementary
possibilities. In true community,” he further writes, “unity is not lessened by the ever-
increasing uniqueness of the members, and their individuality is not compromised by the
ever-growing solidarity of their common life. Both the uniqueness of each individual and
the solidarity of all increases as the good loved in common is effectively desired,
pursued, and enjoyed by each and all.”106 Love, on this account, reflects the emergence
of an ethics of action beyond the self-sufficiency similar to neo-Aristotelian and Virtue
ethicists. “Let us add that if the ethics of St. Thomas is an ethics of beatitude, it is
nevertheless something entirely different from an interested eduaimonism, because it is
also an ethics of love.”107 Blissfully unaware of the boundaries shaping contemporary
politics, and the exclusivity of national identities, the natural law community brings
agents one step closer to articulating an ethic of love. Rooted in the ontology of being
this ethic represents the institutionalization of a relational ontology capable of achieving
the requirements of commutative justice. This ethic is unbounded in its scope. It calls
into question the dichotomy of domestic and international demonstrating the viability of
international and transnational justice. Moreover, an ethic of love respects the unique
diversity of each agent, reflected in the community safeguarding differences
simultaneously unifying human action centered wholly on development and well-being.
Conclusion
This account of the political community is, on first glance seemingly domestic
and not international. Scholars of international affairs are quick to distinguish between
106 Germain Grisez, “The Way of the Lord Jesus” op. cit., 577.
107 Jacques Martian, “Scholasticism and Politics” op. cit., 124.
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the domestic and international realm noting how the former provides a legitimate
authority and associated laws and institutions whereas the latter, offers no claim to
legitimate political authority. Bearing this in mind, justice and obligation are firmly
situated within the domestic realm and the task of establishing a feasible and reliable
account of international justice, O’Neill notes, proves problematic.108 Contrary to the
arguments of cosmopolitans, as Jean Bethke Elshtain notes, the just existence of any
single individual rests primarily on moral luck. “The reigning assumption is that all of us
are persons who, through neither fault nor merit of our own, happen to be born within the
boundaries of an impoverished country or a wealthy one. Justice, she writes, “consists in
righting the balance between these cases.”109 The justice traditionally attributed to this
task, however, is primarily economic, or distributive in its assumptions. Similar to the
primacy of international sovereignty within International Relations, distributive justice,
and the primacy of the state represent the dominant account, but not the sole account, of
being political. The plural nature of the natural law community, alongside the equality of
being of the Scholastic tradition of natural law provides on opportunity to envision an
alternative conception of moral communities. The natural law community flies in the
face of traditional boundaries of international affairs, and its associated discourses of
justice and morality. The ensuing chapter reveals an account of justice which is
simultaneously interpersonal and transnational reflecting the varying degrees of an ethic
of love and the order of charity in the wider practices of international affairs.
The natural law community sustains another key feature of a pre-modern
investigation of human suffering. Pluralism, conceptualized in light of the overarching
108 Onora O’Neill “Bounded and Cosmopolitan Justice” op. cit., 45-60.
109 Jean Bethke Elshtain, “International Justice as Equal Regard and the Use of Force” op. cit., 63.
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assumption of human equality distinguishes this account from its contemporary
cosmopolitan descendants. Human equality, for the Scholastics was unproblematic, for
theirs was not a universal moral framework. Cosmopolitan frameworks situate human
equality within a universal assumption of moral progress. Associated with the received
view of Modernity, this universality reveals the particular problem of moral favoritism.
A primary emphasis on relationships endorses a version of political communities at odds
with the boundaries international politics. On this account, communities exist whenever
two or more agents decide to engage with one another sharing common interests seeking
moral knowledge. Relationships provide, in this instance, a means of furthering the
necessary metaphysics and moral psychology necessary, as Maritain points out,
incorporating a plethora of customs and norms contributing to the diversity of political
life. In the first instance, the metaphysical knowledge supporting the mutuality of being
is well placed to cultivate the necessary freedom and autonomy required for plural modes
of existence. On the other hand, the moral psychology of the agent, is well situated to
challenge the cognitive empiricism of the received view of Modernity. So understood,
the universality sustaining a rational account of ethics, bounded justice and morality
within the state is challenged articulating instead a more relative and unstructured
account of international political action.
Universalism is a key feature of Modernity. It also evident in the political
discourses of conquer, a point noted by Todorov.110 Investigating the actions of the
Spanish Conquistadors, he demonstrates how the Spanish incursion into the New World,
and the subsequent taming of the American Indians, demonstrates a particular role for
language. In fact, his argument links knowledge and power in light of the ends of
110 Tzvetan Todorov, op. cit.
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conquering. Distinguishing between two forms of language, inter-human dialogue and
otherworldly communication, he notes how the Spanish Conquistadors excelled in the
former. Inter-human dialogue provided the Spaniards with the requisite knowledge to
understand the daily existence of the indigenous population. Moreover, it provided the
necessary language and political skill to impose an alternative culture and way of life on
an pre-existing culture. The imposition of the Spanish way of life on the Amerindians
removed the mysticism and spirituality associated with the indigenous population
fostering the assumptions of Christianity alongside the social and political culture of the
Spaniards. On this account the Conquistadors were the primary vehicle with which to
further the ends associated with the received view of modernity outside the domestic
boundaries of Europe. Todorov further notes within his account of the conquest the
particular lack of otherworldly discourses which would have been at odds with these self-
same assumptions of certainty and absolutism. Unable to account for the larger role of
the individual in the world, something which the spirituality of the American Indians
excelled, Todorov concludes that while the Conquistador may have won the battle, they
had in fact, lost the war. For with the onset of inter-human dialogue, associated with
Modernity, a particular understanding of institutionalization emerged whereby difference
was set aside in favor of procedural neutrality, human rights and liberty. The unique
characteristics of individuals were set aside as the equality of being was interwoven with
the assumptions of universal moral progress denying a particular role for relationships.
Building on this idea, Fred Dallmayr demonstrates how Todorov’s work remains
a valuable contribution to International Relations and democratic institutional design. He
notes that inter-human dialogue is a key feature of the social contract tradition. In
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particular, this form of dialogue sustains within liberal accounts of democracy, both
domestic and international, a conception of neutrality and an emphasis on procedural
governance. It is an approach sustaining homogenous governance masking the unique
characteristics of individuals as human being. “Apart from pointing to continuing
dangers of imperialism (cloaked today behind ‘one-world’ formulas), the story brings
into view a tension or tensional opposition which is not merely accidental but has a basic
or paradigmatic status,” he writes, “the opposition between the egalitarian universalism
of modern Western culture and the array of particular ethnic cultures and religious
traditions, that is, between a rationalized world view and indigenous worlds.”111 The
emerging trend towards international democratization within institutions points to a
further international homogeneity similar to the original aims of the Spanish
Conquistadors, highlighted by Todorov. Bearing this in mind, Dallmayr investigates the
role of radical democracy theorists articulating the politics of difference with which to
account for individual difference within contemporary societies. “In light of these and
related experiences, a politics of difference is liable to be liberating and empowering by
reclaiming cultural identities or ways of life ostracized or marginalized by the dominant
culture,” writes Dallmayr.112 Individuals, on this account, remain firmly embedded
within the distinctive group all the while participating in the larger political community.
Echoing the ideas of Maritain, the politics of difference, according to Dallmayr, sustains
a mode of being political in which individuals develop their personalities and individuals
within and through the larger dominant community group. On this account both the
dominant and minority group, and the individuals constituting its existence, co-exist
111 Fred Dallmayr, op. cit., 203.
112 Fred Dallmayr, op. cit., 209.
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alongside one another. The politics of difference, like the Humanism of the Incarnation
articulated by Maritain, require an acute understanding of freedom and autonomy
facilitating plurality associated with an objective account of political engagement.
The morality of natural law not only provides an worthwhile account of freedom
and autonomy, it does so in such a fashion as to evaluate those customs and norms
acceptable within the community itself. As G. Scott Davis highlights, the morality of
natural law provides a benchmark against which the propriety of social customs can be
measured in light of the ultimate ends of human happiness.113 The authority of this
account of natural law, ultimately rests, not on the governing authority of any political
community but in the ability of the agents to reason, both individually and in common. It
is the reasoning capacity of the agent institutionalizing communities of equal
relationships. It flies in the face of contemporary aims of homogeneity, offering a
particular interpretation of the ‘sameness of self’ respecting always the uniqueness of
each and every agent. Beyond pluralism this account of the community paves the way
for an account of justice, morality and obligation outwith a bounded conception of
international affairs. As Anthony J. Lisska highlights, obligation, like morality and
justice, is also rooted in human reason. “Practical reason pursues the goods which lead to
human well-being. To do the opposite would be to act irrationally. Acting irrationally is
opposed to the rational disposition central to the essence of the human person,” writes
Lisska. “Furthermore, this is opposed to what we are as human beings. Hence, the ends
which make up the human essence, determined by theoretical reason and pursued by
practical reason, establish the obligatory actions for human beings.”114 On this account,
113 G. Scott Davis, “Conscience and Conquest” op. cit., 482.
114 Anthony J. Lisska, op. cit., 109.
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the institutionalization of relationships is not only self-evident it is the primary
responsibility of the agents. Relationships reveal themselves as the primary obligation of
love.
Offering the beginnings of an objective account of being political emphasizing the
equality and mutuality of being, relationships, and the ends of justice it is possible to
articulate a form of morality flying in the faced of the bounded nature of contemporary
justice. “Our time is urgently in need of political imagination and a readiness for
experimentation (qualities that often are in short supply),” Dallmayr writes. “Clearly, to
avoid the pitfalls of communalism as well as universality assimilation, new paths need to
be explored on the levels of both institutional arrangements and of political reflection.”115
In light of cosmopolitanism’s association with the assumptions of the received view of
Modernity, in particular its universal equality and morality, as well as the continued
dominance of inter-human communication, to the detriment of otherwordly dialogue, the
value of a pre-modern interpretation of human suffering increasingly grows in esteem. It
articulates an alternative ontology with which to challenge the empiricism of
contemporary subjective politics. Upon reflection, a renewed understanding of equality,
in light of this conclusion, reveals the value of relativity with which to understand the
needs and requirements of other similarly constituted agents. Moreover, a pre-modern
framework with which to explore human suffering reveals an alternative understanding of
individuals within the larger moral cosmology of being. Unlike contemporary
approaches, the morality of natural law articulates a contextual development. Bearing
this in mind, a pre-modern examination of human suffering is capable of moving beyond
the moral favoritism neatly side-stepping the contemporary boundaries of the state. It
115 Fred Dallmayr, op. cit., 218 & 219.
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articulates a conception of justice focused on the common endeavors of moral agents to
develop their natural equality in diverse and interesting ways. The benefits of a natural
law casuistry lies in the freedom and autonomy it provides to agents to decide which life
plan to follow within a moral taxonomy oriented by the morality of natural law reflected
in the just structures of the moral community. In so doing it offers a vision of the
community in which individuals commit to the ends of natural law morality and meets its
obligations through the loving relationships of which they are a part. This community
espouses the natural equality of all individuals as agents of justice providing a living
example of faith rooted in the unity of human purpose emerging out of the unity of
human purpose.
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Chapter Five
Being Personal is ‘Being Political’:
Morality, Justice & the Ethics of Love
“We need a moral philosophy in which the concept of love, so rarely mentioned now by
philosophers, can once again be made central.”
Iris Murdoch,
Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature
Introduction
This final chapter begins by way of a return to the pre-eminent problem of human
suffering. The cosmopolitan approaches articulated in turn by Thomas Pogge, Andrew
Linklater and Terry Nardin all reflect contemporary assumptions of morality and human
dignity. By their very nature they are rooted in the cognitive epistemology related to the
modern assumptions of moral philosophy articulating the universal nature of human
equality, the ideal of human moral progress, and the idea of a global community uniting
individuals in a common endeavor. Reflecting upon the particular role of positive and
negative duties, each scholar articulates the need to alter the current structures of
international affairs perpetuating on a daily basis, the grosser forms of human suffering.
By way of contrast, this work offers a pre-modern account of human well-being
articulating, and re-interpreting in turn the morality of natural law. In so doing, it has
articulated a natural law account of agency, the natural law agent, and the natural law
community offering, along the way, an objective account of ‘being political’. Reflecting
both the social and political nature of the agent, emphasizing above all else, a particular
role for relationships shaping institutional design the feasibility of this particular
interpretation remains to be seen.
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Beyond cosmopolitan appeals to human suffering there exist alternative
discourses highlighting a particular role for agents and relationships with which to
counter suffering. Skeptical of the dominant classical liberalism order of the state
feminist discourse highlight the capacity and capabilities of women, as agents, beyond
the traditional domestic roles Modernity afforded them. “In confronting liberalism on its
own terms, feminists have but two alternatives,” writes Ruhl, “they can either embrace a
discourse of sameness, leaving the specific needs of women unmet and unaddressed, or
they can endorse a discourse of difference, which itself always references and privileges
the masculine self against which claims of difference are made.”1 Distinguish themselves
from contemporary mainstream debates feminist discourses hope to illustrate the
restrictive nature of political structures on women and the detrimental affect they have on
their daily lives. “Broadly speaking, feminism is a practical and intellectual dedication to
the discovery and uprooting of ideologies, relationships, and institutions that thwart
women’s flourishing and to the creation of new ideologies, relationships, and institutions
that promote it,” writes Traina.2 It is a point that is similarly noted by DeCrane who
seeks to investigate the nature of women’s development and well-being from a Thomist
perspective applying in the process a hermeneutical interpretation of his works.3 On this
account, feminist discourses offer female agency as one recourse to human suffering.
Representing a reaction to the atomic self, feminist ethics provide an alternative response
to human suffering than that of moral cosmopolitans, and in so doing, provide an
interesting avenue to enter into the realm of institutional design. An investigation into
1 Lealle Ruhl, “Natural Governance and the Governance of Nature” Feminist Review 66 (Autumn): 6 & 7.
2 Cristina L. H. Traina, Feminist Ethics and Natural law: The End of the Anathemas (Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press, 1999), 25.
3 Susanne M. DeCrane, op. cit.
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the development of care ethics, and the wider relationship feminist ethics shares with
international affairs, reveals a remarkable epistemological, ontological and
methodological similarity to natural law. Consequently, the inroads of feminist agency in
the domestic state add legitimacy to the possibility of alternative institutional purposes to
the state and the practices of international affairs more generally.
Bearing this in mind, the relationship of feminist ethics and natural law, can, at
first, prove quite a shock. As Lealle Ruhl points out, “it is worth remembering that
natural law arguments have not historically served women’s interests well. They have far
more often been used to curtail women’s freedom than to protect it.”4 Indeed, the
patriarchal dominance within the historical and contemporary morality of natural law
denies a particularly positive role to women. “In the past, the moral priority assigned to
men’s interests was often justified by philosophical denials that women were as fully or
perfectly human as men, and especially claims that they were less rational than men,”
writes Jagger. “Aristotle, Aquinas, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche all argued that
women should serve and please men, since their capacity for reason was different from
and inferior to men’s.”5 Bearing this in mind, as feminist scholars have sought to re-
interpret the morality of natural law, they have done so in such a fashion highlighting not
only the needs of women, but of the constitutive members of the moral community, men
and women alike. To that end, the inclusive nature of natural law morality articulated
throughout this work, revolving around a particular understanding of human equality
ought to appeal not only to feminist ethics, but to any ethic interested in human
flourishing and agency directed towards that end.
4 Lealle Ruhl, op. cit., 21.
5 Alison M. Jaggar, “Ethics Naturalized: Feminism’s Contribution to Moral Epistemology” Metaphilosophy
31, no. 5 (October 2002): 454.
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This chapter opens with a foray into the ethics of care demonstrating the value of
relationships within an account of moral institutional design. In so doing, it articulates
the particular relationship of natural law and feminist ethics. Bearing all of this in mind
is to note however, that care ethics ultimately, are but one way of interpreting the
relationship of morality and human suffering. In seeking to further develop an objective
account of politics, and in so doing reveal the full value of pre-modern assumptions with
regard to contemporary suffering, this final chapter distinguishes itself from care ethics
offering instead an interpretation of philia and agape with which to develop an ethic of
love. Building on the equality of being established in Chapter Four, it demonstrates how
the idea of love, within natural law, is intrinsically related to interpersonal and intrastate
relationships offering not only a personal morality and ethics, but also an ethic structuring
the moral community. Distinguishing itself from classical interpretations of proportional
justice the relationship of love, justice and morality represent ‘the personal’. A mode of
being political challenging the traditional boundaries of international affairs, ‘the
personal’ challenges the ongoing problems of moral favoritism in light of the global
problem of human suffering.
Morality and justice, rooted in an ontological equality of being, articulate an ethic
of love all of which cumulatively represents an objective account of politics. This
account of ‘being political’ is premised on practical reason. It demonstrates how human
action challenges contemporary political structures simultaneously challenging the idea
of private and public spheres of ethics. It reflects, above all else, an emphasis on
relationships sustaining the developmental potential of the individual and the community.
Agency, on this account is rooted in the idea of ‘becoming’ reflecting an alternative idea
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of power, related to a commutative understanding of justice. Politics, on this account, is
decidedly personal, incorporating the emotions and passions of the agent challenging the
boundaries of ‘us and them’ of ‘inside and outside’ associated with the Westphalian
account of sovereignty and international affairs. It is indicative of an unbounded
conception of ‘the good’ sustaining intrapersonal, international, and intranational
accounts of justice which are one and the same. Bearing this in mind, the ensuing chapter
seeks to illustrate the viability of relationships proffering just political structures in line
with the ends of human well-being and development. Moving beyond an ethic of care,
articulating instead an ethic of love, this chapter culminates in the presentation of ‘the
personal’ revealing in its entirety the tenets of a pre-modern account of natural law, in
light of the particular problem of human suffering. Labeled ‘the personal’ this account of
being political utilizes the ethic of love in order to mediate the Aristotelian notion of civic
friendshio demonstrating the institutionalization of charity within ‘the international’. In
so doing it seeks to move beyond the traditional challenges of car ethics demonstrating
the influential nature of charity with regards to justice. The end result of this institutional
endeavor reflects a commutative account of justice endorsing a relational account of
international relations which respects the mutuality of being and the diversity of each
individual situated within a moral community in order to demonstrate the plausibility of
the morality of natural law within International Relations.
Part I: Care Ethics & International Relations
As recounted in Chapter One, Joan C. Tronto, argues that contemporary political
boundaries are rooted in Hobbesian assumptions of power and authority.6 Sustaining a
6 Joan C. Tronto, op.cit.,
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pragmatic society and morality, these assumptions endorse a ‘politics first’ approach to
political activity unaware of moral and ethical deliberations. Consequently, the capacity
and capability of agents to develop their own natural potential, and the potential of others,
is severely limited. This interpretation of political engagement is scientific articulating a
process limiting insecurity and anarchy. Agency, on this account, is uninformed by the
emotions and passions of the agent affecting a particular understanding of international
civil society and agency therein. On the other hand, one can distinguish, as Tronto points
out, a morality first approach premising moral reflection and action above power politics.
This approach has systematically been situated outside the mainstream of high power
politics. Incorporating the practical deliberations of moral agents, this approach she
demonstrates was conceptually at odds with the particular ends of Modernity in its
received view.7
Feminist ethics offer a resounding critique of the politics first approach to
governance challenging the boundaries of public and private informing the practice of
politics. Within feminist scholarship there exist a variety of ethical interpretations.
Similar to the rights bearing subject investigated at length in Chapters One and Three,
liberal feminists such as Susan Parsons and Judith Webb Kay highlight dignity and
humanity within their interpretations of politics, aware of how traditional conceptions of
human rights marginalize women’s experiences. Articulating a healthy skepticism for
politics in general and the assumptions sustaining its practice, social constructivists
challenge the traditional association of rationality with public politics and the limitations
of moral reasoning. Emphasizing context, norms and ideals, this approach questions
previously accepted accounts of politics querying their validity as well as their ends in
7 Alison M. Jaggar, op. cit., 55.
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light of women’s experiences. Social constructivism, however, fails to account for any
relationship of justice and well-being, its value laying solely in its skepticism. Finally,
feminist naturalism examines ‘the natural’ informing politics, and in particular, the
potential contributions that female agents can offer its practice. “Biological naturalism
maps the functioning of bodies and societies (preferably purified of all cultural and
especially technological interventions) onto moral norms, extrapolating moral commands
from physical and social givens,” writes Traina.8 Two different streams emerge within a
natural approach to feminist discourse, one emphasizing the biological tendencies of
women, the other adopting a distinctly teleological anthropology framing feminist
agency. It is within this particular stream of feminist ethics that one begins to see a
particular relationship of natural law and feminist ethics.
Feminist naturalism articulates a continuous exchange between epistemology and
natural sciences. It emphasizes human experience and human practice as a means to
understand the social world. “The naturalistic element of feminist naturalism is
expressed in its concern for empirical adequacy in general, but its feminist aspect lies in
the special focus of that concern, writes Jagger. “Because of its resistance to the
devaluation of women and the feminine, feminist naturalism seeks moral understandings
that reveal rather than obscure empirical inequalities related to gender.”9 Biological
naturalism has been the pre-eminent representation of feminist naturalism. Highlighting
biological, as opposed to the teleological components of agency, it seeks to challenge the
ethical rationality associated with the original ends of Modernity. “For feminists, the
appeal of naturalism may rest on their rejection of this historical denigration of things
8 Cristina L. H. Traina, op.cit., 29.
9 Alison M. Jaggar, op. cit., 458
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female, writes Held. “The body, emotion, embodiment, the natural, and nature, have all
been associated with the feminine in different ways in different periods, and have been
seen as inferior to a mind, reason, and truth seen as separable from such female
naturalness.”10 In light of the oppression endured by women by theological traditions, it
is not surprising that biology and not teleology features so prominently within the
discourse. Bearing this in mind, feminist naturalism highlights the capacities and
capabilities that distinguish men from women focusing in particular on gender
differences. In particular, one can see evidence of this idea in the works of Carol Gilligan
who claimed to have discovered, in her female subjects, a mode of practical reasoning at
odds with traditional accounts of rational activity. On her account, the biological
capacities of women reveal a moral predisposition to care.
Care ethics begins with feminist scholars articulating an account of justice
supporting female agency. Emphasizing, in the first instance, the maternal relationships
typical of the domestic environment associated with the particular role of women, care
offers an alternative to more traditional understandings of responsible political action.
Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice11 first articulated the idea that women reason
differently from their male counterparts, taking account of seemingly irrelevant and
previously unaccounted for, factors in ethical deliberations. Contra the dominant ideas of
a male, power dominated discourse, Gilligan argues that the reasoning process of her
female subjects reveals an interest in and an accounting of the contextual and situational
factors when making decisions. With this in mind Gilligan offers an alternative
10 Viginia Held, “Moral Subjects: The Natural and the Normative” Proceedings and Addresses of the
American Philosophical Association 76, no. 2 (November 2002): 7.
11 Carol Gilligan, In a different voice: psychological theory and women’s development (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982).
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methodology to the rational and subjective agent and its associated consequentialist
deliberations. Articulating the idea that women, due to their vary nature, are caring
individuals, Gilligan further developed the maternal notion of caring elaborated on by
Sara Ruddick12 and Nel Noddings13. She distinguishes a rights/justice approach to ethics
and a responsibility/relational approach to morality arguing that these two traditions are
incompatible, the former associated with a politics first, and the latter with a morality first
approach to ethical reasoning. “Ultimately, Gilligan’s tendency to oppose justice and
care as fundamentally different moral perspectives which are –at best- described as
‘complementary’ seems to reflect a deeply felt tension between the rational values which
are thought to underlie justice,” writes Komter, “and the affective origins assumed to be
characteristic of care.”14 Feminists have built on this idea of care. Whilst some scholars
remain true to the distinction first articulated by Gillians, others have sought to integrate
the approaches providing both a normative and practical account of care, highlighting the
possibilities of caring agency.
Conceptually, care implies an engagement. It begins with the recognition of a
need and the idea that a degree of action is required to meet it. Joan C. Tronto and
Berenice Fisher define care as “a species of activity that includes everything we do to
maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible.”15
They identify four components, or phases, of care- caring about, taking care of, care-
12 Sara Ruddick, Maternal thinking: towards a politics of peace (London: Women’s Press, 1990).
13 Nel Noddings, Caring, A Feminine Approach to Ethics & Moral Education (Berkley: University of
California Press, 1984).
14 Aafke E. Komter, “Justice, Friendship and Care: Aristotle and Gilligan – Two of a Kind?” European
Journal of Women’s Studies 2, 151 (1995): 163.
15 Berenice Fisher and Joan C. Tronto, “Toward a Feminist Theory of Care,” in Circles of Care: Work and
Identity in Women’s Lives eds. Emily Abel and Margaret Nelson, 40 (Albany, NY: State University of New
York Press, 1991).
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giving, and care receiving.16 Virginia Held writes that in order to clarify what care is and
means it ought to be viewed in terms of caring relations. “Care is a practice involving the
work of care-giving and the standards by which the practices of care can be evaluated,”
she writes. “Care must concern itself with the effectiveness of its efforts to meet needs,
but also with the motives with which care is provided.”17 Similarly, Fiona Robinson
understands care as a practice, and not, rules and principles highlighting the relational
ontology that goes on to support such an ethic.18 Care, these definitions reveal, is both a
value and a practice. As a practice, care, writes Virginia Held, “shows us how to respond
to needs and why we should. It builds trust and mutual concern and connectedness
between persons.”19 As a value, care provides the means of evaluating the attitudes and
practices within a care ethic highlighting the centrality of equality, nurturance and
mutuality, shaping the relationships of the care giver and care receiver.20 Joan C. Tronto
adds to these values a role for responsibility and compassion as individuals seek to meet
the needs of others within a caring environment.21 Actively caring for another is a
twofold endeavor. It requires an orientation and disposition towards caring sufficiently
motivating agents, and the capacity and capability to care for others. In the same vein, to
be cared for, requires a disposition open to the ends of care. In other words, care, above
all else, requires of the agent to listen, assess the needs of others and act accordingly. In
light of this fact, Traina argues that care embodies the principles of casuistry.22
16 Joan C. Tronto, op. cit., 105 & 106.
17 Virgina Held, The Ethics of Care (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 36.
18 Fiona Robinson, op. cit., 38 & 39.
19 Virgina Held, “The Ethics of Care” op. cit., 42.
20 Virgina Held, “The Ethics of Care” op. cit., 64.
21 Joan C. Tronto, op. cit., 3.
22 Cristina L. H. Traina, op. cit.143. On this account, care ethics is agent centric, displaying a remarkable
series of methodological similarities to casuistry. “In a way that recalls casuistry,” writes Traina, “care
reasoning tends to preserve relationships by altering principles and descriptions rather than to ensure
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Fiona Robinson’s work Globalizing Care: Ethics, Feminist Theory, and
International Relations,23 accounts for an ethic of care in International Relations.
Transcending the static nature of international affairs employing the values of mutuality,
relationality, partiality, responsiveness, and responsibility her institutional design
challenges the contemporary problems of human suffering simultaneously envisioning an
ethical approach to international affairs. Eliciting a phenomological approach to ethics,
centered on the contextual environment within which relationships develop she writes
that “ an ethics of care must, in the context of social and political relations, seek to
uncover the relationships which exist among and within groups, while at the same time,
maintaining a critical stance towards those relations.” Furthermore noting that “care
ethics involves learning how to listen and be attentive and responsive to the needs and
suffering of others. This, in turn, involves a thorough understanding of how relations are
constructed and how difference is perceived and maintained through institutions and
structures in societies.”24 On this account, identities, relationships, and context influence
social co-ordination and cooperation determining the response of the more powerful care-
giver respectful of the vulnerabilities of the care-receiver. The responsibility to develop
trust, and protect the autonomy of each agent is, on this interpretation, mutual. This
particular approach to ethics and international affairs, according to Robinson, “would
focus instead on the continuous background of interpersonal and social contexts in which
all human relations occur, offering us a better starting point for thinking about the claims,
mathematical quality by adhering to these principles and descriptions, and it often refuses to limit itself to a
simple yes or no response when faced with a dilemma.”
23 Fiona Robinson, op. cit.
24 Fiona Robinson, op. cit., 30.
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entitlements, needs, interests, and dignity of persons.”25 Endorsing a proactive account of
political engagement Robinson proffers a vision of politics transcending the tensions of
sovereignty and human well-being evinced in contemporary approaches to world order.
The appeal of a phenomenological approach articulated by Fiona Robinson rests in the
sustained action of individuals transcending state boundaries, similar to the community
endeavors of Andrew Linklater and Richard Shapcott; however, relying ultimately on the
power of language, she like others before her, remains captured by the distinction of
domestic and international communities and is unable to offer a suitable alternative to
distributive justice.
Care ethics, to date, remain challenged by the innate domesticity of their origins.
Bearing this in mind, a variety of scholars have articulated different means of overcoming
this particular challenge. Grace Clement endeavors to widen the grasp of care situating it
alongside the liberal idea of international justice. Aware of the hierarchy of a male-
dominated account of a justice ethic, and a traditionally female account of a care ethic,
she postulates that when interwoven and viewed alongside one another a plausible
account of the ethics of reasonableness emerges. “In general, I argue that the conflicts
between care and justice orientations need not lead us to accept one at the expense of the
other; indeed, these conflicts can help us distinguish between better and worse versions of
each ethic,” she writes. “Most importantly, they allow us to construct a genuinely
feminist ethic of care.”26 In a similar fashion, Marilyn Friedman investigates the
impartiality of traditional notions of justice alongside the partiality of care discourses.
Noting both the criticisms and proponents of both approaches, she articulates instead,
25 Fiona Robinson, op. cit., 31.
26 Grace Clement, Care, Autonomy, and Justice, Feminism and the Ethic of Care (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1996), 7.
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similar to Grace Clement, an integrationist approach. “Can a primary commitment to
abstract principles and values be integrated with a primary commitment to particular
persons or are we necessarily doomed to a forced choice between them? On this issue, as
on the question of whether care and justice are necessarily distinct, my approach is
integrationist,” she writes. “One possible sort of integration between person-based and
abstract moral commitments is to seek intimate, responsive, and committed relationships
with people we know well enough to be reliably familiar with their needs, desires,
beliefs, and so on and to settle for abstract, rule-based, equal respect toward the vast
numbers of others we cannot know in any particularity.”27 This particular interpretation,
like Clement blends a rational account of ethics with the more particular ends of caring.
Justice consequently is functional limiting the ends of agency limited to a pragmatic
conception of morality. Care ethics, on these interpretations, is at odds with the casuistry
of natural law limiting the potential for individual agency in a relational institutionalized
setting.
Feminist accounts of morality, on the other hand, investigate the assumptions
offered by natural law in order to overcome the parochial challenge of care. Both care
ethics and natural law display a concern for the particular and emphasize above all else,
the relational nature of human development. “Natural law and feminist ethics share a
concern for an implicit or explicit theory of value (in this case, a normative description of
flourishing) and a method (a technique for analyzing concrete states of affairs and for
deciding how and when to pursue particular, sometimes conflicting, incarnations of
flourishing),” writes Traina. “Indispensable here is a means of knitting together
27 Marilyn Friedman, What are Friends For? Feminist Perspectives on Personal Relations and Moral
Theory (Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), 138.
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standards for systematic, social justice-for instance, for political and economic structures
that justly account for women’s particular needs as bearers of children-with probing
discussions of individual moral integrity and accountability.”28 The mutuality of these
assumptions, alongside the universal ends of natural law, so the argument goes, provide
the necessary means to overcome the parochial problem of distance articulating a
normative care agenda. “Care ethics and natural law theory share a number of important
similarities. Both emphasize the inherently social nature of human beings and view the
most basic intimate relationships between individuals, such as parent-child relationships
and friendship, as the model for theories of justice,” Engster writes. “Both likewise
suggest that just relationships among people require attention to the particular needs,
concerns, and characteristics of concrete individuals, and as such, endorses a practical
and situational moralities.”29 Care ethics, so interpreted, represents an account of
morality at odds with modern rationality. It offers not rules and procedures but rather,
articulates an approach that reflects the personality and individuality of the agent in
question.
Daniel Engster provides an argument for an overarching political theory of care
systematically joining the idea of care ethics with the tradition of natural law. She
investigates two different natural law approaches, that of John Finnis and the new natural
lawyers as well as the ideas of Martha Nussbaum and her Capabilities Approach. Noting
the problem of ontology investigated throughout this work she seeks to account for its
loss through a particular re-reading of human rights discounting the necessity of
teleology. “Natural law theories appear almost necessarily to rely upon metaphysical
28 Cristina L. H. Traina, op. cit., 12.
29 Daniel Engster, “Care Ethics and Natural Law Theory: Toward an Institutional Political Theory of
Caring” The Journal of Politics 66, no. 1 (February 2004): 122 & 123.
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notions of human nature and moral obligation,” she writes. “An alternative, immanent
ground for these theories can be found, however, in the intersubjective accounts of
human existence developed by care theorists.”30 Relying on a three-fold distinction of
rights, those relating to development and dependency work, traditional political and
economic rights, and finally, the right of political participation, she fails to incorporate
the required ontology sustaining the agency required of both care ethics and the morality
of natural law. Relying on Finnis’s interpretation of natural law, this synthesis of care
and natural law falls prey to the self-same problem of the new natural law identified in
Chapter Two. In the absence of the teleology of being, care ethics, like that interpretation
offered by Clement and Friedman, remains a rational account of ethics failing to account
for the equality of being necessary to challenge the boundaries and restrictions of
contemporary justice relations. Bearing this in mind, the ideas of Traina further reveal
their value. As the ensuing section of this work demonstrates human non-instrumental
relationships offer a glimpse of political relations at odds with relationships of power,
conflict and anarchy evident within traditional accounts of International Relations.
Building on the personal ethic of love previously highlighted, the ensuing section goes
beyond the current ends of care ethics articulating friendship, charity and a commutative
account of justice in order to demonstrate the value of a relational ontology championing
the moral ends of well-being and development.
Part II: Philia, Agape & Justice Relationships
Returning once again to the theme of Modernity, interpreted in its received view,
is to note the distinct differences of a modern and pre-modern account of the community.
30 Daniel Engster, op. cit., 128.
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Commenting on the influence of modern economics Ray Pahl notes the contemporary
fascination with negative liberty and reciprocal disinterest. “The old comradely world of
friends and neighbors of ‘traditional society’ was being replaced,” he writes, “so it was
commonly asserted by the anonymous competitive individualism of capitalist market
society.”31 The ideal of isolation and reciprocal disinterest are also noted by Kostan.
“The qualities of disinterestedness and intimacy are peculiar to modern friendship, then,
because individuals bonds now occupy the space freed up by the emergence of the
economic spheres governed by market relations,” he writes.32 These ideas are nicely
summarized by King who notes, in the language of the Ancients themselves, isolation
and the amorality it breeds represent, like the American Indians and the conquistadors,
yet another interpretation of barbarism. “Modernity, so far from representing civilization,
would appear – at least from an ancient perspective – to represent a new barbarism.
Modernity is nervous in the face of self revelation,” he writes. “Thus the probing Other
comes to be represented more as peril than prospective ally. Promoters of self-enclosure,
we fear self-disclosure.”33 King, along with Smith reflect on the relevance of civic
friendship in light of this distinction concluding that friendship provides an interesting
and valuable framework with which to investigate contemporary political interactions.34
What Ancient communities understood, and what is lacking from contemporary political
societies, is the knowledge of self-revelation. This point is well captured by King.
“Intimate, personal friendship was widely promoted as vital in part simply because, in the
31 Ray Pahl, On Friendship (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 45 & 46.
32 David Konstan, Friendship in the Classical World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 5.
33 Preston King, “Friendship in Politics” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
10, no. 2 (June 2007): 129.
34 Preston King & Graham M. Smith, “Introduction” Critical Review of International Social and Political
Philosophy 10, no. 2 (June 2007): 117-123.
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circumstances described it was genuinely possible, and enjoyable and profitable. One
could no more do without the loyalty of family and friends then, most of us can do
without a pension or state-funded education now,” he writes. “Friends worth the name
require a great deal in the way of time and attention. But moderns either do not have the
time, or do not take it,” he points out. “They fall back upon their washing machines,
dishwashers, cars, banks, telephones. But such means they are well able to divorce the
practicalities of self-maintenance from intimacy and to insulate such intimates as they
have from one another.”35 Care ethics represents one attempt to regain this particular
intimacy in the wider practice of politics emphasizing as it does familial relations with
which to understand morality and justice. Ultimately this account of politics remains
captured by the structures which it seeks to criticize and fails to elaborate on an
alternative account of justice. The vision of agape love first articulated in the second
chapter of this work provides an alternative starting point to that of care ethics with
which to elaborate on an alternative account of relational politics and in so doing
demonstrates how love and charity provide a mediated version of civic friendship with
which to understand the wider aims and ends of moral agency.
Love in the most general form, orients one towards the good. “Love belongs to
the appetitive power which is a passive faculty. Wherefore its object stands in relation to
it as the cause of its movement or act. Therefore the cause of love must needs be love's
object,” writes Aquinas. “Now the proper object of love is the good; because, as stated
above (26, 1,2), love implies a certain connaturalness or complacency of the lover for the
thing beloved, and to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin and proportionate to
35 Preston King, “Friendship in Politics” op. cit., 129.
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it. It follows, therefore, that good is the proper cause of love.36 Love, on this account, is
related to the ends of being human. At first this love takes the form of self love, as
individuals develop their natural potential. “In this teleological view all beings by their
God-given natures seek their own good,” Stephen Pope writes. “It is an inescapable fact
of human nature that the self is its own object of natural love.”37 Furthermore he notes
that the teleology of the natural law agent “gives rise to a profoundly complementary
view of the relations between self- and other love.”38 The mutuality of being evident in
the previously articulated relational ontology tempers the selfish nature of self-love with
an awareness of the beloved, or other. “For the very fact that two men are alike, having,
as it were, one form, makes them to be, in a manner, one in that form: thus two men are
one thing in the species of humanity,” Aquinas writes. Furthermore, “the affections of
one tend to the other, as being one with him; and he wishes good to him as to himself.”39
Love, so understood, represents the original bond of being human, in common. It
represents the primordial obligations of the natural law agent to recognize the good in
others and seek its development. In this way, both the ‘I’ and ‘You’, the loved and the
beloved develop reflect the natural equality of being sustaining the capacities and
capabilities of each and every individual.
This love is agape love. As the primary obligation of agents it explains both the
selfish desire evident in the moral potential of all individuals tempered by an
understanding the selfless abilities of the agent. In this way the interpretation of agape
love offered by Gene Outka goes a long way to explaining the steadfastness and general
36 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., II-II, q. 27, a. 1.
37 Stephen Pope, “Expressive Individualism and True Self-Love: A Thomistic Perspective” The Journal of
Religion 71, no. 3 (July 1991): 387.
38 Stephen Pope, “Expressive Individualism and True Self-Love” op. cit., 398.
39 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit, II-II, q. 27, a. 3.
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nature of agape love rooted in the natural equality of all individuals. His interpretation of
agape focuses, in the first instance, on neighborly love, and not the self-love of
contemporary political engagements. “The normative content most often accorded to
agape as neighbor-love may be state in summary fashion as follows,” he writes. “Agape
is a regard for the neighbor which in crucial respects is independent and unalterable. To
these features there is a corollary: the regard is for every person qua human existent, to be
distinguished from those special traits, actions, etc, which distinguish particular
personalities from each other.”40 Love of this sort is motivated not by the particular
characteristics sustaining the individuality and personality of the particular person.
Rather, agape love is attracted to the ability of individuals, as agents of justice, noting the
equal capacity to know the good and the capability to act towards its ends. Individuals,
as agents of justice, are motivated to love due to the inherent natural equality associated
with being human.
Yet the value of a natural law interpretation of love rests in its ability to
overcome the parochial problem attributed to care ethics. Agape love, as Cima and
Schubeck demonstrate, is “the inner spirit of love”.41 Agape accounts for the first
instances of self-love and the basic motivations to love another, recognizing in another
the natural law equality of ‘the good’. Consequently a love ethic distinguishes itself from
contemporary ethical discourses. It is outward looking and sees in another the motivation
to act. This differentiates a natural law ethic from cosmopolitan scholars who, drawing
40 Outka, Agape: An Ethical Analysis (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1972), 9.
41 Lawrence R. Cima & Thomas L. Schubeck “Self-Interest, Love and Economic Justice: A Dialogue
Between Classical Economic Liberalism and Catholic Social Teaching” Journal of Business Ethics Vol. 30
(2001): 213-231.
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on the works of Immanuel Kant, look inwards to understand moral obligation.42 It is this
inward orientation which ultimately challenges cosmopolitan investigations of harm. The
predispose agent articulated in the works of Pogge, Linklater and Nardin all reflect and
understanding in which the good of one is similarly the good of another and fails to
provide an understanding of the differences sustained in the particular personality and
characteristics of the agent within the community. In the same vein, this outward
orientation distinguishes the methodology and epistemology of natural law from scholars
who draw on the works of Habermas and his notions of communicative action providing
an account of discourse ethics. For Habermas and his followers, one overcomes the
problems of rationality associated with modernity through conversations, yet, like those
philosophers of the enlightenment which he seeks to criticize, Habermas too adopts a
similar inward orientation.43 This interpretation of agape love is, however, an individual
ethic and reflects the actions of interactions of the individual at the most intimate level of
the community. Only when an ethic of love proliferates beyond the close community
into the wider interests of the agent and those outward relationships can love influence
the wider practices of politics and overcome the traditional challenges associated with
care ethics. In order to achieve this end natural law scholars highlight the preeminent
virtue of charity. Charity reflects the self-same quality of being noted in the agape
accounts of love; however, when charity is examined in light of the relationship it shares
with the virtue of justice it demonstrates the institutional potential of a love ethic
articulating an account of philia love. Philia love, on this reflects the ideas of civic
42 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1980).
43 Jurgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans. Ciaran Cronin
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993).
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friendship mediated through a Thomist account of charity taking into consideration the
natural equality of being sustaining the natural law agent within the community.
Contemporary accounts of civic friendship are modeled on Aristotle’s notion of
philia relations. “Aristotle by contrast offers a very detailed analysis of the varieties of
friendship, of their grounds, likely developments, moral implications, and general
casuistry,” writes Stern-Gillet. “What he describes as friendship’s purest form, viz.,
virtue or primary friendship, differs significantly from modern friendship. Above all it is
essentially a rational association which encompasses what is seen as the essential selves
of the friends.”44 Aristotle’s agent was both social and political. On this account, he
could not conceive of a life without friendship. “Nobody would chose to live without
friendship even if he had all the other good things,” he writes. “Indeed those who hold
wealth and office and power are thought to stand in special need of friends; for what is
the use of such prosperity to them if they are denied the opportunity for beneficence,
which is most commonly and most commendably directed towards friends.”45
Friendships, according to Aristotle are at once mutual and reciprocal. He distinguishes
three motivations for friendship rooted in utility, pleasure, and the pre-eminent friendship
of goodness. “This kind of friendship, then, is perfect both in point of duration and in all
other respects and in it each party receives from the other benefits that are in all respects
44 Suzanne Stern-Gillet, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Friendship (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1995), 8. This is to distinguish between the irrational basis of friendship that characterizes contemporary
political discourse. The author also offers an indepth examination of the changing understandings of
friendship within the world of the pre-moderns and pre-ancients as well noting how in one sense it is
merely institutional and structural, and on other accounts relates to the idea of hospitality of strangers.
Reflected in all of these interpretations however is the main thought of the social nature of the political
agent and the need for relationships to sustain any degree of ethical living.
45 Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by J. A. K. Thomason, revised
with notes and appendices by Hugh Tredennick, introduction and bibliography by Jonathan Barnes
(London, England: Penguin Books, 1976), 258.
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the same or similar, as ought to be the case between friends” he writes.46 Friendships, he
goes on to write, are maintained by equal individuals, eager to better understand ‘the
good’ and cultivate it accordingly. As Komter notes, “the essence of friendship consist
more in giving than in receiving affection.”47 Friendships, so conceptualized are
simultaneously internal and external goods, Nancy Sherman points out. “It provides
beneficiaries for virtuous action, as well as opportunities for action and sentiment
unavailable to the solitary or the childless,” she writes. “In particular, it extends and
redefines its boundaries, in which a way that my happiness or complete good comes to
include the happiness of others. Thus happiness or good living is ascribable to me, not as
an isolated individual, but as an extended self with attachment, or friends.”48
Friendships, on this account, reflect the mutuality of ‘the good’. Bearing this in mind,
Aristotle’s account of friendship remains at best, incomplete. He cannot account for
friendships that endure once virtue has been lost, or indeed, for relationships beginning
and enduring in the absence of virtue itself.
Investigating why individuals remain in relationships void of virtue, Sharon
Sytsma, articulates a fourth friendship category, agapic friendship. “Agapic friendship
can exist independently of friendships of pleasure, utility, and the good, but it can also be
an aspect of those friendships. It can be a precursor to such friendships or it can develop
out of them,” she writes. “Its distinctive feature is that it does not depend on any special
qualifications of the friends involved-not even the presence of virtue.”49 Further
developing the mutuality and reciprocity of Aristotle’s friendship, Sytsma reveals the
46 Aristotle, op. cit., 264.
47 Aafke E. Komter, op. cit., 157.
48 Nancy Sherman, “Aristotle on Friendship and the Shared Life” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 47, no. 4 (June 1987): 595.
49 Sharon E. Sytsma, “Agapic Friendship” Philosophy and Literature 27 (2003): 433.
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self-less and enduring nature of agape love. On her account, agapic friendship, rooted in
love better reflects the equality and reciprocity first articulated by Aristotle providing an
explanation for the longevity and endurance of unreciprocated relationships. “Once we
are aware of others as like ourselves, we are able to experience the same natural and
fundamental attitudes toward others as we have toward ourselves,” she writes.
“Understanding that others face the same needs, desires, trials, tribulations, joys, and
capacities as we do allows us to identify with them, and this identification encourages
feelings of affection for others, since naturally have affection for ourselves. Attending to
and being mindful of this sameness is how we cultivate, practice, maintain and develop
the virtue of love.”50 Her account of agape, so understood, bears striking resemblances to
that articulated by Gene Ouka, and his interpretation of agape as equal regard.
Returning once again to the ideas of Aquinas is to note the following- his account
of friendship reflects the similar ends of Aristotelian friendship. Aquinas further
develops the idea of civic friendship interweaving the ideas of philia love with the more
general ends of agape love thereby avoiding the Aristotelian challenged noted by Systma.
Civic friendship, in the writings of Aquinas, is revealed to be the primary vehicle through
which an ethic of love moves beyond the local community. “Friendship extends to a
person in two ways: first in respect of himself, and in this way friendship never extends
but to one’s friends: secondly, it extends to someone in respect of another, as, when a
man has friendship for a certain person, for his sake he loves all belonging to him, be
they children, servants, or connected with him in any ways,” Aquinas writes. “Indeed so
much do we love our friends that for their sake we love all who belong to them, even if
they hurt or hate us; so that, in this way, the friendship of charity extends even to our
50 Sharon Sytsma, “Agape Sans Dieu” Journal of Value Inquiry 36, no. 1 (2003): 92.
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enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, to whom the friendship of
charity is chiefly directed.”51 Charity, on this account, thus influences the wider practice
of politics complementing the personal love ethic accompanying his account of moral
agency and the agent. “The friendship that is based on the virtuous is directed to none
but a virtuous man the principal person, but for his sake we love those who belong to
him, even though they be not virtuous,” writes Aquinas, “in this way charity, which
above all is friendship based on the virtuous, extends to sinners, whom, out of charity, we
love for God’s sake.”52Charity is in actual fact the product of friendships which respect
the natural equality of being. It complements the naturally social and moral components
of being. It demonstrates the intimate interplay of friendship, equality and agape love
evident between agents within the community. In so doing, this account of friendships
reflects the underlying capacity to love which distinguishes it from its Aritotelian
heritage. “Agape- and this is one of its absolutely crucial features,” writes Stephen Pope,
“is unilateral, meaning in part that it is not dependent on a return of affection or regard.”53
A further examination of this tripartite relationship that charity enjoys a particular
relationship with the virtue of justice facilitating an alternative to proportional justice;
namely, commutative justice further reflecting and entrenching the relational ontology
sustaining the agent and community alike. While agape love provides the original source
of obligation within the agent, it is the order of charity which provides an institutional
rendering of this love taking into account the unity of coordinated agency in light of
structural injustice.
51 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., IIaIIae 23.1.
52 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., IIaIIae 23.1.
53 Stephen J. Pope, “‘Equal Regard’ versus ‘Special Relations’? Reaffirming the Inclusiveness of Agape”
The Journal of Religion 77, no. 3 (July 1997): 355.
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Jacques Maritain elaborates on Aquinas’s order of charity providing a
contemporary account of the common good incorporating love, justice, and above all
else, civic friendship. The common good sustains the development and well-being of its
agents reflecting the teleology of being oriented always towards ‘the good’. It builds on
the natural sociability of the agent reflecting the need for relationships not only to
understand the self, but also to understand the nature of morality and the life with which
it is associated. “This common good is at once material, intellectual and moral, and
principally moral, as man himself is; it is a common good of human persons,” writes
Maritain, “Therefore, it is not only something useful, an ensemble of advantages and
profits, it is essentially something good in itself, -what the Ancients termed bonum
honestum. Justice and civic friendship are its cement.”54 This account of the community
furthers the ideals of equality and in so doing, recognizes the intrinsic important of each
and ever member of the community as ontologically the same simultaneously constituted
by a variety of uniquities that make them who they are. “This conception recognizes
justice and civic friendship as the essential foundations of that community of human
persons which is political society, Maritain furthermore notes. “And, as a result, it holds
also to the fundamental role of equality, not only the equality of nature, which is at the
root, but the equality to be won as an offspring of justice as a fruit of the common good
flowing back over all.”55 The common good, on this account complements the ends of
the natural law community. Proving a contemporary interpretation of charity Maritain
broadens the normative framework of care, extending the original idea of moral action of
54 Jacques Maritain, “The Ends of Machiavellianism” The Review of Politics 4, no. 1(January 1942): 10.
55 Jacques Maritain, “The Rights of Man and Natural Law” op. cit., 24.
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Schwarzenbach into a natural law discourse of love synthesizing philia and agape
offering an objective account of the common good reflecting the mutuality of being.
Recalling the plurality that marked the natural law community articulated by
Maritain in Chapter Four, this notion of the common good, resting on friendship, itself
relating back to the charity and love, sustains an all-encompassing and open atmosphere
in which agents can develop. “The pluralist city multiplies liberties, whose measure is
not uniform, which vary according to a principle of proportionality,” writes Maritain.
“Again, this solution gathers the whole unification of the temporal community into one
essential and natural point: a simple unity of friendship.”56 Friendship rooted in love
respects the distinct characteristics of the agent, and justice furthers the development of
both the agent and the community. “For justice and law, by ruling man as a moral agent
and appealing to reason and free will, deal as such with personality, and transform it to a
relation between two wholes – the individual and the social – what would otherwise have
been a mere subordination of the part to the wholes,” he writes. “And love, by assuming
voluntarily that which would have been compulsion, transfigures it into freedom and into
free gift. While the structure of society depends primarily on justice, the vital dynamism
and the internal creative force of society depend on civic friendship.”57 Ultimately, an
account of friendship in the tradition of natural law recalls the relationship of justice and
charity. For it is charity which provides the necessary outward orientation sustaining a
moral community fostering an agent-centered approach to ethics which is simultaneously
interested in the self and the other. In other words, charity is intimately wound up in the
concept of a relational ontology sustaining both the agent in the community. Yet,
56 Jacques Maritain, “True Humanism” op. cit, 167.
57 Jacques Maritain, “The Rights of Man and Natural Law” op. cit., 22.
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contemporary ethical discourses fail to account for any vestige of charity in its
discourses.
An examination of charity in wider ethical theories reveals four different
understandings of justice and charity’s relationship. As Alan Buchanan demonstrates
first, justice reflects negative duties, and charity positive duties; second; duties of justice
can be enforced whereas duties of charity cannot; third, duties of justice are perfect duties
whereas charity duties are imperfect; and finally, justice reflects matters of rights and
charity does not. Buchanan goes on to note that the absence of charity debates in
contemporary ethical discourses is not a problem and that overall reflections of charity
offer little to ethical principles guiding the actions of the agent. Buchanan’s conclusions
reflect his original assumption; namely, that charity can be a form of justice. In light of
this, the problems of enforcements and entrenchment he raises with regards to charity
remain deeply problematic which can offer one explanation for the dominance of
proportional representations and pragmatic accounts of morality in contemporary
political societies. Yet to put forth an account of charitable justice is to misconstrue the
relationship that these two virtues share.58 Charity is not an imperfect obligation or duty.
Rather, charity informs justice and its influence is evident in the emphasis this account of
justice places on relationships. When charity is examined in light of this relationship it
reveals its virtuous nature. It resonates in the loving capacities of the agent, and the well-
ordered community. In this way charity is not a proscribed behavior, but rather, is
derived from the original ability to love noted in the capacity and capabilities of the
agent. The virtue of charity asks agents not to love the specific characteristics which
comprise one agent, but rather complements the account of natural law agency which
58 Buchanan, op. cit.
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places primary emphasis on the individual within pre-existing social structures and
institutions. One loves, on this account, not for specific ends or purposes, but rather,
loves because that is what moral agents do. In this way, there is no need to specify the
obligations of charity, they are natural; consequently the previous challenge of
proscription and enforcement are rendered unproblematic. Instead, one loves because of
the natural relationships he or she enjoys with the ends of natural law morality and all
hose who seek its ends.
This account of charity emphasizes the possibility of a united human purpose. It
reveals a particular conduct, itself related to the prudent individual, reflecting the equality
of moral relationships and justice in the community. “In charity, others are loved with
the ‘love of friendship (umor umicitiue) either in themselves, as friends are normally
love, or, lacking this, simply out of the love of God, because as rational beings they are
capable of eternal fellowship with God,” writes Pope.59 Friendship, based on charity is
intrinsically related to the ontological equality of all agents as beings in common
representing the particular capacity to know the good and actively seek its development.
Unifying this account of the common good is the equality of being. Friendship, on this
account necessitates equality. “When there is a natural equality among men, they are fit
for friendship’” writes Betz. “When the are naturally unequal, but through convention or
artifice devise mechanisms by which each considers all others his equals, then they
mutually participate in justice, and justice is the very form of the bond which holds them
together.”60 Contemporary notions of justice which flow throughout a variety of
59 Stephen J. Pope, “Aquinas on Almsgiving, Justice and Charity: An Interpretation and Reassessment” The
Heythrop Journal 32 (1991): 168.
60 Joseph Betz, “The Relation Between Love and Justice: A Survey of the Five Possible Positions” The
Journal of Value Inquiry 4, no. 3 (September 1970): 191.
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international relations discourse emphasize social justice, in other words, distributive
justice. This point was elaborated on in some detail in Chapter Four. It recalls not the
equality of being associated with the natural law agent, but rather, the ideas of equity. In
the writings of Aquinas, equity is refereed to as epikeia which bears a striking
resemblance to the ends of pragmatic morality which offers the image of the possessive
individual and an associated account of rational politics. Justice, on this interpretation,
recalls the relationship that the modern state and capitalism share furthering the isolated
existence of the individual.
The confused relationship of charity, love, and justice is well captured by Paul
Tillich. In his opinion, contemporary manifestations of love and justice reflects a
misunderstanding at the ontological level of analysis which results in a proportional
representation of justice which fails to articulate the necessary moral ends of the political
community. Critical of contemporary justice, he notes how distributive justice upholds
the pragmatism of contemporary political affairs. Presenting an holistic account of love
and justice, he goes on to note that love is “the moving power of life” and that “life is
being in actuality”.61 The uniqueness of this particular account is not the division, but
rather, the incorporation of a variety of different accounts of loving traditions. “Tillich
denies the differentiation of the four kinds of love from which we started, and, indeed,
this is the reason why the love related to justice is not philia, friendship,” writes Betz.
“Philia, agape, epithymia, and eros are qualities of love present in every act of love; they
are not kinds of love in their own right. Each contributes to the reunification of different
aspects of the separated, but, just as the resulting unit will be one, so is the four-fold force
61 Paul Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice: Ontological Analyses and Ethical Applications (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1954), 25.
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which effects this union.”62 Love points the agent in the direction of justice
consequently, loving also further develops the practical reasoning of the agent. “Love, in
this respect, has the same relation to justice which revelation has to reason. And this is
not an accidental analogy. It is rooted in the nature of both revelation and love. Both of
them transcend the rational norm without destroying it,” writes Tillich. “And as
revelation does not give additional information in the realm where cognitive reason
decides, so love does not drive to additional acts in the realm where practical reason
decides. Both give another dimension to reason, revelation to cognitive reason, love to
practical reason.”63 On this account, a loving disposition informs the moral taxonomy
guiding the reasoning of the agent on one level, and on another, informs the structures of
the political community through the actions of the agent. Bearing this in mind, creative
justice resembles the natural law account of justice reflecting the influence of charity.
The shared ontology sustaining Tillich’s account of creative justice is likewise the self-
same ontology sustaining the relational ontology of the agent and the community. It is a
commutative form of justice which complements the abilities of the agent revealing an
altogether alternative conception of political engagements highlighting the potential of
agency in common.
When understood as complementary components of justice, agape love and philia
love unite and provide an account of justice which is simultaneously interpersonal and
transnational. It complements the agent centered account of morality demonstrating the
possibility of change all the while working within the pre-existing structures and
practices engendering social change in line with the ends of an ethic of love. This unity
62 Joseph Betz, op. cit., 199.
63 Paul Tillich, op. cit., 83.
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of purpose arising from the naturally social and moral nature of the agent shares
similarities to the neo-roman account of liberty articulated by Quentin Skinner which was
examined in the opening chapter of this work.64 These similarities bear comment because
associated with the neo-roman account of liberty is the idea of human solidarity.65 As
Huake Brunkhorst has demonstrated in his historical description of solidarity, it is a
concept which has developed throughout history recalling the political relationships
which constitute and uphold society. In its republican interpretation it provides the
necessary means for the citizen to achieve his or her freedom. “Solidarity is not the other
of justice,” he writes. “Rather, it is nothing but the democratic realization of individual
freedom. If the classic republican formula of the common good refers to an objectively
recognizable collective good, ‘solidarity’ has from the start an individualistic quality”.66
It is this individualism associated with the ends of modernity and its associated
enlightenment philosophy which this work seeks to challenge. In a similar fashion to one
another, both solidarity and charity sustain a particular relationship with justice.
Regardless of which interpretation of modernity one chooses to endorse, be it a
republican approach or a liberal/capitalist depiction, solidarity and liberty ultimately
sustain an inward and individual account of political relationships. Consequently, the
relationship of charity mediates civic friendship and in so doing offers an account of
commutative justice which is outward oriented and sustains the capacities and
capabilities of the agent in a moral community.
64 Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
65 See the works of Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri Empjre (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).
The relationship of liberty and solidarity is emphasized in relation to enlightenment philosophers. They go
on to show, like Skinner that this republican influence of modernity exists, albeit an account which has lost
out to the influence of the social contract and their associated philosophers.
66 Hauke Brunkhorst, Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community translated by Jeffrey
Flynn (Cambridge: the MIT Press, 2005), 3.
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The order of charity, like the ethic of love, demonstrates the point made by Jean
Porter; namely, that natural law, beyond a reasonable ordering principle guiding agents,
is also capable of articulating an order within the community.67 This is achieved through
the development and implementation of commutative justice. Justice, on this
interpretation complements the original assumption sustaining the moral agent as one
predisposed to engage in politics. The fact then that commutative justice is both an
interpersonal and transnational account of justice complements the idea of an ethic of
love as it reflects both the agapistic and philia-like nature of love. Justice and morality
are both, on this interpretation selfish and selfless recognizing the mutuality of human
development as evident in the relational ontology which emphasizes the role of
relationships in the wider practice of politics. Justice originates in the ability to love and
extends outwards through the wider institutions and practices of the community. These
practices reflect the close community of the individual, as evidence by familial relations
and the wider institutions which sustain the community as described within a variety of
accounts of civil society. Yet in the same way, these just relations are also conceptually
available to agents working within those international and transnational institutions and
corporations that sustain the discourses of a global civil society. Yet, as the cosmopolitan
discussions of harm revealed, as well as the discussion of care ethics highlight, it is the
embedded practices of international institutions which contribute on a daily basis to the
perpetual problem of human harm.
A natural law appraisal of the ends of human rights and humanitarian practices, to
be undertaken in the epilogue, highlights the fact that politics is a natural activity for a
social and moral agent. Moreover, it recognizes that working within the relationships
67 Jean Porter, The Recovery of Virtue (Louisville, Kentucky: John Knox/Westminster Press, 1996).
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sustaining the community there exists a space whereby individuals, as agents of justice,
can demonstrate alternative modes of being political articulating the possibility of a
unified human purpose as articulated the discourses of love. Relationships not only
allow the individual to define her natural potential, they provide the agent the means to
endeavor to help others achieve that self-same goal of integral human fulfillment. To that
end relationships outline the obligations and responsibilities of the agent both in their
general and particular form. Furthermore, when placed alongside the goals of mutual
well-being and integral human fulfillment, it is to explicitly state that one is obliged to
help others achieve this self same goal and this obligation is rooted in the sameness of
self; a sameness of self promoting love and fostering a moral community. It is to make
the point, noted by F. Earle Fox, that “obligation is the relationship itself.”68 Justice, on
this account, is dependent on the depiction of the agent and the relationships the agent
develops rooted in an understanding of morality. In light of this understanding, the
virtuous agent increases in importance. As the singular being capable of loving and
being loved in return, the relationships of the natural law agent set a course of action
which, as Stephen J. Pope points out, “retains and perfects rather than eliminates or
degrades our humanity.”69 This metaphysical account of love explains the motivation to
act in a more personal manner aware of the obligations to those individuals, distant and
local bearing the burden of suffering. Moreover, it is indicative of an alternative
conception of being political premised on the objectivity of natural dominion, articulating
a more personal form of individuals relating to one another as beings in common.
68 F. Earl Fox, “Defining ‘Oughtness’ and ‘Love’” The Journal of Religion 39, no. 3 (July 1959): 174.
69 Stephen J. Pope, “Expressive Individualism and True Self-Love” op. cit., 397.
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As a social and moral being the natural law agent is predisposed to engage in
politics. The political endeavors of the agent reflect the idea that politics is that
metaphysical space whereby individuals produce and reproduce social structures and
practices which co-ordinate their lives in common. Yet the structures of contemporary
international affairs have unwittingly limited this natural tendency towards unity
hindering the possibility of forging human relations. Suffering, so the argument goes, is
directly related to this isolation which denies the possibility of understanding individuals
as persons in relations. Agape and philia represents a particular understanding of love
sustaining an objective account of political action. It is a unifying account of politics
seeking to bring agents together in order to achieve a higher understanding of being in
common. An objective account of political engagement relies on relationships to achieve
its ends. ‘The international’ revolves around shared interests motivating human action.
On this account the desire for the ends of integral human fulfillment motivates agents to
work in communion with one another in order to understand the morality of natural law.
In light of the traditional accounts of justice which reflect the boundaries of ‘inside’ and
‘outside’ limiting the possibility of moral behavior to the domestic affairs of the state, the
value of charity, as an institutional order reveals itself. Charity extends the obligations of
relationships and an ethic of love beyond the local proximity of the agent into the wider
interests which constitute the community. Moreover, it further distinguishes this
interpretation of natural law morality from that of the new natural lawyers. The emphasis
placed on charity and agency lead initiatives facilitated through the interweaving of
natural law and casuistry go a long to challenging the rationality of the requirements of
practical reasoning emphasizing the moral development which occurs when agents
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participate in non-instrumental relationships. The relationship of charity and justice, in
light of this fact, is intrinsically important. It provides the primary means of articulating
an alternative account of justice reflecting the relational ontology of the agent and the
community. The relationship of charity and justice challenges the isolated ends of
politics highlighting the potential of persons in relations achieving the ends of natural law
morality situated in an unbounded account of the moral community predisposed to the
practice of politics.
Part III: ‘The Personal’ as Political
A personal account of agency begins with relations. John MacMurray is one
individual attempting to account for a mutual understanding of self, other, and the
community premised on relations.70 For MacMurray, the idea of ‘the personal’ is
expressed in the mutuality of being. Substituting the “I” and the egocentricity which
guides contemporary societies, MacMurray argues that one can fashion genuine
communities through an understanding of mutual being; namely, the idea that one cannot
understand him or herself without another being with whom one can interact. To that
end, he describes a personal account of community focused on the “I and You”. With
this in mind, he seeks to read into the disciplines of philosophy, theology and politics, the
idea that one can only know one’s self, the community, and the place of individuals in the
world through the negation of the self; that for every positive relationship, a personal
relationship, there exists a negation justifying the positive relations of being. Bearing this
in mind, he goes on to argue that religion is the mode of human interaction upon which
70 John MacMurray, The form of the personal, Vol. 1. The self as agent; being the Gifford Lectures
delivered in the University of Glasgow in 1953 (London: Faber and Faber Limited: London: 1953) & John
MacMurray, “ Persons in relation” op. cit.
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we can, and ought to ground, our understanding of community. This account reveals an
appropriate idea of morality and justice articulating the unity of theory and practice
improving the human experience.
Moving beyond the ideas of MacMurray, ‘the personal’ is one particular account
of being political. It conceptualizes the nature of interactions within ‘the international’
sustaining an objective account of being political. An objective account of being political
rests on the unity of political action. Contemporary politics from Modernity onwards
isolates the individual as a rights-bearing subject situated in bounded political societies.
Society, so the argument goes, elicits loyalty through subservience and conformity. The
objectivity of the agent’s function however, belies conformity premised on a relational
ontology. Developed within moral communities these relationships note the shared
interests uniting individuals in a political project larger then themselves; namely, the
attainment of mutual well-being. The unity of being sustaining a shared desire and sense
of purpose prompts human action evinced in the politics of the personal. This account of
political action is proactive, goal-oriented and human centric. Aware of the grosser
forms of human suffering throughout the world an objective account of political
engagement challenges the subjectivity of contemporary international affairs. It
questions the aims and ends of contemporary order and its ability to facilitate the
developmental potential of individuals in light of its isolated and atomic nature.
This account of ‘the personal’ represents a means of understanding relationships
of distance sustaining a genuine community within ‘the international’. While this is not
an argument for international community, it demonstrates that within the metaphysical
space of the international, a personal accounting of politics can, when associated with the
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idea of the natural law agent, fosters networks representing the web-like relations that
constitute the individual. Moreover, working within the institutional patterns of human
interaction, these networks facilitate agency outside traditional sites of power and
authority. The personal, on this account is at once both local and distant. It is local in
that it is initiated by the agent within the local space in which he or she inhabits
extending outwards through an acute understanding of the wide variety of relationships
and interests reflected in an agent’s institutional participation. It is an experience of
knowledge that exists beyond the traditional boundaries of the state represented in loving
mutual self-revelation. “For the knowledge of one another, and so of ourselves, can be
realized only through a mutual self revelation; and this is possible only when we love one
another,” writes MacMurray. “Moreover, since our knowledge of one another conditions
our activities, both practical and reflective, we find here the ultimate condition of all our
knowing and of all our action.”71 The objective interpretation of ‘the personal’, similar to
the idea of the natural law agent and community, is at once both reasonable and rational.
It exudes a holistic account of human knowledge sustaining dynamic and creative agency
in the face of new and evolving political problems. Motivated by love and not the fear of
another, this knowledge, in stark contrast to the knowledge types of international affairs
unites individuals in common endeavors reflecting the relativity of casuistry.72
Consequently the unity of purpose reflecting both particular and general agency reveals
71 John MacMurray, “Persons in relation: op. cit., 212.
72 See Anthony F. Lang, Jr., “The Problem of Rules”, for Contemporary Politics, forthcoming. His argues,
in this article that the rules of international relations, as one way of understanding and guiding interaction,
are shaped relies on the relationship of knowledge and security, and the idea that we can derive a sense of
security in the knowledgeable intentions of the actors that constitute its structure. This is contrary to the
point that genuine intentions of actions can never be known in and of themselves, and that at best, future
action is a hypothesis,. One would do well to know the intentions of the agents and what motivates them as
a means to engender a trusting environment so as to achieve a heightened sense of security. To that end, it
is also to note that knowledge in this sense is motivated by fear, which has we have already stated leads to
falsified knowledge and not true knowledge of the self as a purposive agent of international affairs.
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itself; mutual development of the self and other oriented around the ends of ‘the good’.
‘The personal’ is guided by a practical knowledge reflecting the loving reason of the
agent and the values, norms, and ideals reflected in her actions and desired ends.73
Loving requires a commitment to living life in a particular manner exuding loving
care in both personal and social relationships. Moreover, it reflects the internal ordering
of the agent. As Gene Outka writes,
In order to judge that an agent is loving we need more than one notable
performance, and more than a limited class of actions which he habitually
performs or refrains from performing. There ought to be a variety of
exemplifications which reflect a long-range policy. The policy persists
through time and integrates a cluster of specific objectives. Love ought to be
genuinely inward, so that the more one comes to know the agent, the less one
senses a discrepancy between manifest operations and deeper aims.74
A commitment to love others and to live according to a loving disposition affirms the
general approach to human interaction. It ensures that as one becomes increasingly
embroiled in the personal aspects of loving others they can maintain the stable, loyal and
steadfast underpinnings of a love ethic. This is to recall a similar point made in the
second chapter of this work; namely, to live within an ethical tradition is to embrace it
whole-heartedly and incorporate it into every action and deliberation of the agent.75 The
commitment to an ethical tradition, and the values and norms which it upholds, sustains
relationships. Providing both individuals, the “I and the You’ with the capacity to
73 There is also an argument to be made, but in another time and place, that this type of personal knowledge
is a combination of the practical and theoretical knowledge, a distinction with flows throughout the
philosophical traditions dating back to the times of Aristotle, evident in the works of Cicero and throughout
the ages. It is a distinction which has shapes the deliberative process and the organization of human
societies and which has had a distinct bearing on our understanding of morality, justice, and ethics. One
would do well to recall the ideas of teleology, deontology, and the pursuit of ends as an endeavor in and of
itself versus the consequentlialist mode of deliberation with which agents are now currently captured by, a
point noted in the conclusions of Chapter Two.
74 Gene Outka, “Agape” op. cit., 132.
75 Germain Grisez, “The Way of the Lord Jesus” op. cit., 128.
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develop it reflects the mutuality of well-being and development.76 In light of a loving
commitment, mutual self-revelation fosters the necessary knowledge paving the way for
trust. It is only with the onset of trust that a normative agenda reflecting human well-
being and development can begin to challenge the traditional structures of international
affairs offering an alternative to violence, insecurity and anarchy.
‘The personal’ sustains the emotive and impassioned responses to the suffering of
others. It carves out a niche for the role of emotional responses of agents reflecting the
metaphysical bond both beings share. On this account, suffering remains firmly
embedded in the human experience intrinsically caught up in the relationships of action,
knowledge and agency itself. “Suffering,” Cynthia Helpern notes, “is the passive voice
of acting, as it were. It is the hidden opposite of agency. We suffer what we cannot act,
or because we cannot act. Suffering means not being able to act.”77 Building on the
definitions of suffering offered in the Introduction, the objective account of being
political, focuses on the development of human potential. It articulates how all
individuals, as beings in common suffer when one cannot further develop.
The mutuality of being, limits the development of the moral agent to the lowest
common denominator. Bearing this in mind, ‘the good’ calls on the empowered to act on
behalf of those who cannot. On this account genuine knowledge of the self, and the self
in relation to others, takes on an impressively important role. Not only does it provide
the means to recognize one’s purpose and announce intention, it reflects the relative
approach catering to the particular well-being of those who suffer. Moreover, it is
76 It is this commitment to morality and love which reflects the ideas of faith articulated by Weber
discussed in the conclusion to Chapter Two. For those individuals who seek a non-theistic and non-
ontological foundation of natural law morality it rests in the product of this particular commitment which is
a moral community.
77 Cynthia Helpern, op. cit., 10.
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indicative of the web-like community existing beyond the natural boundaries of human
engagement. The community, on this account, empowers international agents of justice
to engage with those who traditional fall into the category of ‘other’. The value of a
relational ontology recognizes that the primordial duty to the self is reflected in our
interactions with others; namely, our relations. The normative justification to help those
who suffer rests on the natural equality of being reflected in the relational ontology
sustaining each and every agent. On this account, the community sustained by ‘the
personal’ is neither exclusive nor inclusive. Aware of both the particular and general
needs of others it provides individuals with the capacity to not only will happiness, but
act on the love of another to achieve a higher level of being. On this account, ‘the
personal’ supports loving action challenging the grosser forms of human suffering
throughout the world. It is the representation of an institutionalized version of charity, in
other words, being in common.78
A personal politics ultimately relates to practical reasonableness. It is not
concerned with the science of politics, or the techniques of political engagement. It
offers an alternative to an international common good, which as it is understood in
contemporary discourses, focuses on the individual ego and not the individual in relation
to others. As John Finnis points out, the common good “is a set of conditions which
enables the members of the community to attain for themselves reasonable objective, or
to realize reasonably for themselves the value(s), for the sake of which they have reason,
78 Taking the argument one step further is to note that it is charity which can ultimately challenge the
relationship shared by capitalism and modern liberal democracies which as Brunkhorst points out has
severed the relationships necessary for solidarity. If one applies this argument to the morality of natural
law it becomes increasingly evident that the discourses of love and charity endorsing a particular account of
agency represent the creation of a political space whereby a discourse of moral development can emerge.
In so doing one of the by-products of this discourse will be the re-emergence of the original ideas of those
charged with the declaration of human rights noting in the first instance that a global account of well-being
and development rests in the practical actions and reasons of agents.
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to collaborate with each other (positively or negatively) in a community.”79 It highlights
the centrality of the individual and fails to appreciate the commonness and community
which it ought to support. This is not a community focused on shared ends fostering
social harmony and co-operation, as was highlighted in Chapter Two and again in
Chapter Four. The common good, on this account, upholds the boundaries of ‘public and
private’, of ‘state and individual’, and finally of ‘inside and outside’ denying pride of
place for the obligations of morality. At odds with the common good grounded in the
order of charity, on this interpretation, the common good fails to understand the purpose
and intentions of individuals as international agents of justice. It does not create the
necessary space supporting moral agency. Rather, it perpetuates isolation and self-
sufficiency challenging the development of moral communities.
Aware of the ends of justice, derived from the morality of natural law, a personal
account of politics remains rooted in the ends of human action. On this account, the
politics of the personal is an art and requires the flexibility to adapt to newly emerging
needs and requirements. It does not follow a series of commands linked together forming
one over-arching universal plan of action. Like the casuistic agent, a personal politics is
mutable and reactive aware of the fallible nature of human reasoning, but oriented
towards the good. Couched in the morality of natural law, related to the casuistry of ‘the
good’, ‘the personal’ understands the obligation to act and the responsibility to help those
in need. Reflecting the ends of ‘the personal’, the community, on this account endeavors
to respect and perfect the uniqueness of each individual, all the while respecting the
natural equality of each and every agent.
79 John Finnis, “Natural law and Natural Rights” (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 155 & 156.
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This alternative conception of being political illustrates an important relationship
between freedom, morality and action sustaining any account of moral agency. Morality
asks that agents act in a well-intentioned manner committed always to the good. This
commitment is a reflection of a disposition open to the ends of love. To love is to act. It
recognizes the goodness of others and seeks to participate in that good; however, to love
is also to reason practically. The reasonableness of the individual is integrally important
in this account of ‘the personal’. It counters the subjectivity of international affairs
distinguishing individuals via their rational capacities revealing a sense of purpose.
Reason, in this sense, as MacMurray points out, “become, then, the capacity to act, and
only in a secondary and derivative sense the capacity to think, that is to say, to pursue a
merely theoretical intention.”80 A loving disposition premises action over theory
illustrating the primacy of agents in order to achieve political and social change. On this
account, ‘the personal’ distinguishing itself from the discourse oriented ends of critical
theorists. Individuals, in this sense, display a purposefulness beyond the self and in so
doing proffer a justifiable understanding of the nature of morality and how best to act
upon it. The capacity to reason, beyond giving a sense of purpose provides individuals
recalls always that to reason is to love and to love is to act.
The responsibilities of love require listening to the needs of others, giving one’s
self to others, and finally forgiving those who would through compulsion, act in
contradiction to the stated needs of love.81 Participatory relationships, rooted in human
action, sustain what John Dryzek has called ‘social learning’, the idea that outside the
realms of traditional authority agents can exert influence over formal decision making
80 John MacMurray, “Persons in relation” op. cit., 26.
81 Paul Tillich, op. cit., 84-86.
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processes and in so doing affect change.82 On this account, a personal politics is well
suited for the plurality of responses when seeking to help others acquire a higher level of
being. For recall, relationships are the obligations of love revealing the needs of others.
Bearing this in mind the mutuality of being requires both parties to the ‘I and You’
relationship to participate equally to achieve the ends of morality. Jean Bethke Elshtain
elaborates on this idea assimilating equal regard and the just use of force.83 When an
agent is a victim of injustice, in the first instance, the responsibility lays with that agent to
publicize the injustice in question. Upon hearing the cry for help agents of justice are
required to listen and then deliberate on the best course of action, which in some cases, it
is acknowledge, is best to do nothing; granted, at other times action is required and to do
nothing in such situations is a double injustice. While she notes that individuals react out
of pity, or at best empathy, personal agency as described herein is motivated in the first
instance out of love, which is enduring, selfless and steadfast. Action, on this account,
requires knowledge of the “I” and “YOU” and their particular situation sustaining the
right intentions of the empowered agent.84
The ability to reasons distinguishes the nature of the agent, ‘the international’ and
‘the personal’ sustaining an objective account of being political; however, the ability
reason, absent of a moral taxonomy, is of little value to the agent and the community.
The suitability of practical reasonableness relies on the equality of loving relationships.
The freedom and autonomy stemming from this account of political engagement builds
82 John Dryzek, op. cit., 27 & 28.
83 Jean Bethke Elshtain, “International Justice as Equal Regard and the Use of Force” op. cit., 63 & 64.
84 For a detailed examination of the problems of humanitarian response and humanitarian intervention see
the arguments of Fiona Robinson previously elaborated on in the previous sections of this chapter. She
provides and interesting contrast to the works of Nicholas Wheeler who accounts for humanitarian action in
his work Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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on human experience providing a wide variety of means to tackle moral problems.
Agapistic responses Outka writes, “encompasses far more than formulated rules placing
and governing definite classes of action, even if one agrees that in certain instances it is
positively expressed by them.”85 Agents, on this account, determine, through past
experience and a working knowledge of morality the most suitable course of action, at
that particular moment in time. The emphasis, on this account, is on human intentions
shaped by the natural desires of the agent. On this account, ‘the personal, like the natural
law agent and community, is a casuistic mode of political engagement. It moves beyond
the methodological rules of legalism and expresses a real need to understand the diversity
of each and every situation in which individuals suffer and to treat each situation
accordingly.86 A personal account of agency highlights, in the same vein as Fiona
Robinson that contextuality must always play a key role in deciding an appropriate
course of action.87 It focuses on the role of the agent and his or her capacity to reason
through a particular problem and when properly informed of the situation at hand and
provided with the means to reason accordingly, shapes the action to be undertaken.88
In and of itself casuistry is a mode of ethical living. A casuistic natural law
framework is well equipped to foster an ethic of love within ‘the international’. Casuistry
sustains a personal account of agency geared towards international agents of justice
85 Gene Outka, “Agape” op. cit., 123.
86 Evidence of this approach is offered by of the failure of humanitarian intervention in the final ten years
of the twentieth century. The combinatory effect of the norms of sovereignty, negative liberty, and state
autonomy have created some of the worst human disasters as they have failed to acknowledge human
suffering, or worse, when action has become inevitable, powerful states adhere to standard operating
procedures assumed to be universally applicable which ultimately extend the longevity of the conflict and
the human suffering therein.
87 Fiona Robinson, op. cit., 154.
88 Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, op. cit., contend that this approach exists in everyday life but due
to the epistemological tradition that dominates mainstream scholarly discourse, it is rarely overtly
recognized, a point articulated at length in Chapter Two. One begins to see traces of it in the Just War
Tradition, a point noted by Nicholas J. Rengger in “on the just war tradition in the twenty-first century” op.
cit., 353-363. A point also made in Chapter Two.
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aware of the capacities and capabilities of all individuals, based on a shared ontology to
reason practically. Moreover, the further institutionalization of a relational ontology
reveals how individual limitations can be overcome. Acting within the institutions of
international affairs individual virtue facilitates the entry of reasonableness in otherwise
public agency. Realizing the value of morality as a social ordering principle, its influence
is reflected in the just structures wherein the individual acts, incorporating his or her
particular knowledge within the wider institutional capabilities of coordinated political
action. “Equality of welfare may include apageistic treatments common to everyone,”
writes Ouktka; however, “equality of freedom may lead to unequal treatment.”89 This
developmental approach to ethical living releases the subjective individual from its
isolation paving the way for an alternative interpretation of ‘being political’. Reflecting
the diverse needs of the suffering individual, institutions, on this account are dynamic and
flexible. On this account, a personal politics sustains the plurality of being first elicited
within a natural law account of morality. The teleology of being, supported by the
means and ends of the deliberation process respect the contextuality and social awareness
reflected in the institutions facilitating co-ordinated human action heeding the call for an
international and intranational conception of justice. The institutionalization of charity
within institutional design furthers the opportunities of international and intranational
justice reflecting a disposition open to giving and receiving love. Attuned to the well-
being and development challenging the particular problem of human suffering this accout
respects the equality and diversity of each agent.90
89 Gene Outka, “Agape” op. cit., 123.
90 An analysis of the Rwandan Genocide employing a casuistic methodology is offered in the Epilogue
which follows. It incorporates the personal love of agape and the wider love of charity in order to generate
previously omitted interpretations of the event.
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This casuistic framework sustaining a personal account of agency is integrally
related to the teleology of being. It points to an interpretative account of ‘the good’;
namely human happiness loosely defined as integral human fulfillment and human well-
being. It understands however that the manner in which the agent and community
understand these ends is, in all likelihood, different. On this account, it provides the
freedom of agents as individuals in common to pursue their own particular interpretation
of the good. It is for this reason that a natural law framework is of utmost importance for
this particular task. It distinguishes between first order absolutes and second order
normative claims stating above all else that in pursuing this good, one seeks above all
else to do good and avoid evil.91 The order of charity bears witness to this participatory
morality respecting the equality of being and the ends of ‘the good’ at an individual and
institutional level. On this account, plurality and diversity remain key components of an
objective account of being political.92
The mutuality of being ensures an innate sociability shaping the political
responsibilities of the agent. It is, in the opinion of John MacMurray that this particular
sense of self further elicits a shared purposiveness within the community. He argues that
through human fellowship, or unity, we give meaning to human effort. Described as
social and therefore interactive, the sympathy and empathy of the agent reflected in the
emotional responses of the agent are very real. Related to the suffering of individuals
throughout the world, the purposive nature of the agent induces action sharing, at a
91 Germain Grisez, “The Way of the Lord Jesus” op. cit., 178.
92 At this point the clarity of the problem with human rights as a means to achieve the good should be self-
evident having been examined in some depth in Chapters One and Three. Lacking a teleological drive, it
conceptualizes human well-being in the philosophical ideal of dignity, itself lacking ontological origins
premised on a constructed account of human nature. The stativity of this approach is part and parcel of a
constitutional world order, itself the result of a subjective account of political engagement endorsing a rule
based methodology and its associated legalism of the contemporary era.
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metaphysical level, the pain and deprivation associated with human suffering. A
relational ontology describes not only the shared happiness of individuals in common it
also elicits a shared understanding of suffering. Traditional modes of agency, delineating
spheres of acceptable and unacceptable agency, unwittingly marginalize the emotive
responses to shared suffering, both theoretical and actual. The value of the natural law
account of agency reinstates the shared benefits and consequences of mutual being. It
reflects the inability of all beings to achieve a greater awareness of morality, when one or
more individuals fail to thrive. The lack of attention and viable alternatives with which to
challenge human suffering represents a double moral failure. It prevents individual
development denying a greater sense of purpose within the human community. Taken in
their entirety, examples of human suffering demonstrate the current injustice of political
structures and institutions culminating in a common global failure to help those in need.
The ultimate conclusion of ‘the personal’ is the community. Sustained by the
relationships of equality originating in the ontology of being, the community provides the
means to understand not only one’s purpose, but also one’s obligations and
responsibilities. The sum total of all of these ideas provides agents with not only a means
to understanding the world in which they are a part, but also the manner in which
knowledge is applied to create and navigate their actions. This account of being political
identifies the role of the agent within the political world simultaneously articulating how
interactions with other similarly constituted agents ought to occur. Community, on this
account is neither domestic nor international. It highlights the possibilities that can come
to fruition through the development and cultivation of the first principles of life,
originating in the metaphysics of being.
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‘The personal’ as a mode of agency, sustains human fellowship reflecting being,
in common. It distinguishes a society from a community placing a high degree of
importance on the teleology of ends sustaining the fellowship of moral agents. This is to
return to the real idea of a natural law community which, as Grisez and Shaw remind us,
“is based instead on a shared commitment in which each individual shoulders his or her
special share of the responsibility for realizing the values which originally drew separate
persons into the relationships called community.”93 The institutionalization of charitable
relations remains, in light of this account, intrinsically important in the formation and
sustenance of genuine community.94 “The structure of a community,” MacMurray
reminds us, “is the nexus or network of the active relations of friendship between all
possible pairs of its members.”95 Vis a vis ‘the international’ it is this idea of nexus or
network which will become increasingly important for agents of justice reflecting their
ability to influence political structures and practices therein. The recognition of a
multitude of pairings represents the vast number of channels in which the agents can
operate, both as individuals and in common proliferating prudential calculations of loving
morality in a wider institutional setting.
Agency, on this account, is a call to action, beyond the discourses and language
shaping critical accounts of international affairs. Actions sustain and develop channels of
information beyond traditional sites of authority. The resulting image is a multitude of
93 Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, “Beyond the New Morality” op. cit., 56.
94 This is a point made by Gene Outka, “Agape” op. cit., 42-44 when he contrasts Agape love with the
works of Reihnhold Neibuhr who emphasizes the negative aspects of communal living over the positive
consequences of like Outka does.
95 John MacMurray, “Persons in relation” op. cit., 158. It is to note that societies that relate merely through
purpose or function are incapable of developing genuine human fellowship sustaining the mutual goals
orienting the ends of the community and the organization of its laws. This is to find fault not only with the
idea of purposeful associations, but also practical associations, the former criticized and the latter
advocated as a resourceful alternative to understanding authority within international relations by Terry
Nardin in “Law, Morality and the Relations of States” op. cit.
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relationships shaping communities of similarly constituted agents. Motivated through a
shared sense of purpose agents act so as to promote human well being and development.
On this account, ‘the international’ ‘the personal’ and the morality of natural law
combine to present an account of objective political interaction sustaining an ethic of
love. Agents, so construed, are capable of discerning the more intimate forms of
knowledge respecting the uniqueness of those less powerful within the community
working towards their well-being.
With this in mind, this chapter proffers a vision of love as a disposition and
motivation eliciting the image of the natural law agent alongside the moral community.
It articulates a sameness of self from which political obligation and responsible action
can emerge. This objective account of being political reverses the accepted primacy of
close personal relationships arising out of bounded communities. Instead, this account
of being political focuses on the generalities linking all individuals throughout the world.
Attracted to the basic ontology of being, a personal account of politics provides an ethic
of love in keeping with the original idea of ‘the international’ offered in the opening
chapter of this work. Noting that individuals are social entities, it provides, through a
relational ontology the means by which individuals understand their obligations to others.
It reveals a shared purpose; namely, to help other individuals become more truly human.
It is this unity of purpose reveals the required degree of influence necessary to generate
political change. Rooted in human action, itself the product of free and autonomous
beings, this objective account of being political challenges traditional ideas of power and
the political authority it sustains. Power, on this account, represents the influence of
agency in common. Sustained by a holistic account of knowledge, power, relates to love
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and equality articulating laws within the community uniting individuals offering an
outwardly oriented account of ethics in international affairs.
Conclusion
What this chapter has, above all else, sought to do is illustrate that the image of
the natural law agent represents an alternative epistemology highlighting reasonableness
as opposed to rationality. On this interpretation, the natural law agent, like feminist
discourse in general, challenges existing social structures working for a more inclusive
and caring political community. While the ends of the natural law agent distinguish him
or her self from the ends of feminist ethics, concerned as it is with a universal equality
and a relative methodology, feminist ethics offer an example of political agency
modifying pre-existing social boundaries. Challenging the rationality of public and
private spheres of politics, the ethics of care demonstrates the plausibility of
reasonableness in public engagements. In the same vein, Aristotelian interpretations of
civic friendship demonstrate the value of non-instrumental relations in the practice of
politics. These relationships presuppose moral agency revealing the plausibility of a
relational ontology.
Bearing the feminist example in mind, the emphasis on reasonableness shaping
the morality of natural law provides a necessary account of ontological equality. This
equality sustains the uniqueness of each and every political agent, articulating
simultaneously the requisite social structures entrenching a plurality of life plans. So
noted, this emphasis on the reasonableness of the individuals, provides the necessary
links required to understand the commonness that unites all human beings qua human
beings. Moreover, this reasonableness, informed by love relates to the overarching
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morality of natural law. Feminist scholars, and in particular natural law feminists,
routinely claim that the all-inclusive nature of natural law, on their re-interpretation is
holistic and therefore benefits not only women, but all members of the community.
Bearing this in mind, the interpretation of natural law offered herein, while benefiting
from a myriad of hermeneutical, analytical and traditional accounts of the natural law
tradition, is not a feminist account. That being said, the equality of being noted first in
the works of the Salamanca Theologians frames the discussion of a love ethic and in so
doing generates an account of being human, in common. Working together, this account
demonstrates how unified agency generates the required political influence in order to
achieve a more just political community. Consequently, the inroads made by feminist
scholars and their critique of contemporary social structures and boundaries, is instructive
of the potential capacities and capabilities of individuals as agents of justice in a
contemporary inter-connected age. Likewise, the inclusiveness of this natural law
interpretation ought to appeal to feminist discourses as an agenda seeking an inclusive
and just political order.
The value and need of the objective account of being political lies in its
articulation of an unbounded vision of political engagement. Focusing on the idea of
charity, itself the representation of love and friendship it articulates a conception that is
relational focusing on the natural equality of each and every person. Premised on
commutative justice, derived from the morality of natural law, this account is
transnational in nature. It simultaneously frames the conduct of personal and political
relations, near and far, building on the union of philia and agape relations. Transnational
justice, on this account, is unbounded in its scope. In light of the universal scope of
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human suffering demonstrated in the Introduction, the value of this account of ‘being
political’ lies in its inclusive yet relative nature. Couched in the morality of natural law
and the ends of ‘the good’, this relativity is framed in a moral taxonomy, respectful of the
natural equality of all agents. Bearing this in mind, it is a rigorous reasoning process
seeking the best possible course of action, context and knowledge permitting.
Transnational justice deliberations, on this account, avoid the challenge of solipsism and
carelessness oriented always towards the well-being of the agent in question, aware of his
or her innate moral and social ontology.
As a human experience that cannot be articulated, human suffering is unbounded.
Articulating an alternative to the bounded nature of contemporary political engagement
the natural law tradition offers a vision of political engagement resting on the equality of
being of each and every being. Recognizing the innate potential of all individuals as
reasoning being, this approach articulates an account of obligation resting on the
relationships of being. It is capable of working within and alongside the contemporary
account of international affairs proffering a dynamic and innovative approach to human
suffering resting on the capacity and capability of agents of justice. Yet the value of this
account lies in its demonstrable appeal. As agents continue to work within the
metaphysical space of ‘the international’ united in common interests they articulate
through their own actions, the benefits of moral and reasonable approaches to living. The
value of this account lies, in the first instance, in its articulation of the plight of those who
suffer. In the second instance however, its appeal lies in the fundamental ability of
agents, working in common to alter the trajectory of international affairs and its related
practices beyond high power politics.
Epilogue
The Politics of Potential
“One should bear in mind that there is nothing as difficult to handle, more dubious in
outcome, or more dangerous to organize, than the assumption of responsibility for the
introduction of a new form of government. For the person who introduces this new form
makes enemies of all those who benefited under the old form, and receives only lukewarm
support from all those who would benefit under the new. This half-hearted support is
partly due to their fear of their opponents, who have the laws on their side, and partly to
the incredulous nature of men. Men do not believe in new things wholeheartedly until
they see them firmly established through use.
Niccolo Machiavelli,
The Prince, and other political writings
By way of conclusion it is necessary to return to the idea of a relational ontology
flowing throughout this work and demonstrate its value vis a vis International Relations.
A relational ontology recalls both the social nature of the individual and an unbounded
account of the community. It reveals a lack attention to the human relationships which
constitute the practice of politics understood as the interplay of individual actions and
interactions. Politics are the natural outcome of a social being. The moral practice of
politics reflects the natural law assumption that as rational and reasonable beings,
sustained by the primary principles of knowledge, all individuals are capable of
developing a moral taxonomy reflecting the ability to do good and avoid evil in their
quotidian affairs. It is these assumptions which flow out of a natural law ethic and shape
the manner in which human suffering, beyond the cosmopolitan notions of human harm,
has been presented in this work. Suffering not only precludes the development of a moral
taxonomy reflecting the ends of well-being and development it also highlights the
inability of both the lover and beloved to develop into more fully moral beings.
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Suffering, on this account, is a passive and active experience and calls on individuals in
light of the ethic of love and order of charity to work so as to remedy this problem.
Natural law agency emphasizes the power of unified action. It is mindful of
Stephen Toulmin’s observation that political agency in the future will reflect not the
traditional power of states and their institutions, but instead, will focus on influence. “In
the third phase of Modernity, the name of the game will be influence and not force; and,
in playing on that field, the Lilliputans hold certain advantages.”1 With this in mind, this
work questioned the ability of the International Human Rights Regime to generate the
necessary political influence in order to adequately challenge the pervasive problem of
human suffering throughout the world. It identified the overarching challenge
sovereignty poses to the particular task of human development and sought to originate
this doctrine in the Peace Treaties of Westphalia. In this way sovereignty mirrors many
of the sought after ends of enlightenment philosophy articulating a rational account of
politics and a particular understanding of order reflected in the idea of international
constitutional governance. The boundaries of ‘inside and outside’ associated with this
account limit the role of justice to domestic politics and the primacy of agency in the state
and its representatives demonstrating the link with the continuing prevalence of suffering
throughout the world. This was particularly evident in the cosmopolitan notions of harm
which opened this work revealing that the structures of contemporary international
politics not only perpetuate gross inequalities throughout the world, they also limit the
ability of the individual to act as an agent of justice. The subjectivity of international
affairs was subsequently examined noting the limited nature of human interactions
highlighting the isolated existence of the modern individual.
1 Stephen Toulmin, “Cosmopolis” op. cit., 208.
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An examination of natural law, in its pre-modern conception was then elaborated
upon investigating the role of human non-instrumental relationships in order to
demonstrate an alternative mode of being political. Along the way this account
highlighted the particular idea of a relational ontology with which to conceptualize both
the individual and the community. These assumptions revealed an individual pre-
disposed to moral agency offering a particular structural arrangement catering to both the
moral and social development of individuals. Above all else, these accounts of the
individual and the community highlight the natural equality with which to understand the
capacities and capabilities of the individual thereby revealing the universal nature of
morality alongside the relative ordering of relationships articulating an objective account
of politics. This objectivity reveals ‘the personal’- a particular account of ‘being
political’ at odds with the boundaries of international sovereignty championing instead
human development and well-being. In so doing, it articulated the possibility of
institutional design pre-disposed to achieve the original ends of human rights premised on
the ability of the agent to cultivate relationships of interest through a variety of levels of
community.
With its emphasis on relations, one recalls at this point the importance of ‘the
international’ which revealed an account of order which is process oriented further
distinguishing itself from the ends of contemporary world order. The ordering of the
moral community, according to a natural law ethic, is simultaneously fluid and open-
ended. It is structured through an awareness of the ends of morality; namely, human
wellbeing and fulfillment guiding the moral taxonomy of the agent. As the agent loves,
that is to say, acts, he or she demonstrates through words and deed the virtue of charity in
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the wider institutional setting of international affairs reflecting the teleology of being first
evidenced in the ends of human happiness. This teleological orientation to politics does
not distinguish local, national or international politics but rather discusses the
transnational abilities of the agent in light of the variety of degrees of community in
which he or she participates. Like the virtuous warrior engaged in a just war, it is the
institutional channels of international politics which provides the agent with the
opportunity to further the ends of happiness demonstrating through his or her own
conduct the capacity of individuals, in common, to achieve a more just union. ‘The
international’ thus reveals its importance at this juncture. It reflects the widest degree of
human interaction very much aware of the coordinating role institutions and their pattern
offer to the agent in order to better understand the plight of the suffering other and
acquire the necessary information in order to challenge the particular problem in a
context-specific manner. It is the individual acting as an agent of justice who is, in the
first instance, capable of challenging the bounded nature of International Relations
calling into question the distinction of public and private, of inside and outside which
limits the possibility of genuine human action. In this way, the importance of a
transnational and interpersonal account of justice is further revealed as the drive towards
international constitutionalism, the rule of law at the international level, and the state as
the pre-eminent actor in international politics seeks to further entrench itself regardless of
its ability to adequately meet the needs of individuals throughout the world.
As the high phase of Modernity comes to a close, Stephen Toulmin queries the
manner in which individuals will chose to go forward, welcoming a third stage of
modernity, or in fact, accepting the status quo and all of its vices. “We may welcome a
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prospect that offers new possibilities, but demands novel ideas and more adaptive
institutions; and we may see this transition as a reason for hope, seeking only to be
clearer about the novel possibilities and demands involved in a world of practical
philosophy, multidisciplinary sciences and transnational or subnational institutions,” he
writes. “Or we may turn our backs on the promises of the new period, in trepidation,
hoping that the modes of life and thought typical of the age of stability and nationhood
may survive at least for our own lifetimes.”2 Agents, on this account, can choose either
to face the future, aware of the decline of the traditional nation state with a legitimacy
based on the use of force, or, on the other hand, back into the future with little social
forecasting and new ideas guiding the practice of politics. Predicting the demise of
physics as the master science, an emerging multiplicity of acceptable and respectable
modes of artistry and a co-operative international and transnational approach to dealing
with problems affecting the global commons, Stephen Toulmin presents an ecology of
institutions with which to face the future. “For the moment, the varied political relations
and interactions between transational, subnational and multinational entities, and the
function they can effectively serve, still remain to be analyzed, that has, as yet,” he
writes, “scarcely come into existence.”3 Offering its own take on the metaphor of
ecology, this particular work ponders the politics of potential as one means of
approaching the future of international affairs.
Distinguishing itself from Modernity’s ideal of human progress resting upon a
scientific and technical account of political engagement, the politics of potential offers
the possibility of hope, premised on the capacities and capabilities of the individual
2 Stephen Toulmin, “Cosmopolis” op. cit., 203.
3 Stephen Toulmin, “Cosmopolis” op. cit., 207.
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conceptualized as an agent of justice. Hope, on this account is intimately related to
synderesis and the first principles of reason key to the relationship of the intellect and
will. It indicates the capacity for individuals to do good, aware of the fallible nature of
human reason. Tempering human progress, hope is keenly aware of the wayward nature
of human deliberations and the equal capacity individuals possess to do evil. Ultimately,
this twofold capacity means that while individuals are capable of embracing the morality
of natural law, so to do they possess the choice to remain firmly embedded in the
understandings and assumptions shaping contemporary pragmatic societies.
Consequently, the politics of potential distinguishes itself from Realist and Liberal
interpretations of international order articulating a negative understanding of human
nature. In the same vein, it distinguishes itself from the cosmopolitan assumptions of
universal morality and human progress offering instead a relative approach to governance
incorporating both the positive and negative attributes of the agent. Aware of the crises
and conflicts associated with International Relations, and the example of the Rwandan
Genocide in particular, one begins to see the importance of relationships sustaining an
obligation of well-being in light of the natural equality of all individuals. Advocating an
institutional arrangement derived from the relationships that constitute the moral agent,
the moral taxonomy of natural law casuistry reflects the structures of justice within which
to frame the politics of potential.
The politics of potential reflects the ends of natural law morality and the ethics of
casuistry. It complements the process oriented approach to order and unbounded account
of the political community highlighting the value of agency couched in the possibility of
unified human purpose. The value of this particular account is revealed when one
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examines the events of the Rwandan genocide. The institutional failures surrounding this
incident were well documented in the opening pages of this work. They demonstrated
the lack of agency on the part of the United Nations as well as a variety of states and
militaries who failed to act or in their attempts to mitigate the conflict, were stymied
through the lack of institutional resources available at the time. Nowhere is this problem
better documented then in the autobiography of Leiutenant-General Romeo Dallaire.4
That the Rwandan genocide is a failure of humanity is unquestionable regardless of the
rational or reasonable interpretation one offers. The number of human deaths, the fear
and insecurity generated by the disregard for the Geneva Conventions, The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and the Charter of the United Nations continues to
challenge the cosmopolitan notion of human progress. Yet it is possible to examine this
particular event through the idea of the politics of potential bearing in mind the idea that
politics is an art. The politics of potential reveals an alternative vision of politics
articulating an alternative ordering of the state, its laws and institutional practices. An
account of this vision reveals the necessary assumptions and structures with which to
understand anew the ends of the Rwandan genocide paying particular attention to the role
of forgiveness, trust, and community building.
The politics of potential stands in stark contrast to the rationality associated with
modernity and enlightenment philosophy. It incorporates the positive laws which
structure the current political community, but envisions an altogether different purpose
for them. In this way it acknowledges the necessity of the state, but articulates an
alternative structure to that associated with negative liberty and sovereignty. Laws,
4 Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, (Toronto: Vintage
Canada, 2004).
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reflecting the order of charity, are the unifying structure of individual agency. As
Aquinas himself points out, “laws are nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the
common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated.”5 Laws
represent the norms of justice and similar to the practical knowledge sustaining the moral
deliberations of the agent reflect one’s particular level of human knowledge and
understanding. It is to recall the point made by Jean Porter that natural law, beyond its
requirements of individual reason, provides a normative order around which the
community can organize itself. Reflecting the moral taxonomy of the agent, laws within
the community are remain mutable and flexible, adapting to the newly emerging needs of
the individuals therein. Consequently, as the nature and level of agent based knowledge
increases, and the nature of morality develops in complexity, it is reasonable to expect a
change in the laws which govern the community. Laws, on this account, orient
individual and communal action towards the last ends of the agent, namely ‘the good’
and represent the normative requirements of morality. As Paul E. Sigmund notes, “by
defining law as an ordination of reason Aquinas is saying more than simply that it is
rational in character. As is clear from his explanation,” he points out, “he has in mind a
particular type of reason – reasoning that is teleological or goal-oriented.”6 The laws of
the community are linked to individual reason, and therefore the intellect and will
shaping the desires of the agent and the community that supports him or her. Reflected
in this institutional order is the teleology of being, noted in the natural law agent,
community, and above all the metaphysical space that is ‘the international’.
5 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica” op. cit., II-II, q. 90, a. 4.
6 Paul E. Sigmund, “Law and Politics” in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, eds. Norman Kretzmann
and Eleonore Stump, 222 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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The product of institutionalized relationships oriented around share interests, ‘the
international’ itself is the product of an unbounded account of political action. Building
on the teleology of natural law, individual interests coalesce around the ends of this
morality, aware that actions taken represent a commitment to that self-same morality of
being. This commitment, evident in the proliferation of charity, reveals the beginnings of
trust, developing out of the knowledge ascertained within those loving relations. The
politics of potential, distinguishes itself further from traditional accounts of political
action, articulating the possibility of trust reflected in the moral relations of agents.
Trust, as Annette Baier writes “is accepted vulnerability to another’s possible but not
expected ill will (or lack of good-will) toward one.”7 Elaborating on this idea of trust,
Nicholas Rengger writes that it, “should be understood as the exercise of discretionary
power by some agent (individual or artificial) on behalf of another over matters that the
trusting agent cares about.”8 Insecurity is the product of isolated selves, unaware of the
values and ideals motivating self-interested human action. ‘The international’
represented in the institutionalization of loving relationships, articulates shared values
reflecting the morality of natural law. On this account, the vulnerabilities of an isolated
existence are neatly side-stepped through the unity of being sustained within the
relationships constituting the moral agent. This distinction is important for the trust
emerging from the relationships of ‘the international’ enables the freedom and autonomy
necessary for individuals to act in a manner befitting the mutuality of being committed as
they are to the morality of natural law. Trust, related as it is to the unity of being, is
7 Annette C. Baier, Moral Prejudices, Essays on Ethics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1995), 99.
8 Nicholas Rengger, “The Ethics of Trust in World Politics” International Affairs 73, no. 3 (July 1997):
472.
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represented in the creative account of justice offered in Chapter Five articulating an
alternative notion of power, related to the equality of being united in love and justice.
Power, on this interpretation, is the unified influence of agents acting alongside one
another to achieve political change. The establishment of trust is the first stage of
incorporating a vision of natural law politics within the domain of international affairs. It
paves the way for a change in value orientations and provides the means to conceptualize
anew a variety of practices informing international affairs and the discourses of
International Relations.
A pre-eminent practice in International Relations, humanitarian intervention
represents the tensions of sovereignty and morality in contemporary international affairs.
It seeks to blend, albeit unsuccessfully the ends of universal morality alongside the
military capabilities of the state. “In the old days, ‘humanitarian intervention’ was a
lawyer’s doctrine; a way of justifying a very limited set of exceptions to the principles of
national sovereignty and territorial integrity,” writes Walzer. “It is a good doctrine,
because exceptions are always necessary, principles are never absolute. But we need to
rethink it today, as the exceptions become less and less exceptional.”9 As Fiona
Robinson notes, interventions are generally carried out by the military institutions of the
contemporary state.10 The mandate to intervene is obtained through the legalism of the
United Nations Charter and legitimated through the various organs of the institutions
itself, in particular the General Assembly and the Security Council; however, upon
inspection the legalism of the institution itself challenges the success of each intervention
seeking to employ universal standard operating procedures in lieu of a more nuanced and
9 Michael Walzer, “The Argument about Humanitarian Intervention” Dissent 49, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 29.
10 Fiona Robinson, op. cit.
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context specific approach.11 Despite the damming appraisal offered by Robinson it is
possible to reorient the ends of humanitarian intervention outside the ideal of sovereignty
and non-intervention. Like the orientation of the state within the politics of potential,
humanitarian intervention re-conceptualized provides one avenue with which to extend
the ends of natural law morality and commutative justice within ‘the international’. At
this point, the discourse of feminist ethics and feminist agency is once again instructive
demonstrating alternative conceptions of well-being and care in light of the practices of
international politics.
Building on her account of care, Fiona Robinson’s work is a valuable indicator of
alternative conceptions of humanitarian intervention. Articulating a relational
phenomenology sustaining a contextual and particular knowledge of the unique needs
and requirements of suffering individuals, humanitarian intervention, on her account,
need not be a military endeavor. Indeed, military engagements, constrained by the
certainty of standard operating procedures, remain limited in their ability to meet the
particular needs of a problem as diverse as human suffering; however, Robinson fails to
articulate what bodies ought to spearhead a caring interventionist approach.12 Sybil
Schwarzenbach offers on illustration of how this could be achieved. Developing her idea
of reproductive praxis, a feminist interpretation of reasonable action she offers a vision of
an international civil service premised on caring relations. Schwarzenbach’s account
challenges the boundaries of sovereignty and the traditional mandate of the state’s
military institutions and in so doing seeks to offer an account of justice and care
11 One need only investigate the problems associated with the US lead intervention into Somalia and the
ongoing problems occurring in Darfur to recognize the limitations of intervention as it is currently
practiced.
12 Fiona Robinson, op. cit.
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developing further the idea of civic friendship. “Above all else, such a service would
explicitly now stress the emotional and perceptual competence central to politike philia:
the capacity not only to perceive and to understand, but to respond with goodwill (both
abstractly and in concrete practice) to other persons who are very different from oneself,”
she writes. “And such training in philia could not help but affect a nation’s relations
outwards as well.”13 Noting how the military is an extension of high power politics and
the authority of the state its function, in light of an alternative caring trajectory is
rendered redundant. On this account the international civil service alongside the
casuistry of natural law offers and interesting alternative to the purpose of the state and
its institutions within the politics of potential.
Situated within ‘the international’, humanitarian intervention represents a mode of
engagement extending the ideal of charity beyond the state. Rooted in human agency, it
reveals the ability of agents to reason out their moral duties determining a course of
action respectful of the greater equality sustaining the politics of potential. Consequently,
humanitarian action, as a mode of agency, is well- suited to a casuistic method. Work in
this area has already begun. A noted casuist, Richard B. Miller combines the politics of
rescue articulated by Michael Walzer14 and the just war tradition to reach some insightful
and useful conclusions about the practice of humanitarian intervention.15 Highlighting
the problems associated with the responsibility of rescue, and the associated problems of
reasoning analogically vis a vis humanitarianism and just war, Miller’s aim, “is to
provide a principled basis for mixed motives in humanitarian intervention, paving a
13 Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach, “Civic Friendship: A Critique of Recent Care Theory” op. cit., 252.
14 Michael Walzer, “The Politics of Rescue” Dissent (Winter 1995): 35-41.
15 This article builds on a majority of the arguments he presents in his previous work, Richard B. Miller,
Interpretations of Conflict: Ethics, Pacifism, and the Just-War Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1991).
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middle way between the intuitions of admiration and suspicion in international affairs and
removing the apparent disanalogy between just wars and the politics of rescue.”16
Ultimately challenged by the fact that the just war tradition reasons casuistically about
the just use of force, a point noted by Nicholas Rengger in Chapter Two, this foray into
the nature of intervention whilst incorrectly framed it elicits some interesting conclusions.
Miller provides an example of how, when properly conceptualized outwith the
boundaries of sovereignty, casuistry is a valuable tool with which to evaluate the practice
of humanitarian intervention.
In contrast to the rescue/just war paradigm offered by Miller, Jean Bethke
Elsthain, offers an interesting examination of equal regard and justice which, when
related to the ethical use of force is indicative of a rhetoric of intervention related to the
politics of potential. “I will argue that the just war tradition helps to secure a citizenship
model for international justice-this by contrast to the model of victim/victimizer that
underlies the humanitarian intervention model, one that invites the use of force as a form
of rescue, even welfare,” she writes, “as opposed to the use of force as a way to
strengthen or to secure a political community within which accountable officials are
responsible for securing civic security, order and minimal decency.”17 Correlating equal
regard with human dignity, Elsthain highlights the central role of language underpinning
the use of force ensuring treatment in accord with the assumption of human dignity
further securing the well-being of domestic citizens. On one level this account of the use
of force to restore a just order is similar to notions of well-being and community
articulated throughout this work and for this reason, renders a vision of natural law
16 Richard B. Miller, “Humanitarian Intervention, Altruism, and the Limits of Casuistry” The Journal of
Religions Ethics 28, no. 1(2000): 10.
17 Jean Bethke Elshtain “International Justice as Equal Regard and the Use of Force” op. cit., 66.
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intervention plausible. On the other hand, Elshtain remains firmly centered on a notion
of justice which is subjective in its orientation.
The casuistry of humanitarian intervention, related to the ends of natural law
interweaves the creative justice of agape and philia within a relational setting. In the first
instance, the loving disposition of the agent requires that he or she listen to the unique
needs of others. In this way the uniqueness each and every agent is respected.
Furthermore, this information facilitates the development of a context specific action plan
meeting the needs of the particular individual. This account of intervention is a two
phased endeavor. It is primarily agent centric in that it requires one individual to identify
the needs of another furthermore endeavoring to understand the requirements of those
needs. In the second instance and intervention requires the agent to work within the
institutional relationships generating the necessary influence to achieve unified action.
On its own, individual action appears limited, unable to generate the necessary
momentum. Yet, when situated in the civil service of care, articulated by
Schwarzenbach, it provides the necessary institutional structures representing the ends of
the natural law common good. As was shown in Chapter Five, the order of charity is pre-
eminently a personal order. Yet, when situated within the broader institutionalization of
philia relations, it extends outwards into the broader remit of international affairs.
Recalling at this point the point made by Stephen J. Pope that Aquinas’s order of charity
is primarily a reflection of the prudent agent; however, the lack of further
institutionalization of charity by Aquinas does not limit the just institutional
arrangements of society; rather, the actions of the agent working within institutional
structures is, according to Aquinas, the most efficient manner to proliferate justice into
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the wider community. Building on the relational account of being, and the natural
equality sustaining the virtuous agent, the institutionalization of relationships represents a
further development in the morality of natural law in keeping with the original order of
charity as presented originally by Aquinas.
This representation of intervention reflects the ability of human agency to affect
institutional development. It works within the casuistry of natural law offering a moral
taxonomy outside that of the just war tradition, simultaneously offering an account of
justice that respects the natural equality of being. On this account, it builds on the
shortcomings of Morris and Elshtain reflecting the unity of being articulated in the
common good of the natural law community. It respects local custom and knowledge
catering to the personal development of the suffering agent. Similar to Toulmin’s
ecology of institutions, humanitarian intervention represents a shifting focus of the
modern states modus operandi. “From now on, the overriding concern of administrators
and politicians can no longer be to enhance the scope, power, and glory of those
centralized national institutions,” he writes. “Rather, we need to disperse authority and
adapt it more discerningly and precisely: on the one hand, to the needs of local areas and
communities, and on the other, to wider transnational functions.”18 Humanitarian
intervention, conceptualized within the politics of potential represents both the domestic
and transnational themes identified by Toulmin. It demonstrates a respect for the
plurality of life forms constituting ‘the international’ simultaneously revealing a just
institutional structure therein. On this account, humanitarian intervention reflects the
ends of the order of charity, namely a loving justice which respects and perfects the
18 Stephen Toulmin, “Cosmopolis” op. cit., 206.
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uniqueness of individuals, outside the contemporary ideals of sovereignty and non-
intervention.
In light of the emphasis on commutative justice, the traditional modes of
punishment and its association with retributive forms of justice within international
affairs remains at odds with this relational account of being political. In light of the
alternative ends of the state, and the practice of humanitarian intervention, reflections
upon the traditional legalism guiding international justice must be reviewed. In the face
of gross human tragedy, temporary criminal tribunals as evidenced in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda are created so as to hold individuals engaged in crimes against
humanity accountable. “The principle judicial purpose of these international trials has
been to challenge impunity by identifying who was responsible for acts of atrocity-
crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes – and to prosecute them. This has
involved both individualizing responsibility for acts of atrocity and, at the same time,”
writes Michael Humphrey, “revealing the political and organized character of the crimes
committed. These international legal interventions then are designed not only to make
perpetrators accountable but also to promote peace by restoring the authority of law,
justice, and individual rights after mass atrocity.”19 Following on from these temporary
bodies, the International Criminal Court, a permanent institutions, has developed in order
to pursue ‘international criminals’ with a higher degree of authority and legitimacy;
however, the ends of such institutions curbing the behavior contributing to human
suffering is debatable. “Achieving effective prevention against an entrenched culture of
impunity, and fostering inhibitions against widespread rape, pillage, and murder in a
19 Michael Humphrey, “International intervention, justice and national reconciliation: the role of the ICTY
and ICTR in Bosnia and Rwanda” Journal of Human Rights 2, no. 4 (2003): 496.
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context of habitual violence, cannot be realized through the efforts of a few ad hoc
tribunals and national trials here and there,” writes Payam Akhavan.20 It is a point further
commented on by David Wippman. “Uncertainties about deterrence should not detract
from the many other reasons noted earlier for supporting the prosecution of those who
violate international humanitarian law. But such uncertainties, he writes, “should make
us wary of exaggerated claims concerning the benefits of such prosecutions.”21 Building
on the proportional representation of justice, this account of international judicial politics
builds on the isolation of contemporary political structures further isolating the individual
within society. Heeding neither the well-being of the victim nor the aggressor this
account of justice furthers the immorality of its political structures contributing to the
detrimental existence of individuals as subjects.
An institutional framework structured around the ideal of charity, and building on
the unity of creative justice, seeks in the first instance unity. Unity, alongside human
development, can not occur in isolation. Consequently, the ends of any political conflict
must have as their end goal reunion. There does not exist a form of punishment within
the commutative structures of justice, rather, it builds on the ability of the agent to listen
and assimilate knowledge ultimately moving towards the final component of a
commutative justice; namely, forgiveness. Forgiveness, on this account, is related to the
unity of being, of persons in relations overcoming their isolated existence and seeking, in
communion with one another a higher level of being. “The third and most paradoxical
form in which justice is united with love is forgiving,” writes Tillich. “Nothing seems to
20 Payam Akhavan, “Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?” The
American Journal of International Law 95, no. 1 (January 2001): 31.
21 David Wippman, “Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice” Fordham International
Law Journal 23 (1999): 488.
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contradict more the idea of justice than this doctrine, and everybody who has pronounced
it has been accused of promoting injustice and amorality, he further notes. “Without
reconciliation there is no reunion. Forgiving love is the only way of fulfilling the
intrinsic claim in every being, namely its claim to be reaccepted into the unity to which it
belongs. Creative justice demands that this claim be accepted and that he be accepted
who is unacceptable in terms of proportional justice.”22 A discourse of forgiveness is
proactive in the rebuilding stages of institutional design reconstituting the relationship of
the agent and victim through an innate recognition of the sameness of self providing the
first steps with which to cultivate a seedbed of trust.
Returning to the aforementioned relationships of equality love and justice, is to
note the following: the reconstruction of personal relationships can begin only when an
adequate understanding of the past violence is achieved and the victim can accept the
aggressor back into society. Conversely, this acceptance must be accompanied by a
change in values within the aggressor as well. Forgiveness, like humanitarian
intervention already investigated, is in the first instance centered on the loving abilities of
the agent. It represents another interpretation of the virtuous warrior first articulated by
Aquinas. Yet unlike intervention which focuses on the institutionalization of philia
relations, forgiveness focuses on agape relations. It highlights the necessity of
steadfastness in the face of unreciprocated love, or loving in the complete absence of
virtue. Forgiveness takes time, and, like the teleology of ‘the good’ itself, may not be
achievable in the lifetime of one political agent. Consequently, the complete integration
of victim and aggressor into one community represents the progressive movement
22 Paul Tillich, op. cit.,
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towards the unity of the separated; however, in so doing it paves the way for the more
complete development of future generations, reaping the benefits of an ongoing and
developmental approach to morality and justice. Bearing this in mind, forgiveness and
intervention, understand as two parts of a greater process represent two poles within the
institutionalization of relationship each of which respect the fundamental equality and
freedom of the moral agent offering the possibility of furthering the development of both
the self and the other as required by the ends of natural law morality.
The necessary intervention needed to quell the violence in Rwanda did not occur.
Consequently, a casuistic natural law appraisal at this point in time must focus on the role
of forgiveness and question what steps have been taken to ensure that both the victims
and perpetrators are safe in their chosen community and can begin to develop the
necessary personal relationships for the development of the self and the other. These
processes reveal how the community can become one in which mutual-self revelation
sustains the ends of well-being and development. Once again, the art of politics is
instructive. It extends the capacities for moral agency beyond the strict limitations of
public politics and demonstrates, contrary to the ends of a pragmatic and subjective
society how human practices and interests can utilize human non-instrumental
relationships in the practice of politics and in so doing endorse a personal account of
being political. The art of politics reflects the observations of Adorno and Horkheimer
challenging the logically positive mentality of modernity and recalls the unified
relationship of reason and rationality. “For the enlightenment, whatever does not
conform to the rule of computation and utility is suspect. So long as it can develop
undisturbed by any outward repression, there is no holding it,” they write. “To the
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Enlightenment, that which does not reduce to numbers, and ultimately to the one,
becomes illusion; modern positivism writes it off as literature.”23 Following on from this
point the fictional literature surrounding the Rwandan Genocide are particular insightful.
In A Sunday at the pool in Kigali Gil Courtemanche personalizes the events of the
genocide depicting a love story between two characters, Gentille and Valcourt.24 Gentille
a native of Rwanda and Valcourt, a Canadian in Rwanda embark on a love affair during
the genocide and this relationship is used to highlight the atrocity, ignorance and apathy
of the world community. Yet, the manner in which this story portrays the genocide
reveals the ability of fiction to pave the way for instances of forgiveness and trust. It
demonstrates the inter-racial relationships which pre-date the genocide and continued to
exist throughout the atrocities. In so doing it demonstrates how fiction reveals the ability
of unified personal relationships needed for safe post-conflict community building.
In a similar fashion, one can examine the lives of particular agents in order to see
how their lives have been affected by the tragedy on a personal level noting what
institutional channels they are developing in order to spread knowledge and
understanding sustaining reunion. In the first instance, one can look to the academic
literature investigating the Rwandan Genocide. A diverse series of writings examine the
events and questions the failure of the international community to act as obliged agents
offering alternative modes of agency in the future. Philip Gourevitch provides a
particularly graphic description of the mixed loyalties emerging from familial relations in
his work We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: stories
23 Theodor W. Adorno & Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (London: Blackwell Verso, 1997),
7.
24 Gil Courtemanche, A Sunday at the pool in Kigali (Edinburgh: Canongate Books Ltd, 2004).
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from Rwanda25 noting how close communities were torn apart through the demarcation of
racial lines. In so doing he questions the validity of territorial borders and recalls the
challenge faced by African nations to achieve a positive level of sovereignty. In the same
vein, Scott Peterson wrote his work Me against my brother: at war in Somalia, Sudan,
and Rwanda: a journalist reports from the battle fields of Africa.26 This work
demonstrates the ability of one individual to proliferate information beyond the small
closed community and in so doing engages with the wider levels of interest communities.
While his efforts were challenged, they demonstrate the potential capacity of one
individual striving for goodness in the midst of injustice and immorality.
Finally, one can look at the wider role which civil society, comprised of NGOs,
IGOs and a variety of institutions can work together in order to critically examine the
failings of one event and generate the necessary information to challenge its occurrence
in the future. For recall, casuistry is rarely about hard cases per se, but reflects the
quotidian affairs of agents in the community thus it looks to understand events in light of
the overarching ends its agents seek. Genocidal events question the capacity of this
method to effectively quell large scale suffering and trauma, but provide one avenue for
individuals who wish to make a difference and criticize the structures which perpetuate
the problem on a global scale. In this way, the works of Romeo Dallaire are again
instructive. Beyond his own autobiography and his participation as a consultant in the
movie Hotel Rwanda he is engaged with the Montreal Genocide Institute itself associated
with Concordia University. These two institutions reflect how the interests of one agent
intersect creating wider relationships of interests in order to affect political and moral
25 Gourevitch, op. cit..
26 Peterson, op. cit..
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change. Romeo Dallaire reflects well the virtuous warrior acting out the art of politics.
As a single agent he interweaves positive and creative relationships bridging the gap of
legal and reasonable agency in order to further develop knowledge and awareness of the
tragic events of Rwanda. In this way he demonstrates the value of the politics of
potential.
The Rwandan genocide reflects the ultimate failure of a pragmatic politics and
morality. Its laws and territorial boundaries sought to isolate individuals from one
another, both in an historical and contemporary sense and in so doing, denied the
development of knowledge of the self and other contributing to ill-informed decision
making procedures on the part of individuals and institutions alike. In this sense an
historical examination of the genocide reveals a decided lack of trust and a commitment
to the morality of well-being and development. Yet the ongoing work of individuals
within the community is indicated of the necessary forgiveness and healing which is
occurring outside the formal boundaries of International Relations. The agent lead
initiatives complement the formal juridical process of the International Criminal Tribunal
of Rwanda (ICTR) demonstrating the existence of ‘artful politics’ alongside the logical
positive approach associated with pragmatic morality which seeks in its own particular
way to generate knowledge in order to create moral communities. The potential benefits
of this work reveal the possibility of individuals living side by each respecting the unique
differences of particular agents aware of the natural equality which links all individuals
together as beings in politics. This proactive approach represents the ends of the politics
of potential and goes some way to healing the suffering associated with the Rwandan
genocide recalling the capacity of agents to do both good and evil.
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The politics of potential, like the ideal of human happiness represents an ideal
type. It is not out of the realms of possibility that such a complete community can be
achieved, but its achievement is a long and arduous process. Recalling the skepticism
originally faced by feminist scholars, advocating agency to achieve a more open and
inclusive society, one is mindful of the capacity for otherwise relegated ideas to affect
political and social change in light of the achievements of feminists agents to date. For
this reason the discussions throughout this work represents the hope of the capacity and
capability of individuals, as agents of justice, to achieve greater things; however, it is a
hope which, unlike the enlightenment ideals of progress, is very much aware of the
fallible nature of human reasoning. Bearing all of this in mind, this particular thought
process and foray into the institutional design of international affairs represents, above all
else, a critique of the subjective account of international engagements sustaining the
isolated and self-sufficient rights bearing subject. The ideal of sovereignty, and its
associated order, represent one particular reading of international affairs mitigating the
abuse of power simultaneously protecting the right of each and every state to co-exist in a
cooperative manner at the international level. Yet the boundaries it sustains and the
practices it endorses contribute to the ongoing suffering of individuals. The appeal of the
natural law account of agency and agents and the objective account of being political it
sustains lies in its ability to check the ends of this particular arrangement mindful of the
original ends they sought to achieve. In light of the continuing political atrocities such as
the Rwandan genocide, the function and utility of human rights and humanitarian law
within contemporary international affairs requires an immediate re-appraisal.
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This account of politics does not culminate in one over-arching ordering principle.
In so doing it further distinguishes itself from contemporary accounts of political order.
Instead, it emphasizes the capacities and capabilities of the individual as an agent of
justice. Justice in this instance reflects the natural equality of being similarly evident in
its account of morality which is powerful in light of the ideas of community and politics
understood as degrees of human relationships. The degrees of human relationships are
similar tempered by a personal ethic of love and the wider institutionalization of charity
which seek at the end of the day to demonstrate the very basic similarities which
characterize what it is to be human. It is this very basic understanding motivating agency
challenging the immorality of human suffering and seeking to provide relief to those who
bear its burdens. Ultimately this account is but a brief appraisal of the need for
alternative accounts of International Relations challenging accepted modes of practice in
light of injustice and immorality therein. As the investigations of human harm reveal the
ultimate ends of human rights are not being met. It is thus necessary to determine why
this is and seek to rectify this particular problem. Natural law not only provides an
interest series of assumptions to pose these questions, it also highlights an account of the
good life articulating the pre-eminent value of being human, in common with which to
order anew international affairs.
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